Documentation
¶
Overview ¶
Package authz is the authorization chokepoint (permission + tenant-isolation ADRs): authorize(principal, capability-formula, scope) evaluated in-transaction against current policy with no cache, returning a proof-carrying value the store accepts calls only with. This package, the resolution surface (internal/store/authn), the transaction package, and the store's query registry form the enumerated trusted set — changes here are the highest-scrutiny diffs in the repo.
Index ¶
- Constants
- Variables
- func AdequateAssurance(a Assurance) bool
- func AssuranceRank(a Assurance) int
- func BoundKey(p Proof) (domain.RuleKey, bool)
- func ContractArtifactClass(caller Identity) string
- func FormulaDemandsMFA(op Operation) bool
- func IncludesSelfConfig(p Proof) bool
- func IsSelfConfig(p Proof) bool
- func IsSystemProof(p Proof) bool
- func NavigationEnvironmentAllowed(p Proof, id domain.EnvID) bool
- func NavigationProjectAllowed(p Proof, id domain.ProjectID) bool
- func PublishKeyAllowed(p Proof, id string) bool
- func TrackCallerActivity(ctx context.Context) context.Context
- func Verify(p Proof, op StoreOp, tok *TxToken) (domain.Scope, error)
- func VerifyEvent(p Proof, op StoreOp, tok *TxToken, et audit.EventType) (domain.Scope, error)
- func VerifyOwner(p Proof, op StoreOp, tok *TxToken) (domain.Scope, domain.PrincipalID, error)
- func VerifySelfConfigSnapshot(p Proof, snapshotID string) error
- func WithDeveloperDelivery(ctx context.Context) context.Context
- type AccessGrant
- type Account
- type AccountProfile
- type AffectedCredential
- type Assurance
- type Atom
- type AuditMapping
- type Binding
- type BindingPredicate
- type CLILogin
- type CLIReauthHandoff
- type Cache
- type CallerActivity
- type Class
- type CredentialAuthority
- type CredentialEstablishEvidence
- type CredentialPolicy
- type DeleteServiceAccountAggregateInput
- type Denial
- type DeveloperCredential
- type EmailInvitation
- type EmailInvitationListing
- type EnvSetting
- type EnvironmentChain
- type ExpiredRegistrationSignup
- type ExternalIdentity
- type FederationIssuer
- type Formula
- type FormulaPin
- type GrantLine
- type GrantOriginRow
- type GrantRow
- type HandoffPurpose
- type Identity
- type InstanceConnection
- type KDFParams
- type KeyTarget
- type LockoutRetention
- type LoginChallenge
- type MachineCredential
- type NetworkOperationPolicy
- type NewCLIReauthHandoff
- type NewCredential
- type NewCredentialAuthority
- type NewExternalIdentity
- type NewFederationIssuer
- type NewInstanceConnection
- type NewLoginChallenge
- type NewOAuth2Provider
- type NewOAuth2Transaction
- type NewOIDCTransaction
- type NewProvider
- type NewReauthWindow
- type NewRegistrationSignup
- type NewSAMLProvider
- type NewSAMLReplay
- type NewSAMLSPKey
- type NewSAMLTransaction
- type NewServiceAccount
- type NewSession
- type NewTOTPCredential
- type NewWebAuthnCeremony
- type NewWebAuthnCredential
- type NewWorkspaceHandoff
- type OAuth2Provider
- type OAuth2ProviderUpdate
- type OAuth2Transaction
- type OIDCProvider
- type OIDCTransaction
- type Operation
- type OrgIdentity
- type OrgImage
- type Origin
- type PasswordCredential
- type PrincipalRef
- type PrivacyAccountView
- type PrivacyActivity
- type PrivacySession
- type Proof
- type ProviderUpdate
- type Reachable
- type ReauthWindow
- type RecoveryBatch
- type RegistrationEntry
- type RegistrationPolicy
- type RegistrationSignup
- type RegistrationSignupRef
- type Registry
- type RegistryFacts
- func (RegistryFacts) AuditMappings() map[Operation]AuditMapping
- func (RegistryFacts) Caches() map[string]Cache
- func (RegistryFacts) FormulaPins() []FormulaPin
- func (RegistryFacts) Formulas() map[Operation]Formula
- func (RegistryFacts) Operations() map[Operation]Class
- func (RegistryFacts) StoreOps() map[StoreOp][]Operation
- func (RegistryFacts) SystemSiteEvents() map[SystemSite][]audit.EventType
- func (RegistryFacts) SystemSites() map[SystemSite][]StoreOp
- func (RegistryFacts) TenantOperations() map[Operation]domain.Level
- func (RegistryFacts) Wire() map[string]Class
- func (RegistryFacts) WireEvents() map[string][]audit.EventType
- func (RegistryFacts) WireRoutes() map[string][]Operation
- type RemotePairedConnection
- type RemotePairingExchange
- type RemotePairingInvite
- type RestoreState
- type RuleLine
- type SAMLProvider
- type SAMLProviderUpdate
- type SAMLSPKey
- type SAMLTransaction
- type SCIMCredential
- type ServiceAccount
- type ServiceAccountCreation
- type ServiceAccountDeletion
- type SessionSummary
- type StoreOp
- type StoredRule
- type StoredRuleItem
- type SystemSite
- type TOTPCredential
- type TxAuthorizer
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) AccountByEmail(ctx context.Context, email string) (Account, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) AccountByID(ctx context.Context, id string) (Account, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) AccountByPrincipal(ctx context.Context, p domain.PrincipalID) (Account, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) AccountByUsername(ctx context.Context, username string) (Account, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) AccountByWebAuthnUserHandle(ctx context.Context, handle []byte) (Account, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) AccountCount(ctx context.Context) (int64, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) AccountProfile(ctx context.Context, accountID string) (AccountProfile, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) ActiveSAMLSPKey(ctx context.Context) (SAMLSPKey, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) AddGrantOrigin(ctx context.Context, id, grantID string, p domain.PrincipalID, o Origin, ...) error
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) AdmitOperation(ctx context.Context, caller Identity) error
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) AdvanceGeneration(ctx context.Context, p domain.PrincipalID) error
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) AdvanceRestoreEpoch(ctx context.Context, now time.Time) error
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) AdvanceTOTPStep(ctx context.Context, id string, rowVersion, step int64) (bool, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) AdvanceWebAuthnSignCount(ctx context.Context, id string, rowVersion, count int64, at time.Time) (bool, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) AllowWorkspaceOrigin(ctx context.Context, o authn.WorkspaceOrigin) error
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) ApproveCLILogin(ctx context.Context, id, session, snapshot string, code []byte) (bool, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) ApproveCLIReauthHandoff(ctx context.Context, id string, codeVerifier, windows []byte) (bool, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) ApproveWorkspaceHandoff(ctx context.Context, id string, codeVerifier []byte, p domain.PrincipalID, ...) (bool, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) AssertActiveInstanceDEKVersion(ctx context.Context, version int64) error
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) AttributeDenials(obj audit.Object)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) Authenticate(ctx context.Context, presented string, now time.Time) (Identity, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) AuthenticateCaller(ctx context.Context, presented string, now time.Time) (Identity, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) AuthenticateFederated(ctx context.Context, issuerID, subject string, check BindingPredicate, ...) (Identity, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) AuthenticatePairedConnection(ctx context.Context, token, proof string, now time.Time) (Identity, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) AuthenticateSCIMCaller(ctx context.Context, presented string, now time.Time) (Identity, string, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) AuthenticateSelfSurface(ctx context.Context, presented string, now time.Time) (Identity, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) AuthenticateSessionByID(ctx context.Context, id string, now time.Time) (Identity, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) AuthorityByValue(ctx context.Context, verifier []byte) (CredentialAuthority, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) Authorize(ctx context.Context, caller Identity, op Operation, scope domain.Scope) (Proof, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) AuthorizeDEKRotation(ctx context.Context, caller Identity, scope domain.Scope) (Proof, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) AuthorizeKey(ctx context.Context, caller Identity, op Operation, scope domain.Scope, ...) (Proof, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) AuthorizePublishKeys(ctx context.Context, caller Identity, scope domain.Scope, ids []string) (Proof, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) AuthorizeRule(ctx context.Context, caller Identity, op Operation, scope domain.Scope, ...) (Proof, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) AuthorizeRuleList(ctx context.Context, caller Identity, scope domain.Scope) (Proof, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) BindRemotePairedConnection(ctx context.Context, c RemotePairedConnection) error
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) BindSessionToOAuth2Provider(ctx context.Context, sessionID, providerID string) (bool, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) BindSessionToSAMLProvider(ctx context.Context, sessionID, providerID string) (bool, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) BindingsForIssuer(ctx context.Context, id string) (int64, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) CLILoginByCode(ctx context.Context, verifier []byte) (CLILogin, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) CLILoginByState(ctx context.Context, verifier []byte) (CLILogin, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) CLILoginByUserCode(ctx context.Context, verifier []byte) (CLILogin, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) CLIReauthHandoffByCode(ctx context.Context, verifier []byte) (CLIReauthHandoff, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) CLIReauthHandoffByState(ctx context.Context, verifier []byte) (CLIReauthHandoff, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) CallerCanDefineKeys(ctx context.Context, caller Identity, scope domain.Scope) (creatable, editable bool, err error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) CallerHolds(ctx context.Context, caller Identity, op Operation, scope domain.Scope) (bool, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) CallerHoldsApprovalKeys(ctx context.Context, caller Identity, scope domain.Scope, ids []string) (bool, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) CallerMayListEnvironment(ctx context.Context, caller Identity, scope domain.Scope, env domain.EnvID) (bool, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) CaptureAudit(trail audit.Trail, scope domain.Scope, e audit.Event)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) ClaimFederatedAuthority(ctx context.Context, id, kind string, at time.Time) (bool, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) ClaimRemotePairingAttempt(ctx context.Context, id string, now time.Time) (bool, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) ClaimRemotePairingReplay(ctx context.Context, thumbprint string, v []byte, expires time.Time) (bool, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) ClaimSAMLReplay(ctx context.Context, replay NewSAMLReplay) (bool, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) ClampCredentialExpiry(ctx context.Context, ceiling time.Time) (int64, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) ClampDeveloperCredentialExpiry(ctx context.Context, id string, at time.Time) error
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) ClampIndefiniteCredentials(ctx context.Context, ceiling time.Time) (int64, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) ClearPendingTOTP(ctx context.Context, accountID string) error
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) CommittedRefusalReceipt(ctx context.Context)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) ConfirmTOTP(ctx context.Context, id string, rowVersion, step int64, at time.Time) (bool, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) ConfirmedTOTP(ctx context.Context, accountID string) (TOTPCredential, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) ConsumeAuthority(ctx context.Context, id string, at time.Time) (bool, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) ConsumeCLILogin(ctx context.Context, id string, at time.Time) (bool, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) ConsumeCLIReauthHandoff(ctx context.Context, id string, at time.Time) (bool, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) ConsumeLoginChallenge(ctx context.Context, id string, at time.Time) (bool, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) ConsumeOAuth2Transaction(ctx context.Context, id string, at time.Time) (bool, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) ConsumeOIDCTransaction(ctx context.Context, id string, at time.Time) (bool, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) ConsumeOrgEmailInvitation(ctx context.Context, id string, verifier []byte) (bool, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) ConsumeOutstandingAuthorities(ctx context.Context, accountID string, at time.Time) error
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) ConsumeRegistrationSignup(ctx context.Context, id string, verifier []byte) (bool, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) ConsumeRemotePairingExchange(ctx context.Context, id string, now time.Time, epoch int64) (bool, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) ConsumeRemotePairingInvite(ctx context.Context, id string, now time.Time, epoch int64) (bool, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) ConsumeSAMLTransaction(ctx context.Context, id string, at time.Time) (bool, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) ConsumeSingleDecisionWindow(ctx context.Context, id string, at time.Time) (bool, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) ConsumeWebAuthnCeremony(ctx context.Context, id, credentialID string, at time.Time) (bool, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) ConsumeWorkspaceHandoff(ctx context.Context, id string, at time.Time) (bool, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) CorrectPrivacyAccount(ctx context.Context, account, username, displayName string) error
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) CountExternalIdentitiesForIssuer(ctx context.Context, kind, issuer string) (int64, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) CountGrantsInOrg(ctx context.Context, org string) (int64, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) CountLiveOrgEmailInvitations(ctx context.Context, org domain.OrgID, at time.Time) (int64, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) CountLiveRemotePairingExchanges(ctx context.Context, id string, now time.Time) (int64, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) CountLiveRemotePairingInvites(ctx context.Context, now time.Time) (int64, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) CountRegistrationPolicyOrgs(ctx context.Context, policyID string) (int64, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) CountRemotePairingReplays(ctx context.Context) (int64, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) CountRemotePairingReplaysForKey(ctx context.Context, thumbprint string) (int64, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) CreateAccessGrant(ctx context.Context, id string, p domain.PrincipalID, g domain.Grant, ...) error
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) CreateAccount(ctx context.Context, acc Account) error
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) CreateCLILogin(ctx context.Context, h CLILogin) error
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) CreateCLIReauthHandoff(ctx context.Context, h NewCLIReauthHandoff) error
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) CreateDeveloperCredential(ctx context.Context, c DeveloperCredential, v []byte) error
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) CreateExternalIdentity(ctx context.Context, n NewExternalIdentity) error
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) CreateFederationIssuer(ctx context.Context, iss NewFederationIssuer) error
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) CreateGrant(ctx context.Context, id string, p domain.PrincipalID, g domain.Grant, ...) error
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) CreateHumanPrincipal(ctx context.Context, id domain.PrincipalID, at time.Time) error
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) CreateLoginChallenge(ctx context.Context, c NewLoginChallenge) error
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) CreateMachineCredential(ctx context.Context, c NewCredential) error
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) CreateMachinePrincipal(ctx context.Context, id domain.PrincipalID, class domain.PrincipalClass, ...) error
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) CreateOAuth2Provider(ctx context.Context, n NewOAuth2Provider) error
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) CreateOAuth2Transaction(ctx context.Context, t NewOAuth2Transaction) error
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) CreateOIDCTransaction(ctx context.Context, t NewOIDCTransaction) error
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) CreateProvider(ctx context.Context, n NewProvider) error
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) CreateProvisioningPrincipal(ctx context.Context, id domain.PrincipalID, at time.Time) error
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) CreateRegistrationPolicy(ctx context.Context, p RegistrationPolicy) error
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) CreateRegistrationSignup(ctx context.Context, n NewRegistrationSignup) error
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) CreateRemotePairingExchange(ctx context.Context, e RemotePairingExchange) error
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) CreateRemotePairingInvite(ctx context.Context, i RemotePairingInvite) error
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) CreateRule(ctx context.Context, rule domain.Rule, createdBy domain.PrincipalID, ...) error
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) CreateSAMLProvider(ctx context.Context, provider NewSAMLProvider) error
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) CreateSAMLSPKey(ctx context.Context, key NewSAMLSPKey) error
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) CreateSAMLTransaction(ctx context.Context, transaction NewSAMLTransaction) error
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) CreateServiceAccountAggregate(ctx context.Context, sa NewServiceAccount) (ServiceAccountCreation, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) CreateTOTP(ctx context.Context, c NewTOTPCredential) error
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) CreateWebAuthnCeremony(ctx context.Context, c NewWebAuthnCeremony) error
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) CreateWebAuthnCredential(ctx context.Context, c NewWebAuthnCredential) error
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) CreateWorkspaceHandoff(ctx context.Context, h authn.NewWorkspaceHandoff) error
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) CredentialAuthorityByID(ctx context.Context, id string) (CredentialAuthority, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) CredentialEpoch(ctx context.Context) (int64, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) CredentialEstablish(ctx context.Context, sessionID string, principal domain.PrincipalID, ...) (CredentialEstablishEvidence, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) CredentialPolicy(ctx context.Context) (CredentialPolicy, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) CredentialsBeyondCeiling(ctx context.Context, ceiling time.Time) ([]AffectedCredential, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) DeleteAccessGrantsForRequest(ctx context.Context, p domain.PrincipalID, requestID string) (int64, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) DeleteExpiredSAMLReplay(ctx context.Context, at time.Time) (int64, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) DeleteFederationIssuer(ctx context.Context, id string) (bool, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) DeleteGrantRow(ctx context.Context, grantID string, p domain.PrincipalID) (bool, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) DeleteOAuth2Provider(ctx context.Context, id string) error
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) DeleteOrgEmailInvitationInOrg(ctx context.Context, id string, org domain.OrgID) (bool, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) DeleteProvider(ctx context.Context, id string) error
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) DeleteRegistrationPolicy(ctx context.Context, id string, expected int64) (bool, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) DeleteRegistrationSignup(ctx context.Context, id string) (bool, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) DeleteRetiringSAMLSPKey(ctx context.Context, id string) (bool, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) DeleteRule(ctx context.Context, id string, p domain.PrincipalID) (bool, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) DeleteRuleItem(ctx context.Context, ruleID, itemID string, p domain.PrincipalID) error
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) DeleteSAMLProvider(ctx context.Context, id string) error
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) DeleteServiceAccountAggregate(ctx context.Context, in DeleteServiceAccountAggregateInput) (ServiceAccountDeletion, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) DeleteSessionsForOAuth2Provider(ctx context.Context, providerID string) (int64, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) DeleteWebAuthnCredential(ctx context.Context, id, accountID string) (bool, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) DeliveryReporterHolds(ctx context.Context, principal domain.PrincipalID, scope domain.Scope) (bool, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) DeliveryReporterLive(ctx context.Context, principal domain.PrincipalID, scope domain.Scope, ...) (bool, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) DenialCaptureError() error
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) DeveloperCredentialPolicy(ctx context.Context) (time.Duration, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) DeveloperDeliveryGrants(ctx context.Context, caller Identity) ([]domain.Grant, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) DisableWebAuthnCredential(ctx context.Context, id string, rowVersion int64, at time.Time) (bool, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) EnabledProviderByIssuer(ctx context.Context, kind, issuer string) (OIDCProvider, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) EnabledProviderBySlug(ctx context.Context, slug string) (OIDCProvider, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) EnvironmentChainByID(ctx context.Context, envID string) (EnvironmentChain, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) EnvironmentReauthSettings(ctx context.Context, envID string) (EnvSetting, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) EnvironmentsInProject(ctx context.Context, scope domain.Scope) ([]domain.EnvID, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) ErasePrivacyAccount(ctx context.Context, account, p, username string) (int64, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) ExpiredRegistrationSignups(ctx context.Context, at time.Time) ([]ExpiredRegistrationSignup, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) ExternalIdentitiesForAccount(ctx context.Context, accountID string) ([]ExternalIdentity, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) ExternalIdentityByID(ctx context.Context, id string) (ExternalIdentity, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) ExternalIdentityByKey(ctx context.Context, kind, issuer, subject string) (ExternalIdentity, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) FederationIssuerByID(ctx context.Context, id string) (FederationIssuer, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) FederationIssuerByIssuer(ctx context.Context, issuer string) (FederationIssuer, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) FederationIssuers(ctx context.Context) ([]FederationIssuer, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) GetRule(ctx context.Context, id string) (StoredRule, bool, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) GrantLinesAtInstance(ctx context.Context) ([]GrantLine, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) GrantLinesInOrg(ctx context.Context, org string) ([]GrantLine, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) GrantLinesInProject(ctx context.Context, org, project string) ([]GrantLine, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) GrantOriginCount(ctx context.Context, grantID string) (int64, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) GrantOriginsFor(ctx context.Context, grantID string) ([]Origin, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) GrantOriginsForPrincipal(ctx context.Context, p domain.PrincipalID) ([]GrantOriginRow, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) GrantRowsForPrincipal(ctx context.Context, p domain.PrincipalID) ([]GrantRow, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) GrantsForResetTarget(ctx context.Context, p domain.PrincipalID) ([]domain.Grant, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) GrantsOf(ctx context.Context, p domain.PrincipalID) ([]domain.Grant, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) GuardOAuth2ProviderForMint(ctx context.Context, id string, rowVersion int64, issuer string) (bool, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) GuardProviderForMint(ctx context.Context, id string, rowVersion int64, issuer string) (bool, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) GuardSAMLProviderForMint(ctx context.Context, id string, rowVersion int64, entityID string) (bool, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) HoldRestoredPKIIssuers(ctx context.Context) error
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) HoldsInstanceCapability(ctx context.Context, caller Identity, op Operation) (bool, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) IncompatiblePasswordKDFCount(ctx context.Context, kdf KDFParams) (int64, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) IndefiniteCredentials(ctx context.Context) ([]AffectedCredential, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) InstanceConnectionByID(ctx context.Context, id string) (authn.InstanceConnection, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) InstanceConnectionByPrincipal(ctx context.Context, p domain.PrincipalID) (authn.InstanceConnection, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) InstanceConnections(ctx context.Context) ([]authn.InstanceConnection, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) InstanceIdentity(ctx context.Context) (string, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) InvalidateReauthWindowsForEnvironment(ctx context.Context, environmentID string) (int64, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) InvalidateRestoredAdapterCredentials(ctx context.Context) error
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) InvalidateRestoredDynamicProviderCredentials(ctx context.Context) error
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) InvalidateRestoredExternalCredentials(ctx context.Context, now time.Time) error
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) IsProtectedOrg(ctx context.Context, org domain.OrgID) (bool, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) ListDeveloperCredentials(ctx context.Context) ([]DeveloperCredential, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) ListLiveOrgEmailInvitations(ctx context.Context, org domain.OrgID, at time.Time) ([]EmailInvitationListing, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) ListOAuth2Providers(ctx context.Context) ([]OAuth2Provider, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) ListProviders(ctx context.Context) ([]OIDCProvider, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) ListRemotePairingInvites(ctx context.Context) ([]RemotePairingInvite, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) ListSAMLProviders(ctx context.Context) ([]SAMLProvider, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) LiveAccessGrants(ctx context.Context, p domain.PrincipalID, now time.Time) ([]AccessGrant, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) LiveMachineCredentialCount(ctx context.Context, serviceAccountID string, epoch int64, now time.Time) (int64, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) LiveMachineCredentialCounts(ctx context.Context, scope domain.Scope, epoch int64, now time.Time) (map[string]int64, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) LockCredentialPolicy(ctx context.Context) error
