accesscontrolv1

type CheckAccessRequest struct {
	XXX_raceDetectHookData protoimpl.RaceDetectHookData
	XXX_presence           [1]uint32
	// contains filtered or unexported fields
}

type CheckAccessRequest_builder struct {

	// What the caller is trying to resolve — mirrors the resolver pattern.
	Pattern *string
	// Identity/context of the process making the request.
	Requester *Requester
	// contains filtered or unexported fields
}

type CheckAccessResponse struct {
	XXX_raceDetectHookData protoimpl.RaceDetectHookData
	XXX_presence           [1]uint32
	// contains filtered or unexported fields
}

type CheckAccessResponse_builder struct {
	Decision *Decision
	// contains filtered or unexported fields
}

type DarwinSigningInfo struct {
	XXX_raceDetectHookData protoimpl.RaceDetectHookData
	XXX_presence           [1]uint32
	// contains filtered or unexported fields
}

type DarwinSigningInfo_builder struct {

	// Apple-assigned Team Identifier (kSecCodeInfoTeamIdentifier). Apple
	// guarantees uniqueness per developer account, so this is a reliable
	// trust key.
	TeamId *string
	// Code-signing identifier (kSecCodeInfoIdentifier), typically the bundle
	// ID, e.g. "com.docker.docker". Use to pin a specific application within
	// a team.
	Identifier *string
	// Company name from the leaf certificate subject.O, e.g. "Docker Inc".
	// Human-readable but NOT guaranteed unique or immutable — display/logging
	// only, never a sole trust key.
	Organization *string
	// Leaf certificate subject.CN, e.g.
	// "Developer ID Application: Docker Inc (9BNSXJN65R)". Contains the company
	// name and team ID as embedded display text.
	CommonName *string
	// Code directory hash (kSecCodeInfoUnique), the exact identity of this
	// specific binary build, hex-encoded. Use to pin an exact build.
	CdHash *string
	// Dynamic code-signing status word (kSecCodeInfoStatus) — the kernel's live
	// view of the signature. Raw uint32 bitmask; values are fixed by Apple's
	// <Security/SecCode.h> and preserved verbatim (unknown bits included).
	// Known flags:
	//
	//	0x0000_0001 VALID    — dynamically valid; cleared on runtime tamper.
	//	0x0000_0100 HARD     — kernel refuses to page in invalid pages.
	//	0x0000_0200 KILL     — process killed if it becomes invalid.
	//	0x1000_0000 DEBUGGED — debugger attached; red flag for a secrets peer.
	Status *uint32
	// contains filtered or unexported fields
}

type Decision int32

type LinuxSigningInfo struct {
	// contains filtered or unexported fields
}

type LinuxSigningInfo_Signer struct {
	XXX_raceDetectHookData protoimpl.RaceDetectHookData
	XXX_presence           [1]uint32
	// contains filtered or unexported fields
}

type LinuxSigningInfo_Signer_builder struct {

	// OIDC issuer embedded in the Fulcio leaf certificate, e.g.
	// "https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com".
	CertIssuer *string
	// Certificate SAN — the signer's workflow identity, e.g.
	// ".../sign-release.yml@refs/tags/v0.7.1".
	CertIdentity *string
	// Source repository URI from the Fulcio GitHub extension, e.g.
	// "https://github.com/docker/secrets-engine".
	SourceRepo *string
	// Git ref that was built, e.g. "refs/tags/v0.7.1". Ties the binary to a
	// release tag.
	SourceRef *string
	// Source commit SHA the binary was built from (Fulcio source-repository
	// digest extension).
	SourceCommit *string
	// "github-hosted" or "self-hosted" (Fulcio extension) — a self-hosted
	// runner minting a release signature would be a red flag.
	RunnerEnvironment *string
	// Event that started the signing workflow, e.g. "release" (Fulcio
	// extension).
	BuildTrigger *string
	// Points at the specific GitHub Actions run that produced the signature
	// (Fulcio extension) — for audit/log correlation.
	RunInvocationUri *string
	// Entry's index in the Rekor transparency log.
	RekorLogIndex *int64
	// When the signature was recorded in Rekor.
	IntegratedTime *timestamppb.Timestamp
	// contains filtered or unexported fields
}

type LinuxSigningInfo_builder struct {
	Signers []*LinuxSigningInfo_Signer
	// contains filtered or unexported fields
}

type Requester struct {
	XXX_raceDetectHookData protoimpl.RaceDetectHookData
	XXX_presence           [1]uint32
	// contains filtered or unexported fields
}

type Requester_builder struct {

	// OS process ID of the caller.
	Pid *int32
	// Process name.
	Name *string
	// Absolute path to the caller's binary on disk.
	AbsoluteBinaryPath *string
	// True if the binary's signature chains to Docker's signing identity.
	SignedByDocker *bool

	// Fields of oneof xxx_hidden_SigningInfo:
	Darwin  *DarwinSigningInfo
	Windows *WindowsSigningInfo
	Linux   *LinuxSigningInfo
	// contains filtered or unexported fields
}

type WindowsSigningInfo struct {
	XXX_raceDetectHookData protoimpl.RaceDetectHookData
	XXX_presence           [1]uint32
	// contains filtered or unexported fields
}

type WindowsSigningInfo_IntegrityLevel int32

type WindowsSigningInfo_builder struct {

	// Whether WinVerifyTrust confirmed the Authenticode signature chains to a
	// trusted root and is not revoked. The remaining signature fields are only
	// meaningful when true.
	TrustedChain *bool
	// Signing certificate Subject Organization (O), e.g. "Docker Inc".
	SubjectOrg *string
	// Signing certificate Subject Common Name (CN).
	SubjectCommonName *string
	// Common Name of the issuing CA, e.g. the DigiCert / Sectigo code-signing
	// intermediate.
	Issuer *string
	// Hex-encoded SHA-256 hash of the leaf signing certificate. Strongest
	// identity pin, but brittle across cert rotation.
	ThumbprintSha256 *string
	// Whether the signature uses an Extended Validation code-signing certificate
	// (hardware-backed key, stricter vetting), detected from the leaf
	// certificate's CA/Browser Forum EV policy OID.
	IsEv *bool
	// Peer process's mandatory integrity level from its access token. Collected
	// for logging/diagnostics only; trust is gated on the signature, not
	// integrity (the engine itself runs at Medium as a per-user service).
	Integrity *WindowsSigningInfo_IntegrityLevel
	// --- Corroborating only (PE version resource; NOT trustworthy) ---
	//
	// From the PE VERSIONINFO resource: unsigned and attacker-controllable, so
	// display/logging only — must never gate trust.
	CompanyName *string
	ProductName *string
	FileVersion *string
	// contains filtered or unexported fields
}