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) LockInstanceIdentityRow(ctx context.Context) error
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) LockMachinePrincipal(ctx context.Context, p domain.PrincipalID) error
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) LockOAuth2ProviderForDelete(ctx context.Context, id string) error
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) LockProviderForDelete(ctx context.Context, id string) error
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) LockSAMLProviderForDelete(ctx context.Context, id string) error
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) LockTargetPrincipal(ctx context.Context, p domain.PrincipalID) error
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) LockWorkspaceOrigin(ctx context.Context, origin string) (bool, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) LockoutRetentions(ctx context.Context) ([]LockoutRetention, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) LockoutRetentionsInOrg(ctx context.Context, org domain.OrgID) ([]LockoutRetention, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) LoginChallengeByID(ctx context.Context, id string) (LoginChallenge, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) MachineCredentialsFor(ctx context.Context, serviceAccountID string) ([]MachineCredential, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) MachineRevealOptIn(ctx context.Context, caller Identity, project domain.ProjectID) (bool, int64, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) ManageMembersHolders(ctx context.Context, org string) ([]domain.PrincipalID, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) MarkSAMLSPKeyRetiring(ctx context.Context, id string, rowVersion int64) (bool, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) MintAuthority(ctx context.Context, n NewCredentialAuthority) error
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) MintInstanceConnection(ctx context.Context, n authn.NewInstanceConnection) error
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) MintSession(ctx context.Context, s NewSession) error
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) OAuth2ProviderBySlug(ctx context.Context, slug string) (OAuth2Provider, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) OAuth2ProviderForCallback(ctx context.Context, id string) (OAuth2Provider, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) OAuth2TransactionByState(ctx context.Context, stateVerifier []byte) (OAuth2Transaction, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) OIDCTransactionByState(ctx context.Context, stateVerifier []byte) (OIDCTransaction, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) OpenReauthWindow(ctx context.Context, w NewReauthWindow) error
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) OrgEmailInvitationByVerifier(ctx context.Context, verifier []byte) (EmailInvitation, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) OrgEmailInvitationInOrg(ctx context.Context, id string, org domain.OrgID) (EmailInvitation, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) OrgEmailInvitationOrgName(ctx context.Context, org domain.OrgID) (string, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) OrgImageVisibleTo(ctx context.Context, caller Identity, org domain.OrgID) (OrgImage, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) OrgsForPrincipal(ctx context.Context, caller Identity) ([]OrgIdentity, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) PasswordCredentialFor(ctx context.Context, accountID string) (PasswordCredential, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) PeekDeveloperCredentialPolicy(ctx context.Context) (time.Duration, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) PendingDenials() []Denial
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) PendingTOTP(ctx context.Context, accountID string) (TOTPCredential, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) PersonalEligible(ctx context.Context, p Proof) (int, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) PersonalOwnerHasAccess(ctx context.Context, owner domain.PrincipalID, scope domain.Scope) (bool, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) PersonalValueOwners(ctx context.Context) ([]domain.PrincipalID, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) PinGeneration(ctx context.Context, p domain.PrincipalID, env domain.EnvID) (int64, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) PollCLILogin(ctx context.Context, id string, at time.Time, interval int64) error
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) PrincipalClass(ctx context.Context, p domain.PrincipalID) (domain.PrincipalClass, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) PrincipalFootprintOrgs(ctx context.Context, p domain.PrincipalID) ([]domain.OrgID, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) PrincipalGeneration(ctx context.Context, p domain.PrincipalID) (int64, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) PrivacyAccount(ctx context.Context, p string) (PrivacyAccountView, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) PrivacyActivity(ctx context.Context, p string) ([]PrivacyActivity, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) PrivacySessions(ctx context.Context, p string) ([]PrivacySession, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) ProjectMachineReveal(ctx context.Context, projectID string) (authn.MachineRevealState, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) ProviderBySlug(ctx context.Context, slug string) (OIDCProvider, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) ProviderForCallback(ctx context.Context, id string) (OIDCProvider, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) PruneCLILogins(ctx context.Context, at time.Time) error
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) PruneExpiredOrgEmailInvitations(ctx context.Context, at time.Time) (int64, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) PruneExpiredRegistrationSignup(ctx context.Context, id string, at time.Time) (bool, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) PruneRemotePairingState(ctx context.Context, now time.Time) error
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) PurgePersonalValues(ctx context.Context, owner domain.PrincipalID, cause string, at time.Time) (int64, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) ReactivateBinding(ctx context.Context, id string, at time.Time) (bool, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) ReauthWindowFor(ctx context.Context, sessionID, environmentID string) (ReauthWindow, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) RebindSAMLExternalIdentityProvider(ctx context.Context, id, expectedProviderID, newProviderID string) (bool, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) ReconcilePrincipal(ctx context.Context, p domain.PrincipalID) (bool, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) RecordAuthEvent(ctx context.Context, e audit.Event) error
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) RecordedPrincipalHolds(ctx context.Context, caller Identity, principal domain.PrincipalID, ...) (bool, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) RecoveryCodesFor(ctx context.Context, accountID string) (RecoveryBatch, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) RegistrationAuthorityHolds(ctx context.Context, principal domain.PrincipalID, op Operation, ...) (bool, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) RegistrationPolicyFor(ctx context.Context, org domain.OrgID) (RegistrationPolicy, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) RegistrationSignupByEmail(ctx context.Context, email string) (RegistrationSignup, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) RegistrationSignupByVerifier(ctx context.Context, verifier []byte) (RegistrationSignup, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) RegistrationSignupsForPolicy(ctx context.Context, policyID string) ([]RegistrationSignupRef, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) ReissueRegistrationSignup(ctx context.Context, n NewRegistrationSignup) error
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) ReleaseGrantOrigin(ctx context.Context, grantID string, p domain.PrincipalID, o Origin) (bool, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) RemotePairedConnectionByID(ctx context.Context, id string) (RemotePairedConnection, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) RemotePairingExchangeByID(ctx context.Context, id string) (RemotePairingExchange, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) RemotePairingInviteByCapability(ctx context.Context, v []byte) (RemotePairingInvite, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) RemotePairingInviteByID(ctx context.Context, id string) (RemotePairingInvite, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) RemoveExternalIdentity(ctx context.Context, id string) error
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) RemoveTOTPForAccount(ctx context.Context, accountID string) error
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) RemoveWorkspaceOrigin(ctx context.Context, origin string) (bool, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) ReplacePasswordCredential(ctx context.Context, c PasswordCredential, at time.Time) (bool, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) ReplaceRecoveryCodes(ctx context.Context, b RecoveryBatch, at time.Time) (bool, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) ReplaceRegistrationPolicy(ctx context.Context, p RegistrationPolicy, expected int64) (bool, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) ResolveChain(ctx context.Context, scope domain.Scope) (domain.Scope, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) RestoreState(ctx context.Context) (RestoreState, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) RestrictPrivacyPrincipal(ctx context.Context, p, state string) error
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) RevokeAllSessionsFor(ctx context.Context, p domain.PrincipalID) error
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) RevokeDeveloperCredentials(ctx context.Context, authority domain.PrincipalID, scope domain.Scope, ...) ([]DeveloperCredential, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) RevokeDeveloperCredentialsByProvenance(ctx context.Context, kind, id string, at time.Time) ([]DeveloperCredential, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) RevokeInstanceConnection(ctx context.Context, id string, at time.Time) (bool, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) RevokeInvalidDeveloperCredentials(ctx context.Context, authority domain.PrincipalID, org domain.OrgID, ...) ([]DeveloperCredential, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) RevokeMachineCredential(ctx context.Context, serviceAccountID, id string, at time.Time) (bool, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) RevokeRemotePairingInvite(ctx context.Context, id string, now time.Time) (bool, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) RevokeSession(ctx context.Context, id string) error
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) RevokeSessionForPrincipal(ctx context.Context, id string, p domain.PrincipalID) (bool, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) RevokeWorkspaceSessionsForOrigin(ctx context.Context, origin string) (int64, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) RotateSessionFactors(ctx context.Context, id string, verifier []byte, factors string) error
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) RuleCapabilityHeld(ctx context.Context, caller Identity, target domain.Rule, ...) (bool, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) RuleIDsForEnvironment(ctx context.Context, s domain.Scope) ([]string, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) RuleIDsForKey(ctx context.Context, s domain.Scope, keyID string) ([]string, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) RuleIDsForOrg(ctx context.Context, org domain.OrgID) ([]string, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) RuleIDsForProject(ctx context.Context, s domain.Scope) ([]string, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) RuleKeyExists(ctx context.Context, s domain.Scope, keyID string) error
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) RuleLinesInOrg(ctx context.Context, org domain.OrgID) ([]RuleLine, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) RuleLinesInProject(ctx context.Context, s domain.Scope) ([]RuleLine, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) RulesForProject(ctx context.Context, org domain.OrgID, project domain.ProjectID) ([]domain.Rule, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) RulesManageable(ctx context.Context, caller Identity, targets []domain.Rule, ...) ([]bool, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) SAMLProviderBySlug(ctx context.Context, slug string) (SAMLProvider, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) SAMLProviderForCallback(ctx context.Context, id string) (SAMLProvider, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) SAMLSPKeys(ctx context.Context) ([]SAMLSPKey, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) SAMLTransactionByRelayState(ctx context.Context, verifier []byte) (SAMLTransaction, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) SCIMCredentialByVerifier(ctx context.Context, presented []byte) (SCIMCredential, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) ScopedSystemAuthority(ctx context.Context, site SystemSite, scope domain.Scope) (Proof, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) SelfConfigRecoveryAuthority(ctx context.Context, revision int64) (Proof, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) SelfConfigRuntimeAuthority(ctx context.Context, snapshotID string) (Proof, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) SelfConfigSeedAuthority(ctx context.Context) (Proof, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) ServiceAccountAt(ctx context.Context, scope domain.Scope, id string) (ServiceAccount, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) ServiceAccountByID(ctx context.Context, id string) (ServiceAccount, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) ServiceAccountByPrincipal(ctx context.Context, p domain.PrincipalID) (ServiceAccount, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) ServiceAccountsIn(ctx context.Context, scope domain.Scope) ([]ServiceAccount, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) SessionsForPrincipal(ctx context.Context, p domain.PrincipalID) ([]authn.SessionSummary, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) SetClock(now time.Time)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) SetCredentialPolicy(ctx context.Context, p CredentialPolicy, actor domain.PrincipalID, ...) error
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) SetDeveloperCredentialPolicy(ctx context.Context, d time.Duration) error
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) SetLocalAccountEmail(ctx context.Context, id, email string, at time.Time) error
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) SetPinGeneration(ctx context.Context, p domain.PrincipalID, env domain.EnvID, generation int64) error
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) SetWebAuthnUserHandle(ctx context.Context, accountID string, handle []byte) (bool, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) SlideReauthWindow(ctx context.Context, id string, windowExpires time.Time) (bool, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) SlideSession(ctx context.Context, id string, seen, idleExpires time.Time) error
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) StampCredentialEstablish(ctx context.Context, sessionID, identityID string, expires time.Time) error
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) StrandedRevealPrincipals(ctx context.Context, org, project, env string) ([]domain.PrincipalID, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) SweepExpiredWorkspaceHandoffs(ctx context.Context, before time.Time) (int64, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) SweepSessionsForProvider(ctx context.Context, providerID string) (int64, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) SweepSessionsForSAMLProvider(ctx context.Context, providerID string) (int64, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) SweepSessionsForWebAuthnCredential(ctx context.Context, credentialID string) (int64, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) Token() *TxToken
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) TouchInstanceConnection(ctx context.Context, id string, at time.Time) error
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) TouchMachineCredential(ctx context.Context, id string, at time.Time) error
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) TouchSCIMCredential(ctx context.Context, id string, at time.Time) error
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) UnreconciledPrincipals(ctx context.Context) ([]PrincipalRef, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) UpdateAccountProfile(ctx context.Context, accountID string, profile AccountProfile) error
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) UpdateFederationIssuer(ctx context.Context, id string, source jwkssource.KeySource, refused []string, ...) (bool, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) UpdateOAuth2Provider(ctx context.Context, u OAuth2ProviderUpdate) (bool, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) UpdateProvider(ctx context.Context, u ProviderUpdate) (bool, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) UpdateRequestRefusals(ctx context.Context, sample *audit.RefusalSample) (int64, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) UpdateSAMLProvider(ctx context.Context, provider SAMLProviderUpdate) (bool, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) UpsertOrgEmailInvitation(ctx context.Context, n EmailInvitation) (string, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) VerifiedAccountEmailExists(ctx context.Context, email string) (bool, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) WebAuthnCeremonyByChallenge(ctx context.Context, challengeVerifier []byte) (WebAuthnCeremony, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) WebAuthnCeremonyByID(ctx context.Context, id string) (WebAuthnCeremony, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) WebAuthnCredentialByCredentialID(ctx context.Context, credentialID []byte) (WebAuthnCredential, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) WebAuthnCredentialByID(ctx context.Context, id string) (WebAuthnCredential, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) WebAuthnCredentialsForAccount(ctx context.Context, accountID string) ([]WebAuthnCredential, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) WebAuthnUserHandle(ctx context.Context, accountID string) ([]byte, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) WorkloadPinState(ctx context.Context, p domain.PrincipalID, env domain.EnvID) (WorkloadPinState, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) WorkspaceHandoffByCode(ctx context.Context, verifier []byte) (authn.WorkspaceHandoff, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) WorkspaceHandoffByState(ctx context.Context, verifier []byte) (authn.WorkspaceHandoff, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) WorkspaceOriginAllowed(ctx context.Context, origin string) (bool, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) WorkspaceOrigins(ctx context.Context) ([]authn.WorkspaceOrigin, error)
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) WritePasswordCredential(ctx context.Context, c PasswordCredential, at time.Time) error
- func (a *TxAuthorizer) WriteRecoveryCodes(ctx context.Context, b RecoveryBatch, at time.Time) error
- type TxToken
- type WebAuthnCeremony
- type WebAuthnCredential
- type WorkloadPinState
- type WorkspaceHandoff
- type WorkspaceOrigin
Constants ¶
const ( HandoffEstablishment = authn.HandoffEstablishment HandoffStepUp = authn.HandoffStepUp )
const ReplayKeyLimit = 256
ReplayKeyLimit bounds one enrolled key's share of the durable replay store. Keep the installation-wide ceiling as a separate fail-closed storage bound.
const WorkspaceArtifact = "workspace"
WorkspaceArtifact is the value a WORKSPACE session's `artifact` column stores. It is NOT crypto.ArtifactWorkspaceSession ("ws"), which is the bearer grammar's type: the two are different strings on purpose, and a rule keyed on the wrong one silently matches nothing. It lives here rather than in the service because the authentication leg is the first consumer.
Variables ¶
var MFAMandatory = map[domain.Capability]bool{ domain.CapReveal: true, domain.CapRevealHistory: true, domain.CapManageMembers: true, domain.CapCredentialReset: true, domain.CapInstanceConfig: true, domain.CapAuditRead: true, domain.CapRotateDEK: true, domain.CapReencrypt: true, domain.CapInstanceDirector: true, }
MFAMandatory is the closed set of capabilities the human-auth ADR makes MFA-mandatory. A viewer on a development environment is deliberately not forced to enrol; these are the powers that are.
Functions ¶
func AdequateAssurance ¶
AdequateAssurance reports whether a session's assurance record satisfies the MFA-mandatory rule: two distinct factor classes, or a WebAuthn assertion (user-verifying, inherently two-factor). OIDC sessions whose provider policy asserted multi-factor are handled where that policy is recorded (#54 OIDC slice); here a single-factor session — password only, or an unelevated OIDC login — is inadequate.
func AssuranceRank ¶
AssuranceRank orders assurance tiers so a step-up (e.g. an OIDC reauth) can refuse to re-establish a session with weaker evidence than it already holds:
2 — phishing-resistant (a WebAuthn assertion) 1 — multi-factor (two distinct factor classes) 0 — single-factor
A reauth may only proceed with evidence of rank >= the session's rank. OIDC evidence is capped at rank 1 by construction (oidcFactors never yields "webauthn"): hikyo cannot verify the phishing-resistance of a federated ceremony, so a federated token can never re-authorize a WebAuthn session.
func BoundKey ¶
BoundKey reports the key a proof was minted for when member access rules decided it. A service holding such a proof must act on that key alone.
func ContractArtifactClass ¶
ContractArtifactClass maps a resolved identity to the vocabulary used by x-hikyo-artifacts. Identity class, not bearer spelling, is authoritative.
func FormulaDemandsMFA ¶
FormulaDemandsMFA reports whether an operation's formula touches an MFA-mandatory capability. Exported so the pending-enforcement guard can enumerate exactly which operations will need an adequate session once factors exist.
func IncludesSelfConfig ¶
IncludesSelfConfig is the metadata enumeration projection of the caller's instance-config grant, resolved in the same transaction as the proof.
func IsSelfConfig ¶
IsSelfConfig reports the database-resolved protected resource profile on a canonical proof. It is a value and display hint, never a new authorization door.
func IsSystemProof ¶
IsSystemProof reports whether p was minted at a no-principal system site. The audit write path uses it to decide whether an emitter may ASSERT an actor class: a principal-backed operation's events are attributed from principals.kind, never from what the emitter claims, so only a system proof may say "system" or "break-glass".
func NavigationEnvironmentAllowed ¶
NavigationEnvironmentAllowed preserves the environment selector on a directory read authorized through See, including rule-local exceptions.
func NavigationProjectAllowed ¶
NavigationProjectAllowed narrows a rule-based project directory proof to the projects named by the caller's own rules. Ordinary proofs are unchanged.
func PublishKeyAllowed ¶
PublishKeyAllowed checks the changed-key binding of a collection publish proof. Existing whole-environment proofs have no collection binding.
func TrackCallerActivity ¶
TrackCallerActivity installs request-local storage for the authentication result. Authentication remains inside the operation transaction; only the non-authorizing slide hint survives until the response has been written.
func Verify ¶
Verify is the store boundary check (tenant-isolation ADR: one check, in one package, not per endpoint). Every store method calls it first, passing its own registered StoreOp and the token of the transaction it is bound to, and binds its chain parameters exclusively from the returned scope — the proof's resolved chain, never caller arguments. Rejections are loud internal errors, not uniform responses: a proof failing here is a bug or an attack, and either way no query may run.
Fail-closed rejections, per invariant 5: nil proof (the only forgeable value), foreign-transaction proof, committed/rolled-back-transaction proof, operation-mismatched proof — and for system proofs, any operation outside the mint site's closed set.
func VerifyEvent ¶
VerifyEvent is Verify for the audit-insert doors: on top of the ordinary checks it binds the EVENT TYPE to the operation that minted the proof. Without it a proof for any operation licensed to write the trail could insert any tenant-licensed event type — a project-create proof could persist an environment-note-changed event, forging the meaning of the record while every other guard succeeds. The registry already declares which types each operation emits; this makes that declaration binding at the write boundary.
func VerifyOwner ¶
VerifyOwner is Verify for owner-bound rows (personal values): it also returns the principal the tenant proof was authorized for. A system or instance proof carries no owner and is refused.
func VerifySelfConfigSnapshot ¶
VerifySelfConfigSnapshot confines a runtime proof's payload read to the one retained snapshot chosen at minting. Other proof classes keep their ordinary operation and tenant constraints.
Types ¶
type AccessGrant ¶
type AccessGrant = authn.AccessGrant
AccessGrant is re-exported so the service layer never names authn.
type AccountProfile ¶
type AccountProfile = authn.AccountProfile
type AffectedCredential ¶
type AffectedCredential = authn.AffectedCredential
Re-exported so the service layer never names the resolution-surface package.
type Assurance ¶
type Assurance struct {
Method string
Factors []string
AuthenticatedAt time.Time
CeremonyID string
}
Assurance is how THIS session authenticated — the method, the factor classes actually presented, when, and which ceremony. Authorization of an MFA-mandatory capability consults this record, never the account's credential inventory: an account that owns a passkey but logged in through a weak path has not presented it.
type Atom ¶
type Atom struct {
Cap domain.Capability
At domain.Level
}
Atom is one conjunct of an authorization formula: the principal must hold Cap at the resolved chain truncated to level At, or at any scope above it (grants inherit downward; permission-model ADR § scope lattice).
type AuditMapping ¶
type AuditMapping struct {
Class Class
Formula Formula
Events []audit.EventType
AuditedNone bool
// ReadOnly reports whether every store op the operation can invoke is in
// the pinned read-only set — the mutates-nothing half of the
// `audited: none` permit rule.
ReadOnly bool
}
AuditMapping is one operation's audit linkage, for the completeness invariant (audit-model ADR CI invariant 2).
type BindingPredicate ¶
type BindingPredicate func(iss FederationIssuer, b Binding) error
BindingPredicate is the binding-specific half of federated validation: audience, every pinned claim, the CI event rule and the post-restore `iat` predicate, evaluated against the rows that were actually resolved.
It arrives as a function rather than as data because its inputs are the presented token's claims, which the caller already holds, and its implementation is in internal/oidcfed — a package the chokepoint deliberately does not import. Passing the check in keeps the protocol library behind its own wall while still making the check unskippable: AuthenticateFederated REFUSES a nil predicate rather than treating it as "no further conditions".
It receives the ISSUER ROW READ IN THIS TRANSACTION, not the one the caller captured before validation, and that argument is the fix for a real time-of-check gap: the network half of federated authentication runs outside any transaction, so an administrator who adds a refused audience or switches the key source while a slow verification is in flight would otherwise have that request complete under the superseded policy. The predicate compares the two and refuses when they disagree.
type CLIReauthHandoff ¶
type CLIReauthHandoff = authn.CLIReauthHandoff
type Cache ¶
type Cache struct {
// KeyConstructor is the single function that builds its keys. The ADR's
// keying rule: the full id chain to the owning scope, structured and
// injectively encoded (length-prefixed — bare concatenation is how
// (org "a", project "bc") and (org "ab", project "c") collide).
KeyConstructor string
// ProofGatedAt names the layer that supplies the proof for reads and
// writes. For the DEK LRU this is deliberately NOT inside the cache:
// internal/crypto is a locked leaf package (encryption-model ADR; enforced by
// the boundary test) and may not import the authorization package, so
// its accessors cannot take an authz.Proof. The access rule is therefore
// discharged one layer up, at the service seam that resolves a scope
// before asking crypto to seal for it.
ProofGatedAt string
}
Cache is one registered cache holding derived tenant material (tenant-isolation ADR invariant 12). Registration is mandatory: the invariant test fails on any cache-shaped declaration in the module that is not listed here, so a new cache cannot appear without stating how it is keyed and who may reach it.
type CallerActivity ¶
type CallerActivity struct {
// contains filtered or unexported fields
}
CallerActivity is the narrow, non-authorizing result the transport may retain until its handler returns. It contains no principal, proof, scope or transaction token: it can decide only whether the post-response idle-clock write is worth attempting. The write still re-authenticates inside its own transaction, so revocation remains authoritative.
func ResolvedCallerActivity ¶
func ResolvedCallerActivity(ctx context.Context) (CallerActivity, bool)
ResolvedCallerActivity returns the most recent successful caller resolution observed in this request. Fabricated and otherwise refused bearers leave it empty, so post-response work can stop before opening any transaction.
func (CallerActivity) LastSeenAt ¶
func (a CallerActivity) LastSeenAt() time.Time
LastSeenAt is the timestamp the request's own authentication read resolved.
func (CallerActivity) Slideable ¶
func (a CallerActivity) Slideable() bool
Slideable reports whether the resolved identity owns a session idle clock or service-account credential last-used stamp. Provisioning and instance connections own separate touch paths and preserve the old generic no-op.
type Class ¶
type Class int
Class is the probe classification (tenant-isolation ADR § enforcement machinery): every operation carries exactly one, and each class has its own probe contract. Classification is the completeness mechanism.
const ( // ClassTenant: cross-tenant probes, uniform nonexistent response. ClassTenant Class = iota // ClassInstance: probed for grant refusal, not tenancy. ClassInstance // ClassUnauthenticated: pre-auth contracts (enumeration uniformity). ClassUnauthenticated // ClassSystem: no network route may exist; local-authority preconditions. ClassSystem )
const ClassStub Class = -1
ClassStub marks a CLI verb that is not an operation yet: it refuses (exit 2), reaches no server and no store, and has no entry in the operation registry — the totality check enforces exactly that. It is deliberately not one of the ADR's four probe classes: classifying an unimplemented verb as tenant-scoped or unauthenticated now would let the eventual implementation ride in on a stale class without ever meeting its probe contract. When a verb's ticket lands, its class here changes and the matching probes must exist.
type CredentialAuthority ¶
type CredentialAuthority = authn.CredentialAuthority
CredentialAuthority is a resolved credential-establishment authority.
type CredentialEstablishEvidence ¶
type CredentialEstablishEvidence = authn.CredentialEstablishEvidence
type CredentialPolicy ¶
type CredentialPolicy = authn.CredentialPolicy
Re-exported so the service layer never names the resolution-surface package.
type DeleteServiceAccountAggregateInput ¶
type DeleteServiceAccountAggregateInput = authn.DeleteServiceAccountAggregateInput
Re-exported so the service layer never names the resolution-surface package.
type Denial ¶
Denial is one captured denial event awaiting its durable flush. The actor class is resolved (principals.kind) inside the flush transaction, so the probe-visible attempt keeps its fixed query count. Scope is the chain authorize() itself resolved (tenant trail) or empty (instance trail) — carried beside the event because the envelope deliberately has no chain field a caller could populate.
type DeveloperCredential ¶
type DeveloperCredential = authn.DeveloperCredential
type EmailInvitation ¶
type EmailInvitation = authn.EmailInvitation
EmailInvitation is one pending row of an organisation and address.
type EmailInvitationListing ¶
type EmailInvitationListing = authn.EmailInvitationListing
EmailInvitationListing is the administrator's view of a pending row.
type EnvSetting ¶
type EnvSetting = authn.EnvironmentSettings
GrantRow, Origin and GrantLine are re-exported so the service layer never names the resolution-surface package.
type EnvironmentChain ¶
type EnvironmentChain = authn.EnvironmentChain
EnvironmentChain is a resolved (org, project, env) chain.
type ExpiredRegistrationSignup ¶
type ExpiredRegistrationSignup = authn.ExpiredRegistrationSignup
type ExternalIdentity ¶
type ExternalIdentity = authn.ExternalIdentity
ExternalIdentity is a resolved linked identity.
type FederationIssuer ¶
type FederationIssuer = authn.FederationIssuer
Re-exported so the service layer never names the resolution-surface package.
type Formula ¶
type Formula []Atom
Formula is a conjunction of atoms over dynamically resolved scopes.
type FormulaPin ¶
type FormulaPin struct {
Operation string `json:"operation"`
Class string `json:"class"`
Level string `json:"level"`
Formula []string `json:"formula"`
PostGrantForbidden bool `json:"post_grant_forbidden,omitempty"`
}
FormulaPin is one row of the pinned operation registry (invariant 6's anti-widening half): silently changing an operation's formula — say environment.update-note from edit(E) to read(E) — widens authority without failing any probe whose fixtures happen to hold both. The pin makes every such change a reviewed fixture diff.
type GrantLine ¶
GrantRow, Origin and GrantLine are re-exported so the service layer never names the resolution-surface package.
type GrantOriginRow ¶
type GrantOriginRow = authn.GrantOriginRow
GrantOriginRow and LockoutRetention arrive with the SCIM release algorithm (#73 §2.4): the first is one (grant row, origin) pair, the second is a row a retention origin is holding alive.
type GrantRow ¶
GrantRow, Origin and GrantLine are re-exported so the service layer never names the resolution-surface package.
type HandoffPurpose ¶
type HandoffPurpose = authn.HandoffPurpose
The workspace tier's carrier types, re-exported so the service layer never names internal/store/authn — the import-boundary test enforces that the resolution surface is reachable only through this package.
type Identity ¶
type Identity struct {
Principal domain.PrincipalID
AuthorityPrincipal domain.PrincipalID
DeveloperScope domain.Scope
// PersonalConsent is a developer credential's recorded opt-in to deliver
// its human's personal values (#1235). False on every other identity.
PersonalConsent bool
// Class is what this identity authenticated AS. It is set on every
// resolution path, never inferred from an empty field: the ADR requires
// machine principals to be visibly distinct from humans everywhere they
// appear, and a distinction carried by absence is one a caller forgets.
// A LocalPrincipal actor carries no class, because local host authority
// is neither.
Class domain.PrincipalClass
// SessionID is empty for a machine identity. A machine has no session,
// no cookie and no assurance record (#16's propagation), which is also
// what exempts it from the MFA-mandatory check it could never satisfy.
SessionID string
// ProviderID is the OIDC provider provenance carried by a federated session.
// It remains empty for local, SAML, machine, and workspace identities.
ProviderID string
OAuth2ProviderID string
SAMLProviderID string
// CredentialID names the machine credential presented, and is empty for
// a human. It is the forensic answer to "which token", which is the
// question after a leak — one service account holds several.
CredentialID string
Artifact string
// CredentialExpiresAt is the presenting MACHINE credential's expiry when it
// is finite, and the zero time for an indefinite credential or a human
// session (which has its own idle/absolute clocks instead). The delivery
// surface returns it so a consumer can raise the ADR's ahead-of-time
// expiry condition; it is read from the same credential row resolution
// already loaded, never a second read.
CredentialExpiresAt time.Time
Assurance Assurance
CreatedAt time.Time
LastSeenAt time.Time
IdleExpiresAt time.Time
AbsoluteExpiresAt time.Time
// CSRFVerifier is the browser session's synchronizer-token verifier, nil
// for a CLI session. Carrying the VERIFIER (a hash) rather than the token
// out of the transaction is safe and lets the transport enforce the CSRF
// contract it owns (#54 A10, #56).
CSRFVerifier []byte
// EnrolmentRequired confines a password-assured session minted for an
// unenrolled account under a `required` second-factor policy (#760). The
// authorization chokepoint refuses every operation for such a session except
// the enrolment allowlist until a factor stands.
EnrolmentRequired bool
}
Identity is a live, resolved caller — human or machine.
type InstanceConnection ¶
type InstanceConnection = authn.InstanceConnection
The workspace tier's carrier types, re-exported so the service layer never names internal/store/authn — the import-boundary test enforces that the resolution surface is reachable only through this package.
type KeyTarget ¶
type KeyTarget struct {
// contains filtered or unexported fields
}
KeyTarget names the key a key-aware authorization addresses. The folder a rule matches on is always read from the database, except for a key being created (it has no row yet: the folder IS what is being authorized) and the destination of a move (the id is resolved, the new folder is what is being authorized).
func KeyApprovalRequest ¶
KeyApprovalRequest addresses the first pinned key of an approval request. Eligible approvers may act on another person's request; ownership is checked separately by the approval policy, never inferred from this metadata lookup.
func KeyMovedTo ¶
KeyMovedTo addresses an existing key as it would be after moving to folder.
func KeyPendingVersion ¶
KeyPendingVersion addresses an owned live draft by key metadata only.
func KeyToCreate ¶
KeyToCreate addresses a key that does not exist yet, by destination folder.
type LockoutRetention ¶
type LockoutRetention = authn.LockoutRetention
GrantRow, Origin and GrantLine are re-exported so the service layer never names the resolution-surface package.
type LoginChallenge ¶
type LoginChallenge = authn.LoginChallenge
LoginChallenge is a resolved login challenge (#760).
type MachineCredential ¶
type MachineCredential = authn.MachineCredential
Re-exported so the service layer never names the resolution-surface package.
type NetworkOperationPolicy ¶
NetworkOperationPolicy is the narrow immutable projection used by network adapters to prove that their compiled contract matches the authorization registry. It contains no handler or datastore authority.
func LookupNetworkOperationPolicy ¶
func LookupNetworkOperationPolicy(name string) (NetworkOperationPolicy, bool)
LookupNetworkOperationPolicy returns the registered formula and successful audit disposition for one authorization operation.
type NewCLIReauthHandoff ¶
type NewCLIReauthHandoff = authn.NewCLIReauthHandoff
type NewCredential ¶
type NewCredential = authn.NewMachineCredential
Re-exported so the service layer never names the resolution-surface package.
type NewCredentialAuthority ¶
type NewCredentialAuthority = authn.NewCredentialAuthority
NewCredentialAuthority is the mint carrier.
type NewExternalIdentity ¶
type NewExternalIdentity = authn.NewExternalIdentity
NewExternalIdentity is the link insert carrier.
type NewFederationIssuer ¶
type NewFederationIssuer = authn.NewFederationIssuer
Re-exported so the service layer never names the resolution-surface package.
type NewInstanceConnection ¶
type NewInstanceConnection = authn.NewInstanceConnection
The workspace tier's carrier types, re-exported so the service layer never names internal/store/authn — the import-boundary test enforces that the resolution surface is reachable only through this package.
type NewLoginChallenge ¶
type NewLoginChallenge = authn.NewLoginChallenge
NewLoginChallenge is the login-challenge insert carrier.
type NewOAuth2Provider ¶
type NewOAuth2Provider = authn.NewOAuth2Provider
type NewOAuth2Transaction ¶
type NewOAuth2Transaction = authn.NewOAuth2Transaction
type NewOIDCTransaction ¶
type NewOIDCTransaction = authn.NewOIDCTransaction
NewOIDCTransaction is the transaction insert carrier.
type NewReauthWindow ¶
type NewReauthWindow = authn.NewReauthWindow
NewReauthWindow is the reauth-window insert carrier.
type NewRegistrationSignup ¶
type NewRegistrationSignup = authn.NewRegistrationSignup
NewRegistrationSignup is the pending-row insert carrier.
type NewSAMLProvider ¶
type NewSAMLProvider = authn.NewSAMLProvider
NewSAMLProvider is the provider insert carrier.
type NewSAMLReplay ¶
type NewSAMLReplay = authn.NewSAMLReplay
NewSAMLReplay is the durable assertion replay insert carrier.
type NewSAMLSPKey ¶
type NewSAMLSPKey = authn.NewSAMLSPKey
NewSAMLSPKey is the SP signing-key insert carrier.
type NewSAMLTransaction ¶
type NewSAMLTransaction = authn.NewSAMLTransaction
NewSAMLTransaction is the transaction insert carrier.
type NewServiceAccount ¶
type NewServiceAccount = authn.NewServiceAccount
Re-exported so the service layer never names the resolution-surface package.
type NewTOTPCredential ¶
type NewTOTPCredential = authn.NewTOTPCredential
NewTOTPCredential is the TOTP insert carrier.
type NewWebAuthnCeremony ¶
type NewWebAuthnCeremony = authn.NewWebAuthnCeremony
NewWebAuthnCeremony is the ceremony insert carrier.
type NewWebAuthnCredential ¶
type NewWebAuthnCredential = authn.NewWebAuthnCredential
NewWebAuthnCredential is the passkey insert carrier.
type NewWorkspaceHandoff ¶
type NewWorkspaceHandoff = authn.NewWorkspaceHandoff
The workspace tier's carrier types, re-exported so the service layer never names internal/store/authn — the import-boundary test enforces that the resolution surface is reachable only through this package.
type OAuth2Provider ¶
type OAuth2Provider = authn.OAuth2Provider
OAuth2 uses its own profile and nonce-free transaction carriers.
type OAuth2ProviderUpdate ¶
type OAuth2ProviderUpdate = authn.OAuth2ProviderUpdate
type OAuth2Transaction ¶
type OAuth2Transaction = authn.OAuth2Transaction
type OIDCTransaction ¶
type OIDCTransaction = authn.OIDCTransaction
OIDCTransaction is a resolved transaction row.
type Operation ¶
type Operation string
Operation names one entry in the operation registry — the single table mapping each operation to its authorization formula (permission-model ADR: per operation formulas, never "the capability for this endpoint"). authorize() evaluates the named formula and the proof records which operation it was minted for; the store boundary rejects a proof minted for a different operation.
const ( OpRemotePairingPrepare Operation = "remote-pairing.prepare" OpRemotePairingCreate Operation = "remote-pairing.create" OpRemotePairingList Operation = "remote-pairing.list" OpRemotePairingRevoke Operation = "remote-pairing.revoke" OpRemotePairingComplete Operation = "remote-pairing.complete" OpMailGet Operation = "mail.get" OpMailTest Operation = "mail.test" OpSelfConfigPreview Operation = "self-config.preview" OpSelfConfigStatus Operation = "self-config.status" OpSelfConfigAdopt Operation = "self-config.adopt" OpSelfConfigApply Operation = "self-config.apply" OpSelfConfigTest Operation = "self-config.test" OpSelfConfigProvisionProject Operation = "self-config.provision-project" // The hierarchy surface (#48): Organization, Project, Environment, Folder. // // Org creation and enumeration are instance-scoped — a create has no // parent tenant and a list spans all of them — while every BY-ID org // operation is tenant-class at org depth, so an org the caller may not // reach answers exactly like one that is not there (mvp-boundary C1). OpOrgCreate Operation = "org.create" OpOrgGet Operation = "org.get" OpOrgList Operation = "org.list" OpOrgRename Operation = "org.rename" // The chrome identity (hue, mark, uploaded image) of an org and a project. // The org image READ is deliberately not an operation: it follows the // listMyOrgs visibility (see Orgs.IdentityImage). OpOrgIdentitySet Operation = "org.identity-set" OpOrgIdentityImageSet Operation = "org.identity-image-set" OpOrgIdentityImageClear Operation = "org.identity-image-clear" OpOrgDelete Operation = "org.delete" OpProjectCreate Operation = "project.create" OpProjectGet Operation = "project.get" OpProjectList Operation = "project.list" OpProjectRename Operation = "project.rename" OpProjectIdentitySet Operation = "project.identity-set" OpProjectIdentityImageSet Operation = "project.identity-image-set" OpProjectIdentityImageClear Operation = "project.identity-image-clear" OpProjectIdentityImageGet Operation = "project.identity-image-get" OpProjectDelete Operation = "project.delete" OpEnvCreate Operation = "environment.create" OpEnvRead Operation = "environment.read" OpEnvList Operation = "environment.list" OpEnvParameterSet Operation = "environment.parameter-set" OpEnvRename Operation = "environment.rename" OpEnvReorder Operation = "environment.reorder" OpEnvDelete Operation = "environment.delete" OpEnvUpdateNote Operation = "environment.update-note" // The key catalogue (#49, schema-model ADR). Every operation addresses // PROJECT depth: a key is declared once per project and the scope lattice // has no key level (permission-model ADR: no key-scoped grants in v1). // // The atom is `definitions-edit`, which the permission-model ADR fixes as the // definitions bundle — "keys, rules, folder paths, and environment // topology" — and which explicitly RETIRES the schema-model ADR's earlier // `schema-edit` name for the same grant. OpKeyCreate Operation = "key.create" OpKeyGet Operation = "key.get" OpKeyList Operation = "key.list" OpKeyRename Operation = "key.rename" OpKeyUpdateDeclaration Operation = "key.update-declaration" OpKeyUpdateMetadata Operation = "key.update-metadata" OpKeySetGroup Operation = "key.set-group" OpKeyDelete Operation = "key.delete" OpKeyReclassify Operation = "key.reclassify" OpKeySchemaPublishEmpty Operation = "key.schema-publish-empty" OpKeySchemaPublishValues Operation = "key.schema-publish-values" // The two reveal gates. They are OPERATIONS rather than an inline // capability check because the chokepoint is the only place authorization // is evaluated: a second authorize() call against a registered formula // gets the denial writer, the assurance leg, the formula pin and the // probe contract for free, where a hand-rolled grant lookup would get none // of them and would be a parallel authorization path. // // Both are evaluated BEFORE any evaluation of the changed rule against a // value, per the schema-model ADR's load-bearing security rule: the operation is // rejected without evaluating, because timing and abort/success are // themselves the channel. OpKeySecretRuleChange Operation = "key.secret-rule-change" OpKeyDeclassify Operation = "key.declassify" // Definitions Git flow (#70, source-of-truth ADR). export and check are pure // reads (`read@project`, audited-none); plan and apply carry // `definitions-edit@project`, with apply additionally fanning out // `publish@environment` immediately before commit. Settings read is // `read@project`; settings write rides `project-settings@project`, // deliberately off the definitions-edit path so a blocked editor cannot // disable its own git-mode guard (permission-model ADR §84). OpDefinitionsExport Operation = "definitions.export" OpDefinitionsCheck Operation = "definitions.check" OpDefinitionsPlanCreate Operation = "definitions.plan" OpDefinitionsPlanGet Operation = "definitions.plan.get" OpDefinitionsApply Operation = "definitions.apply" OpDefinitionsSettingsGet Operation = "definitions.settings.get" OpDefinitionsSettingsSet Operation = "definitions.settings.set" // Project capacity is governed by project-settings authority. OpProjectCapacityRead Operation = "project.capacity.read" OpProjectCapacitySet Operation = "project.capacity.set" // The per-project machine-reveal opt-in (source-of-truth ADR). OpProjectMachineRevealGet Operation = "project.machine-reveal.get" OpProjectMachineRevealSet Operation = "project.machine-reveal.set" // The flat value model (#50, flat-model ADR + permission-model ADR's // locked formula table). Every operation addresses ENVIRONMENT depth: a // value attaches to a (key, environment) and there are no other layers, // so there is no shallower thing to address. // // The formulas, and why each is what it is: // // - read → `read(E)`. The permission-model ADR's `read` carries "the // project key catalogue … validation status, diffs // (write-presence only for `secret` keys); **`config` // values**". Presence is write-presence; `config` // plaintext rides `read` because classification IS the // sensitivity boundary. // - reveal → `read(E) ∧ reveal(E)`, the locked disclosure row for // current `secret` material, with one audit event per // disclosed key. // - write → `edit(E) ∧ publish(E)`. `edit` alone is the ADR's // working-state atom and "creates no revision"; this slice // has no working state, so a write here IS delivered // material the moment it commits. Requiring `publish` as // well is the fail-closed reading of the same table that // puts `publish(destination)` on every operation that // makes an environment start delivering something. When // #51 lands drafts, the draft write is `edit` alone and // this pair moves to the publish step. // - copy → the locked row, split across the two scopes it names, // because a formula is evaluated against ONE addressed // scope and this one spans two: `reveal(source E)` on the // source and `reveal(destination E) ∧ publish(destination // E)` on each destination. Clone-at-creation and // bulk-apply are the same pair — the ADR's three // ergonomic operations differ in what they copy, never in // what authorizes it. // // `reveal-history(source E)` — the historical-material half of the locked // row — has no operation here because this slice stores no historical // material: revisions are #51's. It joins when its material does. OpValueRead Operation = "value.read" OpValueList Operation = "value.list" OpValueReveal Operation = "value.reveal" // The reveal guard's own read (#58). It answers "will disclosing here // prompt me, and with which factor" — the window state, the protected // flag, and whether TOTP may open a window at all. Its formula is `read` // ALONE and deliberately not `reveal`: the browser has to render the // ceremony modal's shape before it holds any disclosure, and the answer is // project settings plus the caller's own session state, never material. OpRevealWindowRead Operation = "reveal.window_read" OpValueSet Operation = "value.set" OpValueClear Operation = "value.clear" // The copy pair. Both are reached by copy-to, bulk-apply AND // clone-at-creation: one authorization story for every server-side // duplication of stored material, which is exactly what the flat model's // closed trigger list asks for. OpValueCopySource Operation = "value.copy-source" OpValueCopyDestination Operation = "value.copy-destination" // The destination leg for `config` material, which is NOT reveal-gated on // either side. One surface, two registry rows, because one formula cannot // express two authorization stories — the same shape credential-reset's // org/instance pair takes. // // This is not a softening of the locked row; it is the only reading under // which the locked row's own consequences are reachable. Grants inherit // DOWNWARD only, so `reveal` on an environment that does not exist yet can // come only from a project-or-wider grant — which necessarily covers every // source environment in that project. Requiring destination `reveal` for // `config` material would therefore make source-`reveal` always hold at a // clone, and the flat-model ADR's "creation proceeds and the uncopied // secrets land absent, enumerated by name" — and mvp-boundary C2's "a clone // that would leave a `mode: all` required secret absent aborts naming the // keys" — would be unreachable text. The gate is classification-scoped in // its own wording ("begin delivering a **`secret`** value occurrence the // publisher did not supply"), and the permission-model ADR puts `config` values // under `read`. OpValueCopyDestinationConfig Operation = "value.copy-destination-config" // The import path (#68, import-paths ADR). Two operations, one per phase. // // `import.presence` is phase 1's ONLY server-side contact: it reads the // project's declared keys and, per key, the two-state presence in ONE // environment plus the server-minted occurrence token naming the exact // resolved state. The ADR's formula, exactly: structure reads carry the // project-scoped `read` the member already holds, and PRESENCE READS // REQUIRE `read(E)` for every environment whose presence is consulted — // which for an environment-depth operation is this environment. The // operation therefore carries both atoms: read@project for structure and // read@environment for presence. It never // requires `reveal`, never compares values and never writes; it is // audited-none like every other proof-scoped pure read. // // `value.import` is phase 2's batch write: one transaction, one // environment, the manifest precondition, and then ordinary value writes. // Its formula is `value.set`'s, unchanged — the writes it lands ARE // ordinary value writes, and an import that could write where `values set` // cannot would be a second write path with a weaker gate. OpImportPresence Operation = "import.presence" OpValueImport Operation = "value.import" // Drafts, publishing and revisions (#51, revision-model ADR). OpValueStage Operation = "value.stage" OpValuePendingList Operation = "value.pending-list" // `value.validate` evaluates a proposed change without staging it // (mcp-write ADR § 1). It carries `edit@env`, the authority to make the // change it validates, and it is audited: an authority-bearing action, // not a pure read whose result the trail would duplicate. OpValueValidate Operation = "value.validate" OpValuePublish Operation = "value.publish" OpValueInitialize Operation = "value.initialize" // The one bulk-disclosure verb and its two material halves. `values export` // carries `read ∧ reveal` for CURRENT material and `read ∧ reveal-history` // for historical material; a mixed export evaluates each formula over // exactly the material it governs, which one formula cannot express. OpValueExport Operation = "value.export" OpValueExportReveal Operation = "value.export-reveal" OpValueExportRevealHistory Operation = "value.export-reveal-history" OpRevisionList Operation = "revision.list" OpRevisionShow Operation = "revision.show" OpRevisionSignals Operation = "revision.signals" OpRevisionRestore Operation = "revision.restore" OpRevisionRestoreHistory Operation = "revision.restore-reveal-history" OpRevisionRestoreCurrent Operation = "revision.restore-reveal-current" OpPinSet Operation = "pin.set" OpPinSetHistory Operation = "pin.set-reveal-history" OpPinList Operation = "pin.list" OpPinRelease Operation = "pin.release" // Secret-change approvals (#151). Policy administration is project-scoped // (project-settings). Reading and voting are environment-scoped (publish@env: // only a principal who could publish here may see or vote on the review // queue). OpApprovalVote and OpApprovalBypass are the operations the two new // reauthentication purposes bind to; the merge/bypass DECISION rides the // ordinary OpValuePublish chokepoint with an added live conjunct, never a // second publish path. OpApprovalPolicyWrite Operation = "approval.policy-write" OpApprovalPolicyRead Operation = "approval.policy-read" OpApprovalRequestRead Operation = "approval.request-read" OpApprovalVote Operation = "approval.vote" OpApprovalBypass Operation = "approval.bypass" // Approval-mediated temporary access (#152). Policy administration is // member management (manage-members@project). Everything request-side is // environment-scoped under read@env: a requester can only ask to be lifted // inside an environment they can already see, so a request is never a // discovery oracle. The approver's and revoker's authority beyond read is a // post-grant check in the service (eligibility, grantability), refused with // a reachable 403. OpAccessPolicyWrite Operation = "access.policy-write" OpAccessPolicyRead Operation = "access.policy-read" OpAccessRequestCreate Operation = "access.request-create" OpAccessRequestRead Operation = "access.request-read" OpAccessVote Operation = "access.vote" OpAccessCancel Operation = "access.cancel" OpAccessRevoke Operation = "access.revoke" OpAccessBypass Operation = "access.bypass" // The advisory channel's two checks: one at connect, over the project, and // one PER EVENT over the environment the event names. OpAdvisoryWatch Operation = "advisory.watch" OpAdvisoryEvent Operation = "advisory.event" // `rotate-token-key` rides `rotate-dek`: the permission-model ADR's capability // set is CLOSED and names four rotation atoms for five rotation verbs, and // the root token key is a tier-3 key alongside the DEKs -- same master, // same one-active-per-scope index, same retirement path. OpRotateTokenKey Operation = "crypto.rotate-token-key" // `rotate-scanning-key` is the rotation inventory's sixth member // (secret-scanning ADR section 4): outright replacement of the tier-3 // scanning-fingerprint key with no version keyring and no reencrypt walk, // dropping every dismissal row in the same transaction. It rides the same // `rotate-dek` authority as the other tier-3 rotations for the same reason // `rotate-token-key` does. OpRotateScanningKey Operation = "crypto.rotate-scanning-key" // rotate-dek appends a DEK version for one project or the instance scope // (#75, encryption-model ADR § Rotation), its own instance-level capability. OpRotateDEK Operation = "crypto.rotate-dek" // rotate-master-key generates a new master and re-wraps every tier-3 key // under it, retiring the old master after a fenced zero-reference check. OpRotateMasterKey Operation = "crypto.rotate-master-key" // rotate-root-key replaces the operator-held root through the crash-safe // dual-wrapped protocol (--prepare / --verify / --finalize), one capability // across all three phases. OpRotateRootKey Operation = "crypto.rotate-root-key" // reencrypt walks a scope's ciphertext onto the active DEK version and // retires the old (#75 + #187). Split by scope class: the project walk is // tenant-class (it reads/writes a project's tenant-owned value rows), the // instance walk is instance-class. Both ride the instance-level reencrypt // capability — an operator authority over every scope. OpReencryptProject Operation = "crypto.reencrypt-project" OpReencryptInstance Operation = "crypto.reencrypt-instance" OpKeyGroupCreate Operation = "key-group.create" OpKeyGroupGet Operation = "key-group.get" OpKeyGroupList Operation = "key-group.list" OpKeyGroupRename Operation = "key-group.rename" OpKeyGroupDelete Operation = "key-group.delete" OpFolderCreate Operation = "folder.create" OpFolderGet Operation = "folder.get" OpFolderList Operation = "folder.list" OpFolderRename Operation = "folder.rename" OpFolderDelete Operation = "folder.delete" // OIDC provider administration (#54, human-auth ADR - Login methods). // Instance-config operations, MFA-mandatory like every instance capability. OpOAuth2ProviderPut Operation = "oauth2-provider.put" OpOAuth2ProviderGet Operation = "oauth2-provider.get" OpOAuth2ProviderList Operation = "oauth2-provider.list" OpOAuth2ProviderDelete Operation = "oauth2-provider.delete" OpProviderPut Operation = "oidc-provider.put" OpProviderGet Operation = "oidc-provider.get" OpProviderList Operation = "oidc-provider.list" OpProviderDelete Operation = "oidc-provider.delete" // SAML provider administration (#72, saml-sp ADR). These join the same // instance-config capability surface as OIDC. Metadata refresh is an action // on the provider resource, not a new authority or noun family. OpSAMLProviderPut Operation = "saml-provider.put" OpSAMLProviderPatch Operation = "saml-provider.patch" OpSAMLProviderGet Operation = "saml-provider.get" OpSAMLProviderList Operation = "saml-provider.list" OpSAMLProviderDelete Operation = "saml-provider.delete" OpSAMLProviderRefreshMetadata Operation = "saml-provider.refresh-metadata" OpSAMLSPKeyList Operation = "saml-sp-key.list" OpSAMLSPKeyRotate Operation = "saml-sp-key.rotate" OpSAMLSPKeyRetire Operation = "saml-sp-key.retire" OpSAMLSPKeyCompromiseRetire Operation = "saml-sp-key.compromise-retire" // Administrator-issued credential reset (#54, human-auth ADR - Recovery). // The capability is credential-reset, valid at org and instance scope only. // One route dispatches between these two by the target's grant // classification: an org-bounded target (grants within one org, no instance // capability) is reached through the org-scoped operation — an org-scope OR // instance-scope credential-reset grant covers it by downward inheritance; a // multi-org (no instance capability) target has no single org to address and // is reached only at instance scope. Instance-capability targets have no // network path at all (break-glass only). Both are MFA-mandatory (the atom // is in MFAMandatory) and audit through the resolution surface. OpCredentialReset Operation = "credential-reset.org" OpCredentialResetInstance Operation = "credential-reset.instance" // Audit trail reads (#45, audit-model ADR). One operation per addressed // depth — the registry pins one depth per tenant operation, so the three // depths are three rows sharing one service implementation; the formula // atom is audit-read at the addressed depth (grants inherit downward, so // an org-level audit-read covers all three). The instance trail is read // under an instance-scope audit-read grant — grant-evaluated like every // instance operation, never route-implied. OpAuditQueryOrg Operation = "audit.query-org" OpAuditQueryProject Operation = "audit.query-project" OpAuditQueryEnv Operation = "audit.query-env" OpAuditExportOrg Operation = "audit.export-org" OpAuditExportProject Operation = "audit.export-project" OpAuditExportEnv Operation = "audit.export-env" OpAuditInstanceQuery Operation = "audit.instance-query" OpAuditInstanceExport Operation = "audit.instance-export" // The grant surface (#55, permission-model ADR). One operation per // ADDRESSED depth, as with audit reads and credential-reset: the registry // pins one depth per tenant operation, so the four depths are four rows // sharing one service implementation. // // The formula atom sits at the depth `manage-members` is grantable at, // which is NOT always the addressed depth. Granting `read` on one // environment is authorized by `manage-members(project)` — the atom's // level truncates the resolved chain, so an env-addressed grant asks the // project question. That is the ADR's own rule ("manage-members at org / // project: create, modify and revoke grants at or below that scope") // expressed in the formula rather than in service code. OpGrantCreateOrg Operation = "grant.create-org" OpGrantCreateProject Operation = "grant.create-project" OpGrantCreateEnv Operation = "grant.create-env" OpGrantCreateInstance Operation = "grant.create-instance" // Member invitation (#568): account creation under manage-members, the // human-auth ADR's named path. Two operations because the formula differs // per depth exactly as grant.create does; each route names one. OpMemberInviteOrg Operation = "member.invite-org" OpMemberInviteInstance Operation = "member.invite-instance" // Email invitation of an existing account (#1207). Send, list and revoke // are manage-members at the org; accept re-authorizes the INVITER at the // org with the same formula the template operation carries, so the // template writer's events and the acceptance record share one proof. OpEmailInvitationSend Operation = "email-invitation.send" OpEmailInvitationList Operation = "email-invitation.list" OpEmailInvitationRevoke Operation = "email-invitation.revoke" OpEmailInvitationAccept Operation = "email-invitation.accept" OpRegistrationPolicyGetOrg Operation = "registration-policy.get-org" OpRegistrationPolicyPutOrg Operation = "registration-policy.put-org" OpRegistrationPolicyDeleteOrg Operation = "registration-policy.delete-org" OpRegistrationPolicyGetInstance Operation = "registration-policy.get-instance" OpRegistrationPolicyPutInstance Operation = "registration-policy.put-instance" OpRegistrationPolicyDeleteInstance Operation = "registration-policy.delete-instance" OpGrantRevokeOrg Operation = "grant.revoke-org" OpGrantRevokeProject Operation = "grant.revoke-project" // Member access rules (member-access-rules ADR). A rule may span several // projects of one org; the service authorizes each project it names, so // these address PROJECT depth. The atom is legacy `manage-members`: rules // themselves never satisfy it (it is inert on rules until delegation // containment exists), so only a grant-holding member manager edits rules. OpRuleCreate Operation = "rule.create" OpRuleRevoke Operation = "rule.revoke" // The rule listing mirrors the grant listing: one operation per addressed // depth, legacy `manage-members` at that depth. OpRuleListOrg Operation = "rule.list-org" OpRuleListProject Operation = "rule.list-project" OpGrantRevokeEnv Operation = "grant.revoke-env" OpGrantRevokeInstance Operation = "grant.revoke-instance" // Listing the membership surface is `manage-members` too, not `read`: // who holds which capability is administrative information, and the ADR // puts every grant read and write under the same atom ("create, modify // and revoke grants at or below that scope" is the administration of the // list the surface shows). OpGrantListOrg Operation = "grant.list-org" OpGrantListProject Operation = "grant.list-project" OpGrantListInstance Operation = "grant.list-instance" // Template application is grant creation with a name attached: the // expansion happens AT GRANT TIME and produces ordinary grants, so it // carries the same formula as a create at the same depth. OpTemplateApplyOrg Operation = "grant.template-org" OpTemplateApplyProject Operation = "grant.template-project" OpTemplateApplyEnv Operation = "grant.template-env" OpTemplateApplyInstance Operation = "grant.template-instance" // The protected-environment flag and the per-environment reauthentication // window (#55). `project-settings` is deliberately split out of // `definitions-edit` — these exist to restrain the definitions editor, and // a guard whose off-switch sits in the hand it restrains is not a guard. // The read is bare `read(E)`: an environment's protection state is part of // its public shape, and hiding it from a reader would make the reveal // ceremony inexplicable. OpEnvSettingsRead Operation = "environment.settings-read" OpEnvSettingsUpdate Operation = "environment.settings-update" OpOrgRetentionRead Operation = "retention.org-read" OpOrgRetentionUpdate Operation = "retention.org-update" OpProjectRetentionRead Operation = "retention.project-read" OpProjectRetentionUpdate Operation = "retention.project-update" OpRetentionHealthRead Operation = "retention.health-read" OpUpdateStatusRead Operation = "update.status-read" OpUpdateRequest Operation = "update.request" OpUpdateJobRead Operation = "update.job-read" // Machine identities (#61). Every one of these asks // `manage-identities(project)` and nothing more, because that is the // whole of what the CHOKEPOINT decides here. // // The mint and widen formulas' reveal conjuncts are deliberately NOT in // this table, and that is the load-bearing part: they range over a set // computed from the RESULTING STATE — every environment reachable in the // post-state for a mint, only the newly reachable set for a grant // mutation — which no static (capability, level) atom can express. They // are evaluated in service.Identities, in the same transaction, against // the same grant rows, and refuse before any row is written. A formula // atom here would have been a claim the registry could not keep. OpServiceAccountCreate Operation = "identity.service-account-create" OpServiceAccountList Operation = "identity.service-account-list" OpServiceAccountDelete Operation = "identity.service-account-delete" OpCredentialMint Operation = "identity.credential-mint" OpCredentialList Operation = "identity.credential-list" OpCredentialRevoke Operation = "identity.credential-revoke" OpCredentialPolicyRead Operation = "identity.credential-policy-read" OpCredentialPolicyUpdate Operation = "identity.credential-policy-update" OpDeveloperCredentialMint Operation = "developer-credential.mint" OpDeveloperCredentialListProject Operation = "developer-credential.list-project" OpDeveloperCredentialRevokeProject Operation = "developer-credential.revoke-project" OpDeveloperCredentialPolicyRead Operation = "developer-credential.policy-read" OpDeveloperCredentialPolicyUpdate Operation = "developer-credential.policy-update" // OIDC federation (#62). Issuer configuration is INSTANCE-scoped under // `instance-config`, never org- or project-scoped: #16 fixed this exact // argument for human providers, because an org-scoped issuer would let an // org admin add a provider and mint identities authenticating into the // instance. OpFederationIssuerCreate Operation = "federation.issuer-create" OpFederationIssuerList Operation = "federation.issuer-list" OpFederationIssuerUpdate Operation = "federation.issuer-update" OpFederationIssuerDelete Operation = "federation.issuer-delete" // Creating a federated binding is a MINT, so it sits beside // identity.credential-mint and carries the same capability half here and the // same post-state disclosure conjunct in the service. There is no // binding-UPDATE operation, and that absence is the immutability rule // expressed in the registry: a change is a replacement mint through this // same row, carrying the full formula, and an operation for editing in place // would be the authority-laundering path #15 closed for adapters. // // Binding DELETE and LIST reuse identity.credential-revoke and // identity.credential-list: a binding IS a credential row, so a second pair // of operations over the same rows would be two places for one formula to // drift. Reactivation (§ Restore) rides credential-revoke too, because it // only ever NARROWS what the binding accepts. OpBindingCreate Operation = "identity.binding-create" // The machine delivery surface (#62; ADR § Authentication, authorization // and the fetch path). Tenant-class at ENVIRONMENT depth under bare `read`, // which is what makes a caller who lost `read` receive the // uniform-nonexistent answer rather than "current" — the conditional path // authorizes exactly like the delivering path. // // It is NOT `audited: none` despite being a bare-`read` tenant operation: // the ADR requires one immutable access record per fetch, including the // conditional fetch that delivers nothing. OpDeliveryFetch Operation = "delivery.fetch" // Personal values (#1235, personal-values ADR). No capability atom reaches // another person's value: every owner operation binds the owner from the // proof, so the formula decides only whether the caller may act on their // own value in this environment. Set and reveal carry the reveal gate's // `read ∧ reveal`; list and delete need `read`. Members and member delete // return and remove metadata only and never read ciphertext. OpPersonalValueList Operation = "personal-value.list" OpPersonalValueSet Operation = "personal-value.set" OpPersonalValueReveal Operation = "personal-value.reveal" OpPersonalValueDelete Operation = "personal-value.delete" OpPersonalValueMembers Operation = "personal-value.members" OpPersonalValueDeleteMember Operation = "personal-value.delete-member" OpPersonalValueCounts Operation = "personal-value.counts" OpPersonalOffboardingReport Operation = "personal-value.offboarding-report" // Offline disclosure records are accepted only through a live machine // presentation holding the same environment read authority as delivery. OpDeliveryReconcileOffline Operation = "delivery.reconcile-offline" // Delivery-target condition reporting (#788, k8s-condition-reporting ADR). // Report and tombstone are the machine half: `report-delivery-status` at // environment depth, the workload's one value-free write (D1). List is the // human half: bare `read` on the environment (D7), so rows of an // environment the viewer cannot read are absent, never redacted. OpDeliveryTargetReport Operation = "delivery-target.report" OpDeliveryTargetTombstone Operation = "delivery-target.tombstone" OpDeliveryTargetList Operation = "delivery-target.list" // Generic file destinations (#164). Create, update and delete bind a // workload service account's delivery to one environment and key // selection, so they need both the adapter and the identity authority of // the project. Inspect is adapter metadata. Report is the bound workload's // value-free write, under the integration-neutral `report-delivery-status` // atom the condition-reporting ADR introduced for exactly this shape. OpFileTargetCreate Operation = "file-target.create" OpFileTargetUpdate Operation = "file-target.update" OpFileTargetDelete Operation = "file-target.delete" OpFileTargetInspect Operation = "file-target.inspect" OpFileTargetReport Operation = "file-target.report" // SCIM provisioning (#73, scim-provisioning ADR). Two families, two // formulas, one depth. // // The ADMINISTRATION family is `manage-members(org)` AT ORG SCOPE EXACTLY // (§1): a mapping row causes grants the author need not hold, and // unheld-capability granting is an org/instance power under the locked // escalation asymmetry — a project-scope member manager must not reach it // through SCIM. The atom sits at LevelOrg rather than the capability's own // deepest level for exactly that reason. // // The WIRE family is `scim-provision(org)`, the machine-only atom the // provisioning connection holds structurally. There is no ambient routing // by credential: the presented credential must match the binding in the // path, and the org in the path is what the formula resolves against. OpSCIMBindingCreate Operation = "scim-binding.create" OpSCIMBindingGet Operation = "scim-binding.get" OpSCIMBindingList Operation = "scim-binding.list" OpSCIMBindingDelete Operation = "scim-binding.delete" OpSCIMMappingCreate Operation = "scim-mapping.create" OpSCIMMappingUpdate Operation = "scim-mapping.update" OpSCIMMappingDelete Operation = "scim-mapping.delete" OpSCIMMappingList Operation = "scim-mapping.list" OpSCIMCredentialMint Operation = "scim-credential.mint" OpSCIMCredentialGet Operation = "scim-credential.get" OpSCIMCredentialList Operation = "scim-credential.list" OpSCIMCredentialRevoke Operation = "scim-credential.revoke" OpSCIMDirectoryUsers Operation = "scim-directory.users" OpSCIMDirectoryGroups Operation = "scim-directory.groups" OpSCIMUserCreate Operation = "scim-user.create" OpSCIMUserGet Operation = "scim-user.get" OpSCIMUserList Operation = "scim-user.list" OpSCIMUserReplace Operation = "scim-user.replace" OpSCIMUserPatch Operation = "scim-user.patch" OpSCIMUserDelete Operation = "scim-user.delete" OpSCIMGroupCreate Operation = "scim-group.create" OpSCIMGroupGet Operation = "scim-group.get" OpSCIMGroupList Operation = "scim-group.list" OpSCIMGroupReplace Operation = "scim-group.replace" OpSCIMGroupPatch Operation = "scim-group.patch" OpSCIMGroupDelete Operation = "scim-group.delete" // Discovery (ServiceProviderConfig / ResourceTypes / Schemas) is static // protocol documentation carrying no tenant data, but it still runs under // the binding's authentication and admission — so it is an operation like // any other rather than an unauthenticated hole in the mount. OpSCIMDiscovery Operation = "scim-discovery.read" // OpSCIMUnsupported is the authenticated refusal of Bulk, /Me and the // `.search` POST query. They are routes rather than 404s because the ADR // requires each to be refused with the RFC 7644 error shape, and they // authenticate like every other wire operation so an unauthenticated caller // gets the uniform refusal rather than a 501 confirming the binding exists. OpSCIMUnsupported Operation = "scim-unsupported.refuse" // Multi-instance, the serving side (#71). The directory-serve operation is // what an instance-connection credential presents against, and — per the // ADR's amendment to the artifact-eligibility matrix — the ONLY operation // it may reach. The embedded OpenAPI operation's `instance-credential` // declaration is the other half of the confinement; the formula alone // would not carry it, because a later // operation adopting the same formula would widen every existing token. // // It is an instance-scope read that crosses org boundaries BY DESIGN: the // listing is instance identity, version, health, and the names and counts // of orgs and projects. That is why it is registered as its own operation // and probe-classified instance-scope rather than riding any tenant read — // there is no single tenant it addresses, and pretending otherwise would // put a cross-org read behind a per-org probe contract. OpRemoteDirectoryServe Operation = "remote.directory-serve" // Multi-instance, the VIEWING side (#71). The split follows the ADR's own // reasoning: CUSTODY of connections — add, remove, credential storage — is // instance configuration and rides `instance-config`; VIEWING the directory // is `instance-directory`, its own grantable atom, because reading is power // and is never bundled. The org/project NAMES in the listing are the reason // that gate exists: they are foreign structure, and the remote cannot scope // them per-viewer without the proxy machinery the ADR rejects. OpRemoteAdd Operation = "remote.add" OpRemoteList Operation = "remote.list" OpRemoteShow Operation = "remote.show" OpRemoteRename Operation = "remote.rename" OpRemoteRemove Operation = "remote.remove" // Multi-instance, the SERVING side (#71). Credential custody and the origin // allowlist are both instance configuration. OpRemoteCredentialCreate Operation = "remote-credential.create" OpRemoteCredentialList Operation = "remote-credential.list" OpRemoteCredentialShow Operation = "remote-credential.show" OpRemoteCredentialRevoke Operation = "remote-credential.revoke" OpWorkspaceOriginList Operation = "workspace-origin.list" OpWorkspaceOriginAdd Operation = "workspace-origin.add" OpWorkspaceOriginRemove Operation = "workspace-origin.remove" // Deployment adapters (#65). The registry carries the plain // manage-adapters half; service code adds reveal over every affected // environment and reauthentication for configure/widen/adopt/sync. OpAdapterConfigure Operation = "adapter.configure" OpAdapterCredentialSet Operation = "adapter.credential-set" OpAdapterCredentialRevoke Operation = "adapter.credential-revoke" OpAdapterAdopt Operation = "adapter.adopt" OpAdapterInspect Operation = "adapter.inspect" OpAdapterPlan Operation = "adapter.plan" OpAdapterTest Operation = "adapter.test" OpAdapterSync Operation = "adapter.sync" OpAdapterDelete Operation = "adapter.delete" OpAdapterPush Operation = "adapter.push" // Dynamic secrets (#147). Provider configuration is project-scoped standing // authority (manage-identities); a lease is an environment-scoped // short-lived credential. Mint carries read+reveal so the machine-reveal // opt-in and pin rules apply unchanged. OpLeaseRenew is the worker's // per-transition re-authorization for renew (mint re-auths through // OpLeaseMint); revoke/expire are the fail-safe direction and re-check no // grants. OpDynamicProviderConfigure Operation = "dynamic-provider.configure" OpDynamicProviderInspect Operation = "dynamic-provider.inspect" OpDynamicProviderCredentialSet Operation = "dynamic-provider.credential-set" OpDynamicProviderCredentialRevoke Operation = "dynamic-provider.credential-revoke" OpDynamicProviderDelete Operation = "dynamic-provider.delete" OpLeaseMint Operation = "lease.mint" OpLeaseInspect Operation = "lease.inspect" OpLeaseRenew Operation = "lease.renew" OpLeaseRevoke Operation = "lease.revoke" OpLeaseSettle Operation = "lease.settle" // SSH user certificates (#155). Everything is environment-scoped. CA and // profile management is manage-identities@project; reads of public trust // material and metadata are read@environment (machine-holdable, so a host // holding a workload credential fetches its trust bundle and KRL). Issue // is read@environment like lease.mint; the per-profile requester list and // the human mint ceremony are its service-side conjuncts. Revoke is // read@environment plus "requester or manage-identities" in the service. OpSSHCAConfigure Operation = "ssh-ca.configure" OpSSHCAInspect Operation = "ssh-ca.inspect" OpSSHCARotate Operation = "ssh-ca.rotate" OpSSHCARetireKey Operation = "ssh-ca.retire-key" OpSSHCADelete Operation = "ssh-ca.delete" OpSSHProfileConfigure Operation = "ssh-profile.configure" OpSSHProfileInspect Operation = "ssh-profile.inspect" OpSSHProfileDelete Operation = "ssh-profile.delete" OpSSHCertIssue Operation = "ssh-cert.issue" OpSSHCertInspect Operation = "ssh-cert.inspect" OpSSHCertRevoke Operation = "ssh-cert.revoke" // Transit (#156, transit ADR D7). Key management rides crypto-manage at // project scope (human-only); the data plane rides crypto-use at // environment scope (workload and automation may hold it). Inspection is // the bare `read@environment` metadata read, audited-none. transit.use // carries postGrantForbidden: key policy (state, version window, per-key // caller entries, allowed operations) refuses after the formula passes. OpTransitKeyCreate Operation = "transit.key-create" OpTransitKeyInspect Operation = "transit.key-inspect" OpTransitKeyConfigure Operation = "transit.key-configure" OpTransitKeyRotate Operation = "transit.key-rotate" OpTransitKeyLifecycle Operation = "transit.key-lifecycle" OpTransitKeyTrim Operation = "transit.key-trim" OpTransitUse Operation = "transit.use" // Private PKI (#154, pki ADR). Issuers and profiles are instance policy // (`instance-config`); issuance is an environment act under the // `issue-certificate` atom, machine-holdable under the profile's // machine_issuance opt-in, which the service applies per caller class (the // lease.mint shape). Inspect is the audit-free certificate read. OpPKIIssuerInspect Operation = "pki-issuer.inspect" OpPKIIssuerCreate Operation = "pki-issuer.create" OpPKIIssuerInstall Operation = "pki-issuer.install" OpPKIIssuerRotate Operation = "pki-issuer.rotate" OpPKIIssuerRetire Operation = "pki-issuer.retire" OpPKIIssuerRevoke Operation = "pki-issuer.revoke" OpPKIIssuerReleaseHold Operation = "pki-issuer.release-hold" OpPKIIssuerPublishCRL Operation = "pki-issuer.publish-crl" OpPKIProfileInspect Operation = "pki-profile.inspect" OpPKIProfileCreate Operation = "pki-profile.create" OpPKIProfileUpdate Operation = "pki-profile.update" OpPKIProfileDelete Operation = "pki-profile.delete" OpPKIProfileBind Operation = "pki-profile.bind" OpPKIProfileUnbind Operation = "pki-profile.unbind" OpCertificateIssue Operation = "certificate.issue" OpCertificateRenew Operation = "certificate.renew" OpCertificateRevoke Operation = "certificate.revoke" OpCertificateInspect Operation = "certificate.inspect" )
The registered operations. Service code names operations through these constants; the registry below is keyed by them.
type OrgIdentity ¶
type OrgIdentity = authn.OrgIdentity
OrgIdentity re-exports the resolution surface's navigation record so internal/service can name it without importing internal/store/authn, which the boundary test forbids.
type Origin ¶
GrantRow, Origin and GrantLine are re-exported so the service layer never names the resolution-surface package.
type PasswordCredential ¶
type PasswordCredential = authn.PasswordCredential
PasswordCredential is a resolved verifier row with its CAS version.
type PrincipalRef ¶
type PrincipalRef = authn.PrincipalRef
PrincipalRef names a principal awaiting reconciliation.
type PrivacyAccountView ¶
type PrivacyAccountView = authn.PrivacyAccountView
type PrivacyActivity ¶
type PrivacyActivity = authn.PrivacyActivity
type PrivacySession ¶
type PrivacySession = authn.PrivacySession
type Proof ¶
type Proof interface {
// contains filtered or unexported methods
}
Proof is evidence that authorize() ran, for one operation, inside one still-live transaction. It is an interface with an unexported method, implemented by exactly one unexported type in this package: outside code cannot implement it and cannot construct a non-nil value of it — the only forgeable value is nil, and the store boundary rejects that fail-closed (tenant-isolation ADR § chokepoint pattern). A proof is not a capability token: it dies with its transaction, so it cannot be stored, replayed, or reused across retries.
func SystemAuthority ¶
func SystemAuthority(site SystemSite, tok *TxToken) (Proof, error)
SystemAuthority mints a SystemProof for one of the closed no-principal mint sites (boot, migration, recovery-mode reconciliation, break-glass, scheduler). It is not generic store authority: the proof is operation- and transaction-bound like every other kind, against the site's closed operation set in the system registry — growth of either set fails the build until the tenant-isolation ADR is amended (invariant 11).
type ProviderUpdate ¶
type ProviderUpdate = authn.ProviderUpdate
ProviderUpdate is the provider reconfigure carrier.
type Reachable ¶
type Reachable struct {
// Current is where read(E) ∧ reveal(E) holds — current plaintext.
Current map[domain.EnvID]bool
// Historical is where read(E) ∧ reveal-history(E) holds — superseded
// plaintext, which may still be live in an external service.
Historical map[domain.EnvID]bool
}
Reachable is the ADR's reachability computation, and the comment is the point of the function: the two authority classes are computed INDEPENDENTLY and never collapsed into one "can reach plaintext" boolean.
Collapsing them is a named bypass in the ADR, and a subtle one: a service account already holding read(E) ∧ reveal(E) shows an EMPTY delta when granted reveal-history(E), so an actor with no historical access at all could hand a machine principal the power to read superseded secrets. The permission-model ADR fixed the rule this violates — "reveal-history implies nothing about reveal, and vice versa".
func ReachableFrom ¶
ReachableFrom evaluates the two classes over a project's environments for one grant set. `grants` is the WHOLE set a principal would hold in the state being tested, so the caller computes a pre-state and a post-state and diffs them per class.
type ReauthWindow ¶
type ReauthWindow = authn.ReauthWindow
ReauthWindow is a resolved reauthentication-window row.
type RecoveryBatch ¶
type RecoveryBatch = authn.RecoveryBatch
RecoveryBatch is a resolved recovery-code batch.
type RegistrationEntry ¶
type RegistrationEntry = authn.RegistrationEntry
RegistrationEntry is one external entry of a policy.
type RegistrationPolicy ¶
type RegistrationPolicy = authn.RegistrationPolicy
RegistrationPolicy is a resolved policy with its child rows.
type RegistrationSignup ¶
type RegistrationSignup = authn.RegistrationSignup
type RegistrationSignupRef ¶
type RegistrationSignupRef = authn.RegistrationSignupRef
RegistrationSignupRef names one pending local sign-up row.
type Registry ¶
type Registry struct {
// contains filtered or unexported fields
}
Registry is the validated, immutable operation registry. newRegistry is the only way to build one, and mustNewRegistry installs it at package init, so a malformed policy table aborts initialization instead of surfacing later as a runtime authorization anomaly. Production lookups read this, never the raw table.
type RegistryFacts ¶
type RegistryFacts struct{}
Registry exposes read-only registry facts to the invariant tests (registry completeness, classification totality, system-site enumeration) without exposing mutation. Production code has no business calling these.
func (RegistryFacts) AuditMappings ¶
func (RegistryFacts) AuditMappings() map[Operation]AuditMapping
AuditMappings returns every registered operation's audit linkage.
func (RegistryFacts) Caches ¶
func (RegistryFacts) Caches() map[string]Cache
Caches returns the cache registry for the invariant test.
func (RegistryFacts) FormulaPins ¶
func (RegistryFacts) FormulaPins() []FormulaPin
FormulaPins returns the whole operation registry in a stable, diffable shape, sorted by operation name.
func (RegistryFacts) Formulas ¶
func (RegistryFacts) Formulas() map[Operation]Formula
Formulas returns each operation's formula; a registered operation with an empty formula fails invariant 6.
func (RegistryFacts) Operations ¶
func (RegistryFacts) Operations() map[Operation]Class
Operations lists every registered operation and its class.
func (RegistryFacts) StoreOps ¶
func (RegistryFacts) StoreOps() map[StoreOp][]Operation
StoreOps returns the union of store operations reachable through the operation registry, keyed by which operations may invoke them.
func (RegistryFacts) SystemSiteEvents ¶
func (RegistryFacts) SystemSiteEvents() map[SystemSite][]audit.EventType
SystemSiteEvents returns the event types each no-principal mint site may emit. Keeping this visible to the audit closure invariant prevents a system event from becoming dead catalogue merely because it has no human operation.
func (RegistryFacts) SystemSites ¶
func (RegistryFacts) SystemSites() map[SystemSite][]StoreOp
SystemSites returns the closed mint-site enumeration and each site's operation set.
func (RegistryFacts) TenantOperations ¶
func (RegistryFacts) TenantOperations() map[Operation]domain.Level
TenantOperations lists each tenant-class operation with the chain depth it addresses, for registry well-formedness checks.
func (RegistryFacts) Wire ¶
func (RegistryFacts) Wire() map[string]Class
Wire returns the wire registry for the invariant tests.
func (RegistryFacts) WireEvents ¶
func (RegistryFacts) WireEvents() map[string][]audit.EventType
WireEvents returns the direct wire→event mapping for the invariant tests.
func (RegistryFacts) WireRoutes ¶
func (RegistryFacts) WireRoutes() map[string][]Operation
WireRoutes returns the route→operation(s) mapping for the invariant tests and the contract cross-check.
type RemotePairedConnection ¶
type RemotePairedConnection = authn.RemotePairedConnection
Re-exported so the service layer never names the resolution-surface package.
type RemotePairingExchange ¶
type RemotePairingExchange = authn.RemotePairingExchange
Re-exported so the service layer never names the resolution-surface package.
type RemotePairingInvite ¶
type RemotePairingInvite = authn.RemotePairingInvite
Re-exported so the service layer never names the resolution-surface package.
type RestoreState ¶
type RestoreState = authn.RestoreState
RestoreState is the instance's restore posture.
type SAMLProvider ¶
type SAMLProvider = authn.SAMLProvider
SAMLProvider is a resolved SAML identity-provider row.
type SAMLProviderUpdate ¶
type SAMLProviderUpdate = authn.SAMLProviderUpdate
SAMLProviderUpdate is the provider compare-and-swap carrier.
type SAMLTransaction ¶
type SAMLTransaction = authn.SAMLTransaction
SAMLTransaction is a server-side AuthnRequest transaction.
type SCIMCredential ¶
type SCIMCredential = authn.SCIMCredential
The SCIM provisioning credential as AUTHENTICATION sees it (#73 §7). Its administration lives on the proof-carrying repository instead.
type ServiceAccount ¶
type ServiceAccount = authn.ServiceAccount
Re-exported so the service layer never names the resolution-surface package.
type ServiceAccountCreation ¶
type ServiceAccountCreation = authn.ServiceAccountCreation
Re-exported so the service layer never names the resolution-surface package.
type ServiceAccountDeletion ¶
type ServiceAccountDeletion = authn.ServiceAccountDeletion
Re-exported so the service layer never names the resolution-surface package.
type SessionSummary ¶
type SessionSummary = authn.SessionSummary
The workspace tier's carrier types, re-exported so the service layer never names internal/store/authn — the import-boundary test enforces that the resolution surface is reachable only through this package.
type StoreOp ¶
type StoreOp string
StoreOp names one store method in the trusted query registry. Every store method is registered to the operation(s) it serves (invariant 6); the boundary check consults this registry on every call.
const ( StoreSelfConfigSeedInputs StoreOp = "selfconfig.SeedInputs" StoreSelfConfigHostSeedInputs StoreOp = "selfconfig.HostSeedInputs" StoreSelfConfigPutSeedInput StoreOp = "selfconfig.PutSeedInput" StoreSelfConfigRecoverTarget StoreOp = "selfconfig.RecoverTarget" StoreSelfConfigBinding StoreOp = "selfconfig.Binding" StoreSelfConfigPreviousRevision StoreOp = "selfconfig.PreviousRevision" StoreSelfConfigRollout StoreOp = "selfconfig.Rollout" StoreSelfConfigPutRollout StoreOp = "selfconfig.PutRollout" StoreSelfConfigNextRolloutSequence StoreOp = "selfconfig.NextRolloutSequence" StoreSelfConfigJobs StoreOp = "selfconfig.Jobs" StoreSelfConfigJob StoreOp = "selfconfig.Job" StoreSelfConfigJobByIdempotencyKey StoreOp = "selfconfig.JobByIdempotencyKey" StoreSelfConfigNodes StoreOp = "selfconfig.Nodes" StoreSelfConfigRetained StoreOp = "selfconfig.Retained" StoreSelfConfigCreateBinding StoreOp = "selfconfig.CreateBinding" StoreSelfConfigBeginJob StoreOp = "selfconfig.BeginJob" StoreSelfConfigCommitJob StoreOp = "selfconfig.CommitJob" StoreSelfConfigFinishJob StoreOp = "selfconfig.FinishJob" StoreSelfConfigPutNode StoreOp = "selfconfig.PutNode" StoreSelfConfigFenceRestored StoreOp = "selfconfig.FenceRestored" StoreKeysInsertInitialProjectDEK StoreOp = "keys.InsertInitialProjectDEK" StoreOrgsCreate StoreOp = "orgs.Create" StoreOrgsGet StoreOp = "orgs.Get" StoreOrgsList StoreOp = "orgs.List" StoreOrgsListIDs StoreOp = "orgs.ListIDs" StoreOrgsCount StoreOp = "orgs.Count" StoreOrgsRename StoreOp = "orgs.Rename" StoreOrgsSetIdentity StoreOp = "orgs.SetIdentity" StoreOrgsSetIdentityImage StoreOp = "orgs.SetIdentityImage" StoreOrgsLock StoreOp = "orgs.Lock" StoreOrgsSetRetention StoreOp = "orgs.SetRetention" StoreOrgsDelete StoreOp = "orgs.Delete" StoreProjectsCreate StoreOp = "projects.Create" StoreProjectsGet StoreOp = "projects.Get" StoreProjectsGetCapacity StoreOp = "projects.GetCapacity" StoreProjectsSetCapacity StoreOp = "projects.SetCapacity" StoreProjectsList StoreOp = "projects.List" StoreProjectsListIDs StoreOp = "projects.ListIDs" // StoreProjectsListAll is the cross-org enumeration the multi-instance // directory serves (#71). It belongs to instance-scope operations only. StoreProjectsListAll StoreOp = "projects.ListAll" StoreProjectsLock StoreOp = "projects.Lock" StoreProjectsRename StoreOp = "projects.Rename" // The chrome identity (hue, mark, uploaded image) of a project. StoreProjectsSetIdentity StoreOp = "projects.SetIdentity" StoreProjectsSetIdentityImage StoreOp = "projects.SetIdentityImage" StoreProjectsGetIdentityImage StoreOp = "projects.GetIdentityImage" StoreProjectsSetRetention StoreOp = "projects.SetRetention" // StoreProjectsSetDefinitionsSource flips the git/db definitions mode (#70). // It rides project-settings authority, off the definitions-edit path. StoreProjectsSetDefinitionsSource StoreOp = "projects.SetDefinitionsSource" // StoreProjectsSetMachineReveal flips the per-project machine-reveal // opt-in (source-of-truth ADR), a project-settings write. StoreProjectsSetMachineReveal StoreOp = "projects.SetMachineReveal" StoreProjectsDelete StoreOp = "projects.Delete" // The definitions plan ledger (#70). CreatePlan/MarkPlanApplied/PruneExpired // mutate; GetPlan/CountOpenPlans/LatestAppliedPlan read. StoreDefinitionsPlanCreate StoreOp = "definitions.CreatePlan" StoreDefinitionsPlanGet StoreOp = "definitions.GetPlan" StoreDefinitionsPlanCountOpen StoreOp = "definitions.CountOpenPlans" StoreDefinitionsPlanApply StoreOp = "definitions.MarkPlanApplied" StoreDefinitionsPlanPrune StoreOp = "definitions.PruneExpiredPlans" StoreDefinitionsLatestAppliedPlan StoreOp = "definitions.LatestAppliedPlan" StoreEnvironmentParametersGet StoreOp = "environments.Parameters" StoreEnvironmentParametersSet StoreOp = "environments.SetParameters" StoreEnvironmentsCreate StoreOp = "environments.Create" StoreEnvironmentsGet StoreOp = "environments.Get" StoreEnvironmentsList StoreOp = "environments.List" // StoreEnvironmentsListPage is the MCP-bounded keyset environment read (#629). StoreEnvironmentsListPage StoreOp = "environments.ListPage" StoreEnvironmentsCount StoreOp = "environments.Count" StoreEnvironmentsNextOrder StoreOp = "environments.NextOrder" StoreEnvironmentsUpdateNote StoreOp = "environments.UpdateNote" StoreEnvironmentsRename StoreOp = "environments.Rename" StoreEnvironmentsSetOrder StoreOp = "environments.SetOrder" StoreEnvironmentsDelete StoreOp = "environments.Delete" // The protected flag and per-environment window (#55). StoreEnvironmentsGetSettings StoreOp = "environments.Settings" StoreEnvironmentsSetSettings StoreOp = "environments.SetSettings" // StoreEnvironmentsListProtection is the project-scoped protected-flag read // behind the definitions plan/apply protected-set pin (#70). StoreEnvironmentsListProtection StoreOp = "environments.ListProtection" // The key catalogue (#49). Named `catalogue.*` and not `keys.*`: that // prefix is the KEYRING's (#43, wrapped crypto material), and two unrelated // senses of "key" sharing an operation prefix is how a proof minted for one // would look admissible for the other. StoreCatalogueCreate StoreOp = "catalogue.Create" StoreCatalogueGet StoreOp = "catalogue.Get" StoreCatalogueList StoreOp = "catalogue.List" // The MCP-bounded catalogue reads (#629): a keyset key page, a single key // resolved under the list authorization, and one key's presence rows. StoreCatalogueListPage StoreOp = "catalogue.ListPage" StoreCatalogueGetInProject StoreOp = "catalogue.GetInProject" StoreCataloguePresenceForKey StoreOp = "catalogue.PresenceForKey" StoreCatalogueCount StoreOp = "catalogue.Count" StoreCatalogueAdapterPins StoreOp = "catalogue.AdapterPins" StoreCatalogueRename StoreOp = "catalogue.Rename" StoreCatalogueUpdateMetadata StoreOp = "catalogue.UpdateMetadata" StoreCatalogueUpdateDeclaration StoreOp = "catalogue.UpdateDeclaration" StoreCatalogueSetClassification StoreOp = "catalogue.SetClassification" StoreCatalogueSetGroup StoreOp = "catalogue.SetGroup" StoreCatalogueDelete StoreOp = "catalogue.Delete" StoreCatalogueGroupCreate StoreOp = "catalogue.CreateGroup" StoreCatalogueGroupGet StoreOp = "catalogue.GetGroup" StoreCatalogueGroupList StoreOp = "catalogue.ListGroups" StoreCatalogueGroupCount StoreOp = "catalogue.CountGroups" StoreCatalogueGroupRename StoreOp = "catalogue.RenameGroup" StoreCatalogueGroupDelete StoreOp = "catalogue.DeleteGroup" StoreCatalogueGroupClearMembers StoreOp = "catalogue.ClearGroupMembers" StoreCataloguePresenceList StoreOp = "catalogue.ListPresence" StoreCataloguePresenceReplace StoreOp = "catalogue.ReplacePresence" // personal_required_in rows (#1235): no rows is `none`, rows are `explicit`. StoreCataloguePersonalRequiredList StoreOp = "catalogue.PersonalRequired" StoreCataloguePersonalRequiredReplace StoreOp = "catalogue.ReplacePersonalRequired" StoreCataloguePresenceCascade StoreOp = "catalogue.DeletePresenceForEnvironment" StoreCatalogueRevisionGet StoreOp = "catalogue.SchemaRevision" StoreAdaptersTarget StoreOp = "adapters.Target" StoreAdaptersGet StoreOp = "adapters.Get" StoreAdaptersConfiguration StoreOp = "adapters.Configuration" StoreAdaptersConfigurationForUpdate StoreOp = "adapters.ConfigurationForUpdate" StoreAdaptersList StoreOp = "adapters.List" StoreAdaptersListTargets StoreOp = "adapters.ListTargets" StoreAdaptersTargetKeyIDs StoreOp = "adapters.TargetKeyIDs" StoreAdaptersCreate StoreOp = "adapters.Create" StoreAdaptersAddTarget StoreOp = "adapters.AddTarget" StoreAdaptersRecordCredentialExpiry StoreOp = "adapters.RecordCredentialExpiry" StoreAdaptersBeginConfigureEffect StoreOp = "adapters.BeginConfigureEffect" StoreAdaptersFinishConfigureEffect StoreOp = "adapters.FinishConfigureEffect" StoreAdaptersUpdateTarget StoreOp = "adapters.UpdateTarget" StoreAdaptersMoveTarget StoreOp = "adapters.MoveTarget" StoreAdaptersMoveOrigin StoreOp = "adapters.MoveOrigin" StoreAdaptersMove StoreOp = "adapters.Move" // Reencrypt walk over the two adapter credential columns. StoreAdaptersListForReencrypt StoreOp = "adapters.ListAdaptersForReencrypt" StoreAdaptersReencrypt StoreOp = "adapters.ReencryptAdapter" StoreAdaptersListMovesForReencrypt StoreOp = "adapters.ListRouteMovesForReencrypt" StoreAdaptersReencryptMove StoreOp = "adapters.ReencryptRouteMove" StoreAdaptersCancelMove StoreOp = "adapters.CancelMove" StoreAdaptersReplaceMoveTarget StoreOp = "adapters.ReplaceMoveTarget" StoreAdaptersReplaceMoveOrigin StoreOp = "adapters.ReplaceMoveOrigin" StoreAdaptersMapping StoreOp = "adapters.Mapping" StoreAdaptersPlanMaterial StoreOp = "adapters.PlanMaterial" StoreAdaptersTargetEnvironments StoreOp = "adapters.TargetEnvironments" StoreAdaptersEnvironments StoreOp = "adapters.Environments" StoreAdaptersConflicts StoreOp = "adapters.Conflicts" StoreAdaptersRecordPlan StoreOp = "adapters.RecordPlan" StoreAdaptersAdopt StoreOp = "adapters.Adopt" StoreAdaptersEnqueuePublished StoreOp = "adapters.EnqueuePublished" StoreAdaptersTeardownTarget StoreOp = "adapters.TeardownTarget" StoreAdaptersTeardownAdapter StoreOp = "adapters.TeardownAdapter" StoreAdaptersReplaceCredential StoreOp = "adapters.ReplaceCredential" StoreAdaptersRevokeCredential StoreOp = "adapters.RevokeCredential" StoreAdaptersEnqueueManual StoreOp = "adapters.EnqueueManual" StoreAdaptersTargetKeys StoreOp = "adapters.TargetKeys" StoreAdaptersPauseTarget StoreOp = "adapters.PauseTarget" StoreAdaptersResumeTarget StoreOp = "adapters.ResumeTarget" StoreAdaptersHealthCounts StoreOp = "adapters.HealthCounts" StoreCatalogueRevisionBump StoreOp = "catalogue.BumpSchemaRevision" // Dynamic secrets (#147). Request-path (proof-carrying) store methods; the // worker's lease-transition SQL runs through the proof-free DynamicRuntime // (the domain-specific outbox pattern, like AdapterRuntime). StoreDynamicProvidersCreate StoreOp = "dynamic.CreateProvider" StoreDynamicProvidersGet StoreOp = "dynamic.GetProvider" StoreDynamicProvidersCredentialCiphertext StoreOp = "dynamic.ProviderCredentialCiphertext" StoreDynamicProvidersList StoreOp = "dynamic.ListProviders" StoreDynamicProvidersReplaceCredential StoreOp = "dynamic.ReplaceProviderCredential" StoreDynamicProvidersRevokeCredential StoreOp = "dynamic.RevokeProviderCredential" StoreDynamicProvidersDelete StoreOp = "dynamic.DeleteProvider" StoreDynamicProvidersListForReencrypt StoreOp = "dynamic.ListProvidersForReencrypt" StoreDynamicProvidersReencrypt StoreOp = "dynamic.ReencryptProvider" StoreDynamicLeasesActiveIDsForProvider StoreOp = "dynamic.ActiveLeaseIDsForProvider" StoreDynamicLeasesCreate StoreOp = "dynamic.CreateLease" StoreDynamicLeasesGet StoreOp = "dynamic.GetLease" StoreDynamicLeasesList StoreOp = "dynamic.ListLeasesForEnvironment" StoreDynamicLeasesFinishMint StoreOp = "dynamic.FinishMint" StoreDynamicLeasesEnqueueTransition StoreOp = "dynamic.EnqueueTransition" // SSH user certificates (#155). Proof-carrying, environment-bound; the // sweeper's revocation SQL runs through the proof-free SSHRuntime. StoreSSHCreateCA StoreOp = "ssh.CreateCA" StoreSSHInsertCAKey StoreOp = "ssh.InsertCAKey" StoreSSHGetCA StoreOp = "ssh.GetCA" StoreSSHListCAs StoreOp = "ssh.ListCAs" StoreSSHActiveCAKey StoreOp = "ssh.ActiveCAKey" StoreSSHRetireActiveCAKey StoreOp = "ssh.RetireActiveCAKey" StoreSSHRetireCAKey StoreOp = "ssh.RetireCAKey" StoreSSHDeleteCA StoreOp = "ssh.DeleteCA" StoreSSHCountLiveProfilesForCA StoreOp = "ssh.CountLiveProfilesForCA" StoreSSHActiveKeyLastExpiry StoreOp = "ssh.ActiveKeyLastExpiry" StoreSSHGetProfile StoreOp = "ssh.GetProfile" StoreSSHListProfiles StoreOp = "ssh.ListProfiles" StoreSSHCreateProfile StoreOp = "ssh.CreateProfile" StoreSSHUpdateProfile StoreOp = "ssh.UpdateProfile" StoreSSHDeleteProfile StoreOp = "ssh.DeleteProfile" StoreSSHIsRequester StoreOp = "ssh.IsRequester" StoreSSHInsertCertificate StoreOp = "ssh.InsertCertificate" StoreSSHGetCertificate StoreOp = "ssh.GetCertificate" StoreSSHListCertificates StoreOp = "ssh.ListCertificates" StoreSSHRevokeCertificate StoreOp = "ssh.RevokeCertificate" StoreSSHRevokeProfileCertificates StoreOp = "ssh.RevokeProfileCertificates" StoreSSHRevokedSerials StoreOp = "ssh.RevokedSerials" StoreSSHListCAKeysForReencrypt StoreOp = "ssh.ListCAKeysForReencrypt" StoreSSHReencryptCAKey StoreOp = "ssh.ReencryptCAKey" StoreSSHPurgeEnvironment StoreOp = "ssh.PurgeEnvironment" // Transit (#156, transit ADR). Request-path, proof-carrying store methods; // the scheduler reaches the rotation and purge doors under scoped system // authority. StoreTransitKeysList StoreOp = "transit.ListKeys" StoreTransitKeysGet StoreOp = "transit.GetKey" StoreTransitKeysGetForUse StoreOp = "transit.GetKeyForUse" StoreTransitKeysCount StoreOp = "transit.CountKeys" StoreTransitKeysCreate StoreOp = "transit.CreateKey" StoreTransitKeysConfigure StoreOp = "transit.Configure" StoreTransitKeysChangeState StoreOp = "transit.ChangeState" StoreTransitKeysCompromise StoreOp = "transit.Compromise" StoreTransitVersionsList StoreOp = "transit.ListVersions" StoreTransitVersionMaterial StoreOp = "transit.VersionMaterial" StoreTransitVersionsAppend StoreOp = "transit.AppendVersion" StoreTransitVersionsTrim StoreOp = "transit.Trim" StoreTransitVersionsFenceTrim StoreOp = "transit.FenceTrim" StoreTransitVersionsListForReencrypt StoreOp = "transit.ListVersionsForReencrypt" StoreTransitVersionsReencrypt StoreOp = "transit.ReencryptVersion" StoreTransitCallersList StoreOp = "transit.ListCallers" StoreTransitSelectDeletionDue StoreOp = "transit.SelectDeletionDue" StoreTransitSelectRotationDue StoreOp = "transit.SelectRotationDue" StoreTransitDestroyVersions StoreOp = "transit.DestroyVersions" StoreTransitDestroy StoreOp = "transit.Destroy" // Private PKI (#154). Request-path store methods; the worker's expiry, // unknown and CRL sweeps run through the proof-free PKIRuntime. StorePKIIssuersList StoreOp = "pki.ListIssuers" StorePKIIssuersGet StoreOp = "pki.GetIssuer" StorePKIIssuersKey StoreOp = "pki.IssuerKey" StorePKIIssuersCreate StoreOp = "pki.CreateIssuer" StorePKIIssuersInstall StoreOp = "pki.InstallIssuerCertificate" StorePKIIssuersTransition StoreOp = "pki.TransitionIssuer" StorePKIIssuersDestroyKey StoreOp = "pki.DestroyIssuerKey" StorePKIIssuersHold StoreOp = "pki.SetIssuerHold" StorePKIIssuersPublishCRL StoreOp = "pki.PublishCRL" StorePKIIssuersPublic StoreOp = "pki.IssuerPublic" StorePKIIssuersActivePublic StoreOp = "pki.ActiveIssuerPublic" StorePKIIssuersSigning StoreOp = "pki.IssuerForSigning" StorePKIIssuersFence StoreOp = "pki.FenceIssuance" StorePKIProfilesList StoreOp = "pki.ListProfiles" StorePKIProfilesGet StoreOp = "pki.GetProfile" StorePKIProfilesCreate StoreOp = "pki.CreateProfile" StorePKIProfilesUpdate StoreOp = "pki.UpdateProfile" StorePKIProfilesDelete StoreOp = "pki.DeleteProfile" StorePKIProfilesBound StoreOp = "pki.BoundProfile" StorePKIProfilesBoundList StoreOp = "pki.BoundProfiles" StorePKIBindingsList StoreOp = "pki.ListBindings" StorePKIBindingsCreate StoreOp = "pki.CreateBinding" StorePKIBindingsDelete StoreOp = "pki.DeleteBinding" StorePKICertificatesGet StoreOp = "pki.GetCertificate" StorePKICertificatesList StoreOp = "pki.ListCertificates" StorePKICertificatesCreate StoreOp = "pki.CreateCertificate" StorePKICertificatesFinish StoreOp = "pki.FinishCertificate" StorePKICertificatesFail StoreOp = "pki.FailCertificate" StorePKICertificatesClaimRenewal StoreOp = "pki.ClaimRenewal" StorePKICertificatesCompleteRenewal StoreOp = "pki.CompleteRenewal" StorePKICertificatesReleaseRenewal StoreOp = "pki.ReleaseRenewal" StorePKICertificatesRevoke StoreOp = "pki.RevokeCertificate" StorePKICertificatesCountLive StoreOp = "pki.CountLiveCertificates" StorePKICertificatesRevokeLive StoreOp = "pki.RevokeLiveCertificates" StorePKICertificatesRevokedEntries StoreOp = "pki.RevokedEntries" StoreFoldersCreate StoreOp = "folders.Create" StoreFoldersGet StoreOp = "folders.Get" StoreFoldersList StoreOp = "folders.List" StoreFoldersRename StoreOp = "folders.Rename" StoreFoldersDelete StoreOp = "folders.Delete" // The flat value model (#50). `values.*` rather than `value.*` to match // the CLI noun and to keep the prefix distinct from `catalogue.*` (the // key DECLARATIONS) and `keys.*` (the KEYRING, #43) — three neighbouring // senses of "key" that must never share a store-op prefix. StoreValuesGet StoreOp = "values.Get" StoreValuesList StoreOp = "values.List" StoreValuesEnvironmentsWithValue StoreOp = "values.EnvironmentsWithValue" StoreValuesPut StoreOp = "values.Put" // The reencrypt walk's project-wide page + in-place re-seal of value rows. StoreValuesListForReencrypt StoreOp = "values.ListForReencrypt" StoreValuesReencrypt StoreOp = "values.Reencrypt" StoreValuesClear StoreOp = "values.Clear" StoreValuesClearEnvironment StoreOp = "values.ClearEnvironment" // StoreValuesCountEnvironment is the project-scoped live-occurrence count // behind the definitions-apply environment-delete refusal (#70). StoreValuesCountEnvironment StoreOp = "values.CountEnvironmentValues" // StoreValuesClearKey clears a key's occurrences project-wide when // definitions apply deletes the key with --allow-delete (#70). StoreValuesClearKey StoreOp = "values.ClearKey" // Drafts and published revisions (#51). `pending.*` is the per-user // working state; `snapshots.*` is the published state, its lineage and // its payload — one aggregate because a revision, its resolved map and // its changed-key rows are written in one act and must never drift. StorePendingListForOwner StoreOp = "pending.ListForOwner" StorePendingListForOwnerInEnvironment StoreOp = "pending.ListForOwnerInEnvironment" // StorePendingListForOwnerInEnvironmentPage is the MCP-bounded keyset draft // read (#629). StorePendingListForOwnerInEnvironmentPage StoreOp = "pending.ListForOwnerInEnvironmentPage" StorePendingListMarkers StoreOp = "pending.ListMarkers" StorePendingStage StoreOp = "pending.Stage" StorePendingListForReencrypt StoreOp = "pending.ListForReencrypt" StorePendingReencrypt StoreOp = "pending.Reencrypt" StorePendingDiscard StoreOp = "pending.Discard" StorePendingDiscardEnvironment StoreOp = "pending.DiscardEnvironment" StorePendingDiscardKey StoreOp = "pending.DiscardKey" // StorePendingCountForProjectExcludingCell is the per-project pending-cap // read taken during a stage: the project's pending total, less the cell // being staged (ops-spec §8, ≤100 pending versions per project). StorePendingCountForProjectExcludingCell StoreOp = "pending.CountForProjectExcludingCell" StoreSnapshotsLatest StoreOp = "snapshots.Latest" StoreSnapshotsParameterContract StoreOp = "snapshots.ParameterContract" // StoreSnapshotsProjectRevisions is the project-scoped per-environment latest // revision behind the definitions plan/apply value-snapshot pin (#70). StoreSnapshotsProjectRevisions StoreOp = "snapshots.ProjectRevisions" StoreSnapshotsAtRevision StoreOp = "snapshots.AtRevision" // StoreSnapshotsList is the whole-environment header read behind the pin // retention consequence; history surfaces page through ListPage instead. StoreSnapshotsList StoreOp = "snapshots.List" // StoreSnapshotsListPage is the bounded keyset revision-history read (#629): // the API, CLI and MCP history surfaces all page through it. StoreSnapshotsListPage StoreOp = "snapshots.ListPage" StoreSnapshotsEntries StoreOp = "snapshots.Entries" StoreSnapshotsListForReencrypt StoreOp = "snapshots.ListForReencrypt" StoreSnapshotsReencrypt StoreOp = "snapshots.Reencrypt" StoreSnapshotsChanges StoreOp = "snapshots.Changes" // StoreSnapshotsChangesInRange is the history page's lineage read: the // change rows of every revision on one page in one statement. StoreSnapshotsChangesInRange StoreOp = "snapshots.ChangesInRange" StoreSnapshotsInsert StoreOp = "snapshots.Insert" StoreSnapshotsInsertEntry StoreOp = "snapshots.InsertEntry" // StoreSnapshotsSecretValueOccurrenceIDsIn is the point membership read of // the sticky sensitivity lineage for a handful of named value entries. StoreSnapshotsSecretValueOccurrenceIDsIn StoreOp = "snapshots.SecretValueOccurrenceIDsIn" StoreSnapshotsRecordSecretValueOccurrence StoreOp = "snapshots.RecordSecretValueOccurrence" StoreSnapshotsInsertChange StoreOp = "snapshots.InsertChange" StoreSnapshotsDeleteEnvironment StoreOp = "snapshots.DeleteEnvironment" StorePinsGetForWorkload StoreOp = "pins.GetForWorkload" StorePinsList StoreOp = "pins.List" StorePinsCountProject StoreOp = "pins.CountProject" StorePinsInsert StoreOp = "pins.Insert" StorePinsDelete StoreOp = "pins.Delete" StorePinsDeleteEnvironment StoreOp = "pins.DeleteEnvironment" StoreDeliveryTargetsGet StoreOp = "deliverytargets.Get" StoreDeliveryTargetsList StoreOp = "deliverytargets.List" StoreDeliveryTargetsQuotaNotices StoreOp = "deliverytargets.QuotaNotices" StoreDeliveryTargetsLastFetch StoreOp = "deliverytargets.LastFetchAt" StoreDeliveryTargetsCountPrincipal StoreOp = "deliverytargets.CountForPrincipal" StoreDeliveryTargetsInsert StoreOp = "deliverytargets.Insert" StoreDeliveryTargetsUpdate StoreOp = "deliverytargets.Update" StoreDeliveryTargetsRecordRefusal StoreOp = "deliverytargets.RecordRefusal" StoreDeliveryTargetsDelete StoreOp = "deliverytargets.Delete" StoreDeliveryTargetsRecordQuota StoreOp = "deliverytargets.RecordQuotaRefusal" // The hourly 30-day purge (ADR D6): scheduler authority only. StoreDeliveryTargetsSelectExpired StoreOp = "deliverytargets.SelectExpired" StoreDeliveryTargetsPurge StoreOp = "deliverytargets.Purge" StoreFileTargetsList StoreOp = "filetargets.List" StoreFileTargetsGet StoreOp = "filetargets.Get" StoreFileTargetsKeys StoreOp = "filetargets.Keys" StoreFileTargetsKeysForTargets StoreOp = "filetargets.KeysForTargets" StoreFileTargetsForPrincipal StoreOp = "filetargets.ForPrincipal" StoreFileTargetsCreate StoreOp = "filetargets.Create" StoreFileTargetsReplaceKeys StoreOp = "filetargets.ReplaceKeys" StoreFileTargetsDelete StoreOp = "filetargets.Delete" StoreFileTargetsRecordReport StoreOp = "filetargets.RecordReport" StoreRetentionAuditPolicy StoreOp = "retention.AuditPolicy" StoreRetentionSetAuditPolicy StoreOp = "retention.SetAuditPolicy" StoreRetentionPruneAudit StoreOp = "retention.PruneAudit" StoreRetentionEligible StoreOp = "retention.Eligible" StoreRetentionSnapshotLock StoreOp = "retention.LockSnapshot" StoreRetentionMarkCollected StoreOp = "retention.MarkCollected" StoreRetentionDeleteEntries StoreOp = "retention.DeleteCollectedEntries" StoreRetentionLastSuccess StoreOp = "retention.LastPruneSuccess" StoreRetentionSetLastSuccess StoreOp = "retention.SetLastPruneSuccess" StoreOpsDiagnosticsRead StoreOp = "retention.Diagnostics" StoreEscrowVerificationWrite StoreOp = "retention.RecordEscrow" StoreReencryptSuccessWrite StoreOp = "retention.RecordReencryptSuccess" // Disaster-recovery health row (#145, ops-spec section 11). Instance // operational state, no tenant chain: the scheduler's export and prune // jobs write it, the restore drill writes its verdict, and the audited // health read plus the /metrics scrape read it. StoreBackupStateGet StoreOp = "backupstate.Get" StoreBackupStateSetExportSuccess StoreOp = "backupstate.SetExportSuccess" StoreBackupStateSetExportFailure StoreOp = "backupstate.SetExportFailure" StoreBackupStateSetPruneResult StoreOp = "backupstate.SetPruneResult" StoreBackupStateSetDrill StoreOp = "backupstate.SetDrill" // The restore drill's decrypt proof reads ONE stored secret cell, // ciphertext only, across the instance (#145). Opening it needs the // keyring the drill is handed separately; the read alone discloses nothing. StoreValuesSampleSecretEntry StoreOp = "values.SampleSecretEntry" // Per-project storage high-water (#185, ops-spec section 8 / section 141). // The two project-scoped byte sums are read at publish to refuse a project // already at the 4 GiB high-water; the two instance-scoped by-project sums // back the operator storage surface (doctor warn at 1 GiB, metric). StoreValuesPayloadBytesForProject StoreOp = "values.PayloadBytesForProject" StoreSnapshotsPayloadBytesForProject StoreOp = "snapshots.PayloadBytesForProject" StoreValuesInstancePayloadByProject StoreOp = "values.InstancePayloadByProject" StoreSnapshotsInstancePayloadByProject StoreOp = "snapshots.InstancePayloadByProject" // Keyring persistence (#43). These carry no tenant chain: wrapped-key // rows are instance-scoped crypto material, and the scope a tier-3 key // belongs to is part of its AAD, not a tenant predicate. StoreKeysActiveMasterWrappers StoreOp = "keys.ActiveMasterWrappers" StoreKeysActiveTier3 StoreOp = "keys.ActiveTier3" StoreKeysActiveTokenKeyForReceipt StoreOp = "keys.ActiveTokenKeyForReceipt" StoreKeysTier3Versions StoreOp = "keys.Tier3Versions" StoreKeysAllOpenableTier3 StoreOp = "keys.AllOpenableTier3" // StoreKeysAssertActiveDEKVersion is the writer fence, invoked inside every // ciphertext-writing operation's transaction — a read (+ FOR SHARE lock on // postgres) of the sealed DEK version's state. It is in the store sets of the // operations that write ciphertext, not the boot set. StoreKeysAssertActiveDEKVersion StoreOp = "keys.AssertActiveDEKVersion" StoreKeysAcquireHierarchyGeneration StoreOp = "keys.AcquireHierarchyGeneration" StoreKeysInsertMaster StoreOp = "keys.InsertMaster" StoreKeysInsertTier3 StoreOp = "keys.InsertTier3" StoreKeysRotateTokenKey StoreOp = "keys.RotateTokenKey" StoreKeysRotateScanningKey StoreOp = "keys.RotateScanningKey" StoreKeysRotateDEK StoreOp = "keys.RotateDEK" StoreKeysRotateMasterKey StoreOp = "keys.RotateMasterKey" StoreKeysRetireRetiringTier3 StoreOp = "keys.RetireRetiringTier3" // The instance-credential reencrypt surface (#75/#187), one ReencryptRepo. StoreReencryptListPasswordCreds StoreOp = "reencrypt.ListPasswordCredsForReencrypt" StoreReencryptPasswordCred StoreOp = "reencrypt.ReencryptPasswordCred" StoreReencryptListTotpCreds StoreOp = "reencrypt.ListTotpCredsForReencrypt" StoreReencryptTotpCred StoreOp = "reencrypt.ReencryptTotpCred" StoreReencryptListRecoveryCodes StoreOp = "reencrypt.ListRecoveryCodesForReencrypt" StoreReencryptRecoveryCodes StoreOp = "reencrypt.ReencryptRecoveryCodes" StoreReencryptListOidcProviders StoreOp = "reencrypt.ListOidcProvidersForReencrypt" StoreReencryptOidcProvider StoreOp = "reencrypt.ReencryptOidcProvider" StoreReencryptListOauth2Providers StoreOp = "reencrypt.ListOauth2ProvidersForReencrypt" StoreReencryptOauth2Provider StoreOp = "reencrypt.ReencryptOauth2Provider" StoreReencryptListSelfConfigSeedInputs StoreOp = "reencrypt.ListSelfConfigSeedInputsForReencrypt" StoreReencryptSelfConfigSeedInput StoreOp = "reencrypt.ReencryptSelfConfigSeedInput" StoreReencryptListSamlKeys StoreOp = "reencrypt.ListSamlKeysForReencrypt" StoreReencryptSamlKey StoreOp = "reencrypt.ReencryptSamlKey" StoreReencryptListPairingInvites StoreOp = "reencrypt.ListPairingInvitesForReencrypt" StoreReencryptPairingInvites StoreOp = "reencrypt.ReencryptPairingInvites" StoreReencryptListPairingExchanges StoreOp = "reencrypt.ListPairingExchangesForReencrypt" StoreReencryptPairingExchanges StoreOp = "reencrypt.ReencryptPairingExchanges" StoreReencryptListRemotes StoreOp = "reencrypt.ListRemotesForReencrypt" StoreReencryptRemote StoreOp = "reencrypt.ReencryptRemote" StoreReencryptListPkiIssuers StoreOp = "reencrypt.ListPkiIssuersForReencrypt" StoreReencryptPkiIssuer StoreOp = "reencrypt.ReencryptPkiIssuer" StoreKeysAssertRootKeyEpoch StoreOp = "keys.AssertRootKeyEpoch" StoreKeysRootRotatePrepare StoreOp = "keys.RootKeyRotatePrepare" StoreKeysRootRotateFinalize StoreOp = "keys.RootKeyRotateFinalize" StoreKeysInsertScopeGeneration StoreOp = "keys.InsertScopeGeneration" // Secret-scanning dismissal rows (#74, secret-scanning ADR section 4). The // "keep as config" sticky-dismissal surface. Insert/Exists ride the // environment-scoped config-value write; DeleteByKey rides key deletion and // reclassification-to-secret; DeleteByProject rides project deletion; // DeleteAll rides `rotate-scanning-key` (instance-scoped, cross-tenant). StoreScanningDismissalsInsert StoreOp = "scanningdismissals.Insert" StoreScanningDismissalsExists StoreOp = "scanningdismissals.Exists" StoreScanningDismissalsDeleteByKey StoreOp = "scanningdismissals.DeleteByKey" StoreScanningDismissalsDeleteByProject StoreOp = "scanningdismissals.DeleteByProject" StoreScanningDismissalsDeleteAll StoreOp = "scanningdismissals.DeleteAll" // Personal values (#1235). The Own doors bind the owner from the proof; // Holders and DeleteMember name an owner but never return ciphertext. StorePersonalValuesPut StoreOp = "personalvalues.Put" StorePersonalValuesGetOwn StoreOp = "personalvalues.GetOwn" StorePersonalValuesListOwn StoreOp = "personalvalues.ListOwn" StorePersonalValuesDeleteOwn StoreOp = "personalvalues.DeleteOwn" StorePersonalValuesCountProject StoreOp = "personalvalues.CountProject" // The definitions plan reports how many personal values an environment // deletion removes. StorePersonalValuesCountEnvironment StoreOp = "personalvalues.CountForEnvironment" StorePersonalValuesHolders StoreOp = "personalvalues.Holders" StorePersonalValuesDeleteMember StoreOp = "personalvalues.DeleteMember" StorePersonalValuesCellsForKey StoreOp = "personalvalues.CellsForKey" StorePersonalValuesDeleteForKey StoreOp = "personalvalues.DeleteForKey" // DeleteForEnvironment also clears that environment's notices. StorePersonalValuesDeleteForEnv StoreOp = "personalvalues.DeleteForEnvironment" StorePersonalValuesReencryptList StoreOp = "personalvalues.ListForReencrypt" StorePersonalValuesReencrypt StoreOp = "personalvalues.Reencrypt" StorePersonalValueNoticesListOwn StoreOp = "personalvalues.NoticesOwn" StorePersonalValueNoticesDismiss StoreOp = "personalvalues.DismissNotice" StorePersonalValueNoticesForKey StoreOp = "personalvalues.NoticesForKeyName" StorePersonalValueNoticesRecord StoreOp = "personalvalues.RecordNotice" // Matrix counts and the offboarding report (#1235): counts, key names, // environment ids and timestamps, never a value or an audit payload. StorePersonalReportCounts StoreOp = "personalreport.Counts" StorePersonalReportReceipts StoreOp = "personalreport.Receipts" StorePersonalReportKeyChanges StoreOp = "personalreport.KeyChanges" StorePersonalReportEvidence StoreOp = "personalreport.Evidence" StorePersonalReportMemberSeen StoreOp = "personalreport.MemberSeen" // The retention sweep (scheduler): an installation-wide metadata page, then // tenant-scoped suspend/resume and expiry deletes per row. StorePersonalValuesRetentionList StoreOp = "personalvalues.RetentionPage" StorePersonalValuesRetentionMark StoreOp = "personalvalues.MarkSuspended" StorePersonalValuesRetentionDelete StoreOp = "personalvalues.DeleteExpired" // The forbidden_in cascade: one key's personal values in one environment. StorePersonalValuesDeleteForKeyInEnv StoreOp = "personalvalues.DeleteForKeyInEnvironment" // Secret-change approvals (#151). The policy-bound review-and-merge engine's // store doors. Policy CRUD and its child approver/bypasser sets are // project-scoped; requests and votes are environment-scoped. The two // expiry-sweep doors are cross-tenant and ride scheduler authority. StoreApprovalPolicyInsert StoreOp = "approvals.InsertPolicy" StoreApprovalPolicyGet StoreOp = "approvals.GetPolicy" StoreApprovalPolicyCovering StoreOp = "approvals.CoveringPolicy" StoreApprovalPolicyList StoreOp = "approvals.ListPolicies" StoreApprovalPolicyUpdate StoreOp = "approvals.UpdatePolicy" StoreApprovalPolicyDelete StoreOp = "approvals.DeletePolicy" StoreApprovalApproverInsert StoreOp = "approvals.InsertApprover" StoreApprovalApproverList StoreOp = "approvals.ListApprovers" StoreApprovalApproverClear StoreOp = "approvals.ClearApprovers" StoreApprovalBypasserInsert StoreOp = "approvals.InsertBypasser" StoreApprovalBypasserList StoreOp = "approvals.ListBypassers" StoreApprovalBypasserClear StoreOp = "approvals.ClearBypassers" StoreApprovalBypasserGet StoreOp = "approvals.IsBypasser" StoreApprovalRequestInsert StoreOp = "approvals.InsertRequest" StoreApprovalRequestGet StoreOp = "approvals.GetRequest" StoreApprovalRequestList StoreOp = "approvals.ListRequests" StoreApprovalRequestUpdateState StoreOp = "approvals.UpdateRequestState" StoreApprovalRequestSelectExpiry StoreOp = "approvals.SelectExpired" StoreApprovalRequestMarkExpired StoreOp = "approvals.MarkExpired" StoreApprovalRequestCounts StoreOp = "approvals.OperationalCounts" StoreApprovalVoteInsert StoreOp = "approvals.InsertVote" StoreApprovalVoteGet StoreOp = "approvals.GetVote" StoreApprovalVoteList StoreOp = "approvals.ListVotes" // Approval-mediated temporary access (#152). Policy CRUD and its child // sets are project-scoped; requests and votes are environment-scoped. The // sweep and metric doors are cross-tenant and ride scheduler authority. The // time-bound grant rows are NOT here: they are on the resolution surface. StoreAccessPolicyInsert StoreOp = "access.InsertPolicy" StoreAccessPolicyGet StoreOp = "access.GetPolicy" StoreAccessPolicyCovering StoreOp = "access.CoveringPolicy" StoreAccessPolicyList StoreOp = "access.ListPolicies" StoreAccessPolicyUpdate StoreOp = "access.UpdatePolicy" StoreAccessPolicyDelete StoreOp = "access.DeletePolicy" StoreAccessApproverInsert StoreOp = "access.InsertApprover" StoreAccessApproverList StoreOp = "access.ListApprovers" StoreAccessApproverClear StoreOp = "access.ClearApprovers" StoreAccessBypasserInsert StoreOp = "access.InsertBypasser" StoreAccessBypasserList StoreOp = "access.ListBypassers" StoreAccessBypasserClear StoreOp = "access.ClearBypassers" StoreAccessBypasserGet StoreOp = "access.IsBypasser" StoreAccessRequestInsert StoreOp = "access.InsertRequest" StoreAccessRequestGet StoreOp = "access.GetRequest" StoreAccessRequestList StoreOp = "access.ListRequests" StoreAccessRequestGrant StoreOp = "access.GrantRequest" StoreAccessRequestResolve StoreOp = "access.ResolveRequest" StoreAccessRequestSelectDue StoreOp = "access.SelectDue" StoreAccessRequestMarkExpired StoreOp = "access.MarkExpired" StoreAccessRequestCounts StoreOp = "access.OperationalCounts" StoreAccessVoteInsert StoreOp = "access.InsertVote" StoreAccessVoteGet StoreOp = "access.GetVote" StoreAccessVoteList StoreOp = "access.ListVotes" // Audit trails (#45). INSERT and SELECT only — the append-only invariant // lives at the query layer; these are the only store doors to it. The // denial writer does NOT pass through these: it is the authorization // package's own enumerated write path (audit-model ADR amendment part 4) // and runs with no proof to verify. // Multi-instance, the VIEWING side (#71). These are class=instance rows — // instance-scope configuration and foreign structure at rest — so unlike // the connection tables they ride the proof-gated repositories and need // registry entries. Reaching the sealed credential is its own StoreOp so // that an operation licensed to LIST remotes is not thereby licensed to // present one. StoreRemotesCreate StoreOp = "remotes.Create" StoreRemotesList StoreOp = "remotes.List" StoreRemotesGet StoreOp = "remotes.Get" StoreRemotesGetByName StoreOp = "remotes.GetByName" StoreRemotesCount StoreOp = "remotes.Count" StoreRemotesRename StoreOp = "remotes.Rename" StoreRemotesDelete StoreOp = "remotes.Delete" StoreRemotesSealed StoreOp = "remotes.SealedCredential" StoreRemoteSnapshotsList StoreOp = "remotes.Snapshots" StoreRemoteSnapshotsGet StoreOp = "remotes.Snapshot" StoreRemoteSnapshotsWrite StoreOp = "remotes.WriteSnapshot" StoreRemoteSnapshotsFail StoreOp = "remotes.RecordFetchFailure" StoreAuditTenantInsert StoreOp = "audit.InsertTenant" StoreAuditInstanceInsert StoreOp = "audit.InsertInstance" StoreAuditClaimOfflineRecord StoreOp = "audit.ClaimOfflineRecord" StoreAuditTenantPage StoreOp = "audit.PageTenant" StoreAuditInstancePage StoreOp = "audit.PageInstance" StoreAuditTenantMaxSeq StoreOp = "audit.MaxTenantSeq" StoreAuditInstanceMaxSeq StoreOp = "audit.MaxInstanceSeq" // SCIM provisioning (#73). One StoreOp per method on store.SCIMRepo, as // invariant 6 requires: the registry is reflected against the repository // bundle, so a method without a row here — or a row here without a method — // fails the build. Grouping several methods behind one coarse op would have // been shorter and would have let an operation authorized to read the // directory write it. StoreSCIMLockBinding StoreOp = "scim.LockBinding" StoreSCIMCreateCredential StoreOp = "scim.CreateCredential" StoreSCIMCredential StoreOp = "scim.Credential" StoreSCIMCredentials StoreOp = "scim.Credentials" StoreSCIMRevokeCredential StoreOp = "scim.RevokeCredential" StoreSCIMRevokeCredentialsForBinding StoreOp = "scim.RevokeCredentialsForBinding" StoreSCIMDeleteCredentialsForBinding StoreOp = "scim.DeleteCredentialsForBinding" StoreSCIMCreateBinding StoreOp = "scim.CreateBinding" StoreSCIMBinding StoreOp = "scim.Binding" StoreSCIMBindings StoreOp = "scim.Bindings" StoreSCIMTouchBinding StoreOp = "scim.TouchBinding" StoreSCIMDeleteBinding StoreOp = "scim.DeleteBinding" // StoreSCIMRetireConnection removes a binding's provisioning connection, // scoped by the proof's org AND the binding row that owns it. StoreSCIMRetireConnection StoreOp = "scim.RetireConnectionPrincipal" StoreSCIMCreateMapping StoreOp = "scim.CreateMapping" StoreSCIMMapping StoreOp = "scim.Mapping" StoreSCIMMappings StoreOp = "scim.Mappings" StoreSCIMMappingsForGroup StoreOp = "scim.MappingsForGroup" StoreSCIMSetMappingInert StoreOp = "scim.SetMappingInert" StoreSCIMUpdateMappingTemplate StoreOp = "scim.UpdateMappingTemplate" StoreSCIMDeleteMapping StoreOp = "scim.DeleteMapping" StoreSCIMDeleteMappingsForBinding StoreOp = "scim.DeleteMappingsForBinding" StoreSCIMCreateUser StoreOp = "scim.CreateUser" StoreSCIMUser StoreOp = "scim.User" StoreSCIMUserByUserName StoreOp = "scim.UserByUserName" StoreSCIMPageUsers StoreOp = "scim.PageUsers" StoreSCIMUserBySubject StoreOp = "scim.UserBySubject" StoreSCIMUserByAccount StoreOp = "scim.UserByAccount" StoreSCIMUsers StoreOp = "scim.Users" StoreSCIMUpdateUser StoreOp = "scim.UpdateUser" StoreSCIMDeleteUser StoreOp = "scim.DeleteUser" StoreSCIMDeleteUsersForBinding StoreOp = "scim.DeleteUsersForBinding" StoreSCIMCreateGroup StoreOp = "scim.CreateGroup" StoreSCIMGroup StoreOp = "scim.Group" StoreSCIMPageGroups StoreOp = "scim.PageGroups" StoreSCIMGroups StoreOp = "scim.Groups" StoreSCIMUpdateGroup StoreOp = "scim.UpdateGroup" StoreSCIMDeleteGroup StoreOp = "scim.DeleteGroup" StoreSCIMDeleteGroupsForBinding StoreOp = "scim.DeleteGroupsForBinding" StoreSCIMAddGroupMember StoreOp = "scim.AddGroupMember" StoreSCIMGroupMembers StoreOp = "scim.GroupMembers" StoreSCIMMembershipsForUser StoreOp = "scim.MembershipsForUser" StoreSCIMRemoveGroupMember StoreOp = "scim.RemoveGroupMember" StoreSCIMClearGroupMembers StoreOp = "scim.ClearGroupMembers" StoreSCIMRemoveMembershipsForUser StoreOp = "scim.RemoveMembershipsForUser" StoreSCIMDeleteGroupMembersForBinding StoreOp = "scim.DeleteGroupMembersForBinding" StoreSCIMEnterAttention StoreOp = "scim.EnterAttention" StoreSCIMAttention StoreOp = "scim.Attention" StoreSCIMClearAttention StoreOp = "scim.ClearAttention" StoreSCIMDeleteAttentionForBinding StoreOp = "scim.DeleteAttentionForBinding" )
type StoredRule ¶
type StoredRule = authn.StoredRule
StoredRule and StoredRuleItem are re-exported so the service layer never names the resolution-surface package.
type StoredRuleItem ¶
type StoredRuleItem = authn.StoredRuleItem
StoredRule and StoredRuleItem are re-exported so the service layer never names the resolution-surface package.
type SystemSite ¶
type SystemSite string
SystemSite is a SystemProof mint site. The set is closed by the tenant-isolation ADR (invariant 11): boot, migration, recovery-mode reconciliation, break-glass local host authority — the ADR names the existing no-principal set, it adds no new authority. Growth of this set, or of any site's operation set, fails the build until the ADR is amended.
const ( SiteSelfConfigSeed SystemSite = "self-config-seed" SiteSelfConfigRecovery SystemSite = "self-config-recovery" SiteSelfConfigRuntime SystemSite = "self-config-runtime" SiteEscrow SystemSite = "local-escrow-verification" SiteBoot SystemSite = "boot" SiteMigration SystemSite = "migration" SiteRecoveryReconcile SystemSite = "recovery-mode-reconciliation" SiteBreakGlass SystemSite = "break-glass" SiteScheduler SystemSite = "scheduler" )
type TOTPCredential ¶
type TOTPCredential = authn.TOTPCredential
TOTPCredential is a resolved TOTP factor.
type TxAuthorizer ¶
type TxAuthorizer struct {
// contains filtered or unexported fields
}
TxAuthorizer is the in-transaction face of authorize(). The transaction package constructs one per transaction attempt from the resolution surface bound to that same transaction; service code receives it inside the closure and can only mint proofs through it — the resolver itself is never exposed.
func NewTxAuthorizer ¶
func NewTxAuthorizer(r *authn.Resolver, tok *TxToken) *TxAuthorizer
NewTxAuthorizer binds authorize() to one transaction attempt. Called by internal/store/tx only; the concrete *authn.Resolver requirement means no other package can supply a fabricated resolution surface.
func (*TxAuthorizer) AccountByEmail ¶
func (*TxAuthorizer) AccountByID ¶
AccountByID resolves an account by id.
func (*TxAuthorizer) AccountByPrincipal ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) AccountByPrincipal(ctx context.Context, p domain.PrincipalID) (Account, error)
AccountByPrincipal resolves the account a session's principal owns — the bridge the factor paths need to reach an account's password/TOTP/recovery rows from the principal a session carries.
func (*TxAuthorizer) AccountByUsername ¶
AccountByUsername resolves a login handle inside this transaction.
func (*TxAuthorizer) AccountByWebAuthnUserHandle ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) AccountByWebAuthnUserHandle(ctx context.Context, handle []byte) (Account, error)
AccountByWebAuthnUserHandle resolves the account a discoverable assertion names.
func (*TxAuthorizer) AccountCount ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) AccountCount(ctx context.Context) (int64, error)
AccountCount answers the bootstrap path's one question. It has no network route: `hikyo admin create` runs on the server's own host.
func (*TxAuthorizer) AccountProfile ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) AccountProfile(ctx context.Context, accountID string) (AccountProfile, error)
func (*TxAuthorizer) ActiveSAMLSPKey ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) ActiveSAMLSPKey(ctx context.Context) (SAMLSPKey, error)
ActiveSAMLSPKey resolves the signing key used for AuthnRequests.
func (*TxAuthorizer) AddGrantOrigin ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) AddGrantOrigin(ctx context.Context, id, grantID string, p domain.PrincipalID, o Origin, at time.Time) error
AddGrantOrigin attaches one origin to a grant row.
func (*TxAuthorizer) AdmitOperation ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) AdmitOperation(ctx context.Context, caller Identity) error
AdmitOperation enforces the artifact classes declared by the exact network operation attached to a request. Authentication still resolves the live identity inside this transaction; this check then refuses a resolved bearer whose class the contract excludes before handler logic can use it.
An absent operation means an in-process caller. Each network adapter attaches a compiled contract before dispatch, so there is no request-derived fallback table and a new declaration takes effect without a second edit.
func (*TxAuthorizer) AdvanceGeneration ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) AdvanceGeneration(ctx context.Context, p domain.PrincipalID) error
AdvanceGeneration invalidates every session of a principal at once. It runs in the same transaction as the change that triggered it.
func (*TxAuthorizer) AdvanceRestoreEpoch ¶
AdvanceRestoreEpoch performs the restore's invalidation.
func (*TxAuthorizer) AdvanceTOTPStep ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) AdvanceTOTPStep(ctx context.Context, id string, rowVersion, step int64) (bool, error)
AdvanceTOTPStep consumes a code's step; false means it was not beyond the last.
func (*TxAuthorizer) AdvanceWebAuthnSignCount ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) AdvanceWebAuthnSignCount(ctx context.Context, id string, rowVersion, count int64, at time.Time) (bool, error)
AdvanceWebAuthnSignCount writes the presented counter under a row_version CAS; false means the row moved or was disabled.
func (*TxAuthorizer) AllowWorkspaceOrigin ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) AllowWorkspaceOrigin(ctx context.Context, o authn.WorkspaceOrigin) error
func (*TxAuthorizer) ApproveCLILogin ¶
func (*TxAuthorizer) ApproveCLIReauthHandoff ¶
func (*TxAuthorizer) ApproveWorkspaceHandoff ¶
func (*TxAuthorizer) AssertActiveInstanceDEKVersion ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) AssertActiveInstanceDEKVersion(ctx context.Context, version int64) error
AssertActiveInstanceDEKVersion is the writer fence for authentication-surface credential writes, which seal under the instance DEK with no tenant proof to carry the proof-based fence. It refuses (domain.ErrConflict) a write whose sealed instance DEK version a concurrent rotate-dek --instance has retired. See the authn.Resolver method for the query semantics.
func (*TxAuthorizer) AttributeDenials ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) AttributeDenials(obj audit.Object)
AttributeDenials names the OBJECT every denial captured from here on addresses, so a refusal's envelope carries what it was about.
It exists for the schema model's per-key audit obligation on the reveal gates ("every attempt is audited ... per key and per principal"): the grant.denied PAYLOAD is a closed schema shared by every operation and must not grow a key field, but the envelope's object type/id is exactly the place an acted-on object belongs, and it already round-trips to both audit tables.
It attributes, it never authorizes: the object id is caller-supplied vocabulary that decides nothing, and the formula is evaluated as before.
func (*TxAuthorizer) Authenticate ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) Authenticate(ctx context.Context, presented string, now time.Time) (Identity, error)
Authenticate resolves a presented artifact into a live identity inside this transaction.
Credential-liveness failures return domain.ErrUnauthenticated: absent, malformed, unknown, expired, generation-superseded and epoch-superseded artifacts are indistinguishable while the source has allowance. Grammatical artifacts first spend that allowance, unless this node has proven that exact session live, which spends its request budget instead. Overload and datastore faults propagate. On HTTP requests a live identity is then admitted against the attached OpenAPI operation; an excluded class returns the uniform domain.ErrNotFound and records the named refusal.
func (*TxAuthorizer) AuthenticateCaller ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) AuthenticateCaller(ctx context.Context, presented string, now time.Time) (Identity, error)
AuthenticateCaller resolves every ordinary caller class — a human session, service-account credential, or instance connection — plus a SCIM provisioning credential when an HTTP operation is attached. Direct in-process SCIM callers must use AuthenticateSCIMCaller so the caller that owns the wire can also enforce its binding-path match. All resolve inside this same transaction, uncached, at the same chokepoint that mints proofs, which is what the machine-identities ADR requires and what makes revocation bite at the next request.
The split from Authenticate is deliberate and is the guard: a machine credential has no session, no cookie and no assurance record (#16), so a verb that manipulates one must not be reachable with a token. Making the broad function the named one, rather than the default, means a new session-surface verb is machine-proof unless someone opts it in.
The branch is on the TYPE THE CALLER TYPED, not on anything the server trusts: a value whose prefix says `au` still resolves against whatever row its verifier matches, and the row decides everything.
func (*TxAuthorizer) AuthenticateFederated ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) AuthenticateFederated(ctx context.Context, issuerID, subject string, check BindingPredicate, now time.Time) (Identity, error)
AuthenticateFederated resolves a validated federated identity to its service account.
The reads are FIXED in number and order, like the bearer path's, and every predicate is evaluated after all of them. Returning as soon as one failed would make an unbound identity cost one query and a revoked binding two — a query-count oracle for which bindings exist. The resolution-surface read performs the same row decode on a miss as on a hit (federation.go's decoy block), so the work above the storage engine is equal too.
Two residuals, stated rather than discovered.
An UNKNOWN ISSUER short-circuits earlier than an unbound subject, because the caller cannot look up a binding without an issuer id and cannot verify a signature without keys. What that discloses is which issuers the instance trusts — instance configuration an operator publishes to the platforms it federates with anyway, not which workloads exist, which is the fact the uniformity rule protects.
The binding predicate's own COST varies with how far it gets: a token failing the audience check does less work than one failing the last pinned claim, and the miss path's decoy pins are three claims that will not match rather than this binding's. Equalising that would mean comparing every pin of every binding whatever the outcome, which is a different and larger machine than the one the ADR asks for; the request is uniformity "as far as practical, with residuals documented", and this is one. The response shape is identical in every case, which is the half that is not a residual.
func (*TxAuthorizer) AuthenticatePairedConnection ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) AuthenticatePairedConnection(ctx context.Context, token, proof string, now time.Time) (Identity, error)
AuthenticatePairedConnection is a separate authentication door. Ordinary bearer authentication rejects every connection with a persisted key binding. Replay consumption and all live credential checks share the serve transaction.
func (*TxAuthorizer) AuthenticateSCIMCaller ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) AuthenticateSCIMCaller(ctx context.Context, presented string, now time.Time) (Identity, string, error)
AuthenticateSCIMCaller resolves a live provisioning credential without assuming which route received it. The SCIM wire applies its binding-path match and last-used write after operation admission; generic HTTP routes need only the trusted class so an excluded SCIM credential reaches that admission.
func (*TxAuthorizer) AuthenticateSelfSurface ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) AuthenticateSelfSurface(ctx context.Context, presented string, now time.Time) (Identity, error)
AuthenticateSelfSurface is the door for the SELF-SCOPED surface — the caller's own active-session listing and its revoke. It admits the three SESSION artifacts and nothing else.
It remains a named entry rather than a flag on AuthenticateCaller because the service behind it assumes a session row exists. HTTP calls first resolve every bearer class and apply the exact OpenAPI operation declaration, then this door narrows an admitted human-session to the three session artifacts.
A workspace bearer IS admitted, and must be: the shell's liveness poll is this endpoint, and it is how both kill switches become visible to a foreign origin. What a workspace bearer may SEE and REVOKE here is narrowed to its own row by the service, because enumerating and ending the human's CLI and browser sessions is not a power a credential living in another origin's JavaScript may hold.
func (*TxAuthorizer) AuthenticateSessionByID ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) AuthenticateSessionByID(ctx context.Context, id string, now time.Time) (Identity, error)
AuthenticateSessionByID revalidates the session recorded in a server-side cross-site ceremony after that ceremony's independent opaque cookie has been proven. A session id by itself is never accepted from the wire.
func (*TxAuthorizer) AuthorityByValue ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) AuthorityByValue(ctx context.Context, verifier []byte) (CredentialAuthority, error)
AuthorityByValue resolves a presented credential-establishment authority.
func (*TxAuthorizer) Authorize ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) Authorize(ctx context.Context, caller Identity, op Operation, scope domain.Scope) (Proof, error)
Authorize evaluates the named operation's formula for the principal against the addressed scope, inside the current transaction, and mints the proof every store call requires. Outcomes:
- Tenant-scoped operation, chain missing at any level OR formula denied: domain.ErrNotFound — unauthorized ≡ nonexistent, one error, one code path, and exactly one chain-resolution query either way. Missing chains also perform caller grant/rule and applicable decoy key reads, matching the refusal work for an existing inaccessible chain without minting a proof from unresolved or decoy data.
- Instance-scoped operation, formula denied: domain.ErrUnauthorized — the grant-refusal contract; there is no tenant object whose nonexistence could be mimicked.
- Registry or addressing bugs (unknown operation, scope depth mismatch): loud errors, never uniform responses — these are programming errors, not probe outcomes.
The caller is an Identity, not a bare principal, because the MFA-mandatory rule is evaluated HERE, in the same transaction and after the grant check: session assurance is a property of how this session authenticated, and the chokepoint that mints the proof is the one place it cannot diverge from the grant table. A session-less caller (Identity.SessionID == "") is local host authority — bootstrap, break-glass, `hikyo admin` — and is exempt, presenting no session and therefore no factor.
func (*TxAuthorizer) AuthorizeDEKRotation ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) AuthorizeDEKRotation(ctx context.Context, caller Identity, scope domain.Scope) (Proof, error)
AuthorizeDEKRotation authorizes the instance-level rotation capability and, for a project DEK, also proves that the addressed project currently exists. Project key creation happens outside the transaction, so this check must run before any keyring preparation and again in the committing transaction.
func (*TxAuthorizer) AuthorizeKey ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) AuthorizeKey(ctx context.Context, caller Identity, op Operation, scope domain.Scope, key KeyTarget) (Proof, error)
AuthorizeKey is Authorize for an operation acting on exactly one key. It evaluates the same formula; the key only lets a key-narrowed rule take part. A key that does not exist is the uniform nonexistent outcome.
func (*TxAuthorizer) AuthorizePublishKeys ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) AuthorizePublishKeys(ctx context.Context, caller Identity, scope domain.Scope, ids []string) (Proof, error)
AuthorizePublishKeys proves the complete changed-key set of one environment. Snapshot materialization may carry unchanged cells forward, but may mutate only these keys. Empty selections never mint a collection proof.
func (*TxAuthorizer) AuthorizeRule ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) AuthorizeRule(ctx context.Context, caller Identity, op Operation, scope domain.Scope, target domain.Rule) (Proof, error)
AuthorizeRule proves a member-management operation against the complete selector being changed, rather than a single representative key. It shares all caller, assurance, denial and proof checks with Authorize.
func (*TxAuthorizer) AuthorizeRuleList ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) AuthorizeRuleList(ctx context.Context, caller Identity, scope domain.Scope) (Proof, error)
AuthorizeRuleList admits a project membership read through any live Manage access selector. The service must filter the listing with RulesManageable once, before resolving principal names or rendering selector metadata.
func (*TxAuthorizer) BindRemotePairedConnection ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) BindRemotePairedConnection(ctx context.Context, c RemotePairedConnection) error
func (*TxAuthorizer) BindSessionToOAuth2Provider ¶
func (*TxAuthorizer) BindSessionToSAMLProvider ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) BindSessionToSAMLProvider(ctx context.Context, sessionID, providerID string) (bool, error)
BindSessionToSAMLProvider records SAML provider provenance in the same transaction that mints the session.
func (*TxAuthorizer) BindingsForIssuer ¶
BindingsForIssuer is the delete guard's census: removing the issuer of a live binding is an authorization change wearing a configuration change's clothes.
func (*TxAuthorizer) CLILoginByCode ¶
func (*TxAuthorizer) CLILoginByState ¶
func (*TxAuthorizer) CLILoginByUserCode ¶
func (*TxAuthorizer) CLIReauthHandoffByCode ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) CLIReauthHandoffByCode(ctx context.Context, verifier []byte) (CLIReauthHandoff, error)
func (*TxAuthorizer) CLIReauthHandoffByState ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) CLIReauthHandoffByState(ctx context.Context, verifier []byte) (CLIReauthHandoff, error)
func (*TxAuthorizer) CallerCanDefineKeys ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) CallerCanDefineKeys(ctx context.Context, caller Identity, scope domain.Scope) (creatable, editable bool, err error)
CallerCanDefineKeys reports the caller's own existential catalogue affordances. It never mints authority: each write still checks its actual key, folder and complete publication footprint. A single-key selector can offer editing, but cannot offer creation of a different, future key.
func (*TxAuthorizer) CallerHolds ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) CallerHolds(ctx context.Context, caller Identity, op Operation, scope domain.Scope) (bool, error)
CallerHolds answers a UI-affordance question about THE CALLER: would this identity satisfy `op` at this scope, right now?
It is deliberately NOT an authorization decision and it mints no denial event. Authorize() is still the only thing that produces a proof and the only thing that lets an operation proceed; this reads the same grant table through the same predicate so the two cannot disagree, and it exists because a surface has to know what to OFFER before anyone acts.
Concretely (#58): the write-only editing path is a first-class one — `edit` without `reveal` is a valid, supported state the permission model refuses to reject — so the value editor has to say "replace without seeing the current value" to a principal who cannot reveal, and "leave empty to keep unchanged" to one who can. Deriving that from whether a cell happens to be revealed on screen would make the affordance a function of what the human last clicked rather than of what they may do.
It takes a resolved Identity rather than a bare principal id, and answers only about that identity — an exported probe that accepted any principal would be an unaudited "what can THEY do?" oracle waiting for its first caller. It applies the same session policy the chokepoint does beyond the grant check (the MFA-mandatory floor), so a password-only session is not told it may reveal while real authorization refuses it.
It discloses only the caller's OWN capability on a scope they already resolved, which is exactly what the reveal ceremony's own refusals already tell them, and which they can read off their own grants.
func (*TxAuthorizer) CallerHoldsApprovalKeys ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) CallerHoldsApprovalKeys(ctx context.Context, caller Identity, scope domain.Scope, ids []string) (bool, error)
CallerHoldsApprovalKeys is the live quorum eligibility check, scoped to approval decisions only. It never mints a proof or captures denials while recomputing recorded votes. Each pinned key must remain within the voter's current Publish reach; losing one key invalidates that voter's contribution.
func (*TxAuthorizer) CallerMayListEnvironment ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) CallerMayListEnvironment(ctx context.Context, caller Identity, scope domain.Scope, env domain.EnvID) (bool, error)
CallerMayListEnvironment reports whether a project's environment listing would show the caller this environment, WITHOUT leaving a grant.denied record. It is for cosmetic disclosure on a read that has already authorized its own subject (for example naming an environment's org and project): a refusal there is not an attempted operation, so it must neither become audit noise nor turn the successful read into a denial. It mints no proof and gates nothing; any write or sensitive read still calls Authorize.
func (*TxAuthorizer) CaptureAudit ¶
CaptureAudit enrols an event in the same DURABLE SETTLEMENT the denial writer uses: the transaction package rolls the attempt back and then flushes every captured record in its own small transaction, before the outcome returns to the caller.
It exists for the schema model's "every attempt is audited" obligation on the reveal gates. A gate attempt has to be recorded whether it was allowed, denied or rate-limited — and the denied and limited cases roll their transaction back, so an in-transaction insert would vanish exactly when it matters. This is the one path in the system that survives a rollback, and widening its use is a deliberate, reviewed act rather than a convenience: callers must carry no instance data in the payload, because these rows are written outside the operation's own authorization scope.
func (*TxAuthorizer) ClaimFederatedAuthority ¶
func (*TxAuthorizer) ClaimRemotePairingAttempt ¶
func (*TxAuthorizer) ClaimRemotePairingReplay ¶
func (*TxAuthorizer) ClaimSAMLReplay ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) ClaimSAMLReplay(ctx context.Context, replay NewSAMLReplay) (bool, error)
ClaimSAMLReplay atomically records an assertion ID. False means replay.
func (*TxAuthorizer) ClampCredentialExpiry ¶
func (*TxAuthorizer) ClampDeveloperCredentialExpiry ¶
func (*TxAuthorizer) ClampIndefiniteCredentials ¶
func (*TxAuthorizer) ClearPendingTOTP ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) ClearPendingTOTP(ctx context.Context, accountID string) error
ClearPendingTOTP removes only in-progress enrolments.
func (*TxAuthorizer) CommittedRefusalReceipt ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) CommittedRefusalReceipt(ctx context.Context)
CommittedRefusalReceipt is called only after the owning transaction commits.
func (*TxAuthorizer) ConfirmTOTP ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) ConfirmTOTP(ctx context.Context, id string, rowVersion, step int64, at time.Time) (bool, error)
ConfirmTOTP promotes and consumes a step in one CAS; false means the row moved or the step was not beyond the last.
func (*TxAuthorizer) ConfirmedTOTP ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) ConfirmedTOTP(ctx context.Context, accountID string) (TOTPCredential, error)
ConfirmedTOTP resolves an account's confirmed TOTP factor.
func (*TxAuthorizer) ConsumeAuthority ¶
ConsumeAuthority claims an authority atomically; false means it was already consumed and the caller must fail closed.
func (*TxAuthorizer) ConsumeCLILogin ¶
func (*TxAuthorizer) ConsumeCLIReauthHandoff ¶
func (*TxAuthorizer) ConsumeLoginChallenge ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) ConsumeLoginChallenge(ctx context.Context, id string, at time.Time) (bool, error)
ConsumeLoginChallenge claims a login challenge atomically; false means it was already consumed and the caller must fail closed.
func (*TxAuthorizer) ConsumeOAuth2Transaction ¶
func (*TxAuthorizer) ConsumeOIDCTransaction ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) ConsumeOIDCTransaction(ctx context.Context, id string, at time.Time) (bool, error)
ConsumeOIDCTransaction claims a transaction atomically; false means it moved.
func (*TxAuthorizer) ConsumeOrgEmailInvitation ¶
func (*TxAuthorizer) ConsumeOutstandingAuthorities ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) ConsumeOutstandingAuthorities(ctx context.Context, accountID string, at time.Time) error
ConsumeOutstandingAuthorities marks every unconsumed authority of an account consumed, in the same transaction as a fresh mint or consumption.
func (*TxAuthorizer) ConsumeRegistrationSignup ¶
func (*TxAuthorizer) ConsumeRemotePairingExchange ¶
func (*TxAuthorizer) ConsumeRemotePairingInvite ¶
func (*TxAuthorizer) ConsumeSAMLTransaction ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) ConsumeSAMLTransaction(ctx context.Context, id string, at time.Time) (bool, error)
ConsumeSAMLTransaction spends a transaction on first presentation, success or failure.
func (*TxAuthorizer) ConsumeSingleDecisionWindow ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) ConsumeSingleDecisionWindow(ctx context.Context, id string, at time.Time) (bool, error)
ConsumeSingleDecisionWindow claims a single-decision window exactly once; false means it was already spent (B11 double-spend).
func (*TxAuthorizer) ConsumeWebAuthnCeremony ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) ConsumeWebAuthnCeremony(ctx context.Context, id, credentialID string, at time.Time) (bool, error)
ConsumeWebAuthnCeremony claims a ceremony atomically and stamps the credential that answered it; false means it was already consumed.
func (*TxAuthorizer) ConsumeWorkspaceHandoff ¶
func (*TxAuthorizer) CorrectPrivacyAccount ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) CorrectPrivacyAccount(ctx context.Context, account, username, displayName string) error
func (*TxAuthorizer) CountExternalIdentitiesForIssuer ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) CountExternalIdentitiesForIssuer(ctx context.Context, kind, issuer string) (int64, error)
CountExternalIdentitiesForIssuer counts the links under one (kind, issuer).
func (*TxAuthorizer) CountGrantsInOrg ¶
CountGrantsInOrg reports how many grant rows an organization holds — the read behind the per-org grant sanity cap.
func (*TxAuthorizer) CountLiveOrgEmailInvitations ¶
func (*TxAuthorizer) CountLiveRemotePairingExchanges ¶
func (*TxAuthorizer) CountLiveRemotePairingInvites ¶
func (*TxAuthorizer) CountRegistrationPolicyOrgs ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) CountRegistrationPolicyOrgs(ctx context.Context, policyID string) (int64, error)
CountRegistrationPolicyOrgs counts the live orgs a policy minted.
func (*TxAuthorizer) CountRemotePairingReplays ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) CountRemotePairingReplays(ctx context.Context) (int64, error)
func (*TxAuthorizer) CountRemotePairingReplaysForKey ¶
func (*TxAuthorizer) CreateAccessGrant ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) CreateAccessGrant(ctx context.Context, id string, p domain.PrincipalID, g domain.Grant, requestID string, at, expiresAt time.Time) error
CreateAccessGrant writes one environment-scoped temporary grant row.
func (*TxAuthorizer) CreateAccount ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) CreateAccount(ctx context.Context, acc Account) error
func (*TxAuthorizer) CreateCLILogin ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) CreateCLILogin(ctx context.Context, h CLILogin) error
func (*TxAuthorizer) CreateCLIReauthHandoff ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) CreateCLIReauthHandoff(ctx context.Context, h NewCLIReauthHandoff) error
func (*TxAuthorizer) CreateDeveloperCredential ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) CreateDeveloperCredential(ctx context.Context, c DeveloperCredential, v []byte) error
func (*TxAuthorizer) CreateExternalIdentity ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) CreateExternalIdentity(ctx context.Context, n NewExternalIdentity) error
CreateExternalIdentity writes a link.
func (*TxAuthorizer) CreateFederationIssuer ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) CreateFederationIssuer(ctx context.Context, iss NewFederationIssuer) error
func (*TxAuthorizer) CreateGrant ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) CreateGrant(ctx context.Context, id string, p domain.PrincipalID, g domain.Grant, at time.Time) error
CreateGrant writes one grant row. The bootstrap path uses it to expand the `admin` template into separate, visible, individually revocable rows rather than an implicit bundle. The general grant surface is #55's.
func (*TxAuthorizer) CreateHumanPrincipal ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) CreateHumanPrincipal(ctx context.Context, id domain.PrincipalID, at time.Time) error
CreateHumanPrincipal and CreateAccount are the bootstrap path's writes, reachable only from `hikyo admin create` on the server's own host — the closed local-authority exception set's boot/bootstrap member. There is no HTTP route to either, and the classification-totality invariant is what keeps that true.
func (*TxAuthorizer) CreateLoginChallenge ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) CreateLoginChallenge(ctx context.Context, c NewLoginChallenge) error
CreateLoginChallenge writes a single-use, expiring login challenge (#760).
func (*TxAuthorizer) CreateMachineCredential ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) CreateMachineCredential(ctx context.Context, c NewCredential) error
func (*TxAuthorizer) CreateMachinePrincipal ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) CreateMachinePrincipal(ctx context.Context, id domain.PrincipalID, class domain.PrincipalClass, at time.Time) error
func (*TxAuthorizer) CreateOAuth2Provider ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) CreateOAuth2Provider(ctx context.Context, n NewOAuth2Provider) error
OAuth2's profile-pinned provider and single-use transaction resolution.
func (*TxAuthorizer) CreateOAuth2Transaction ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) CreateOAuth2Transaction(ctx context.Context, t NewOAuth2Transaction) error
func (*TxAuthorizer) CreateOIDCTransaction ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) CreateOIDCTransaction(ctx context.Context, t NewOIDCTransaction) error
CreateOIDCTransaction writes a single-use transaction row.
func (*TxAuthorizer) CreateProvider ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) CreateProvider(ctx context.Context, n NewProvider) error
CreateProvider inserts a provider row (authorized at the chokepoint first).
func (*TxAuthorizer) CreateProvisioningPrincipal ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) CreateProvisioningPrincipal(ctx context.Context, id domain.PrincipalID, at time.Time) error
The two ends of the provisioning connection's life: created with its binding, retired by §6's state machine atomically with the structural grant it held. Neither takes a class: the first hardcodes it and the second requires it.
func (*TxAuthorizer) CreateRegistrationPolicy ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) CreateRegistrationPolicy(ctx context.Context, p RegistrationPolicy) error
CreateRegistrationPolicy inserts a policy; a second one per scope is ErrConflict.
func (*TxAuthorizer) CreateRegistrationSignup ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) CreateRegistrationSignup(ctx context.Context, n NewRegistrationSignup) error
CreateRegistrationSignup inserts a pending local sign-up row.
func (*TxAuthorizer) CreateRemotePairingExchange ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) CreateRemotePairingExchange(ctx context.Context, e RemotePairingExchange) error
func (*TxAuthorizer) CreateRemotePairingInvite ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) CreateRemotePairingInvite(ctx context.Context, i RemotePairingInvite) error
func (*TxAuthorizer) CreateRule ¶
func (*TxAuthorizer) CreateSAMLProvider ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) CreateSAMLProvider(ctx context.Context, provider NewSAMLProvider) error
CreateSAMLProvider inserts a provider after instance-config authorization.
func (*TxAuthorizer) CreateSAMLSPKey ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) CreateSAMLSPKey(ctx context.Context, key NewSAMLSPKey) error
CreateSAMLSPKey stores a freshly minted encrypted private key.
func (*TxAuthorizer) CreateSAMLTransaction ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) CreateSAMLTransaction(ctx context.Context, transaction NewSAMLTransaction) error
CreateSAMLTransaction writes a single-use AuthnRequest transaction.
func (*TxAuthorizer) CreateServiceAccountAggregate ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) CreateServiceAccountAggregate(ctx context.Context, sa NewServiceAccount) (ServiceAccountCreation, error)
func (*TxAuthorizer) CreateTOTP ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) CreateTOTP(ctx context.Context, c NewTOTPCredential) error
CreateTOTP inserts a pending TOTP enrolment.
func (*TxAuthorizer) CreateWebAuthnCeremony ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) CreateWebAuthnCeremony(ctx context.Context, c NewWebAuthnCeremony) error
CreateWebAuthnCeremony writes a single-use, expiring challenge row.
func (*TxAuthorizer) CreateWebAuthnCredential ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) CreateWebAuthnCredential(ctx context.Context, c NewWebAuthnCredential) error
CreateWebAuthnCredential inserts a freshly enrolled passkey.
func (*TxAuthorizer) CreateWorkspaceHandoff ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) CreateWorkspaceHandoff(ctx context.Context, h authn.NewWorkspaceHandoff) error
func (*TxAuthorizer) CredentialAuthorityByID ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) CredentialAuthorityByID(ctx context.Context, id string) (CredentialAuthority, error)
func (*TxAuthorizer) CredentialEpoch ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) CredentialEpoch(ctx context.Context) (int64, error)
CredentialEpoch reads the instance epoch.
func (*TxAuthorizer) CredentialEstablish ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) CredentialEstablish(ctx context.Context, sessionID string, principal domain.PrincipalID, at time.Time) (CredentialEstablishEvidence, error)
func (*TxAuthorizer) CredentialPolicy ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) CredentialPolicy(ctx context.Context) (CredentialPolicy, error)
func (*TxAuthorizer) CredentialsBeyondCeiling ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) CredentialsBeyondCeiling(ctx context.Context, ceiling time.Time) ([]AffectedCredential, error)
func (*TxAuthorizer) DeleteAccessGrantsForRequest ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) DeleteAccessGrantsForRequest(ctx context.Context, p domain.PrincipalID, requestID string) (int64, error)
DeleteAccessGrantsForRequest releases every temporary row one request wrote.
func (*TxAuthorizer) DeleteExpiredSAMLReplay ¶
DeleteExpiredSAMLReplay removes replay rows after their signed validity plus skew has elapsed.
func (*TxAuthorizer) DeleteFederationIssuer ¶
func (*TxAuthorizer) DeleteGrantRow ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) DeleteGrantRow(ctx context.Context, grantID string, p domain.PrincipalID) (bool, error)
DeleteGrantRow removes a grant row whose last origin was released.
func (*TxAuthorizer) DeleteOAuth2Provider ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) DeleteOAuth2Provider(ctx context.Context, id string) error
func (*TxAuthorizer) DeleteOrgEmailInvitationInOrg ¶
func (*TxAuthorizer) DeleteProvider ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) DeleteProvider(ctx context.Context, id string) error
DeleteProvider removes a provider.
func (*TxAuthorizer) DeleteRegistrationPolicy ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) DeleteRegistrationPolicy(ctx context.Context, id string, expected int64) (bool, error)
DeleteRegistrationPolicy removes a policy at an expected row version.
func (*TxAuthorizer) DeleteRegistrationSignup ¶
DeleteRegistrationSignup deletes one pending local sign-up row.
func (*TxAuthorizer) DeleteRetiringSAMLSPKey ¶
DeleteRetiringSAMLSPKey erases a retiring key.
func (*TxAuthorizer) DeleteRule ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) DeleteRule(ctx context.Context, id string, p domain.PrincipalID) (bool, error)
func (*TxAuthorizer) DeleteRuleItem ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) DeleteRuleItem(ctx context.Context, ruleID, itemID string, p domain.PrincipalID) error
func (*TxAuthorizer) DeleteSAMLProvider ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) DeleteSAMLProvider(ctx context.Context, id string) error
DeleteSAMLProvider removes a locked provider row.
func (*TxAuthorizer) DeleteServiceAccountAggregate ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) DeleteServiceAccountAggregate(ctx context.Context, in DeleteServiceAccountAggregateInput) (ServiceAccountDeletion, error)
func (*TxAuthorizer) DeleteSessionsForOAuth2Provider ¶
func (*TxAuthorizer) DeleteWebAuthnCredential ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) DeleteWebAuthnCredential(ctx context.Context, id, accountID string) (bool, error)
DeleteWebAuthnCredential removes a credential (de-enrolment) under an account_id predicate. False means zero rows matched — refused fail-closed.
func (*TxAuthorizer) DeliveryReporterHolds ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) DeliveryReporterHolds(ctx context.Context, principal domain.PrincipalID, scope domain.Scope) (bool, error)
DeliveryReporterHolds reports whether a principal holds `report-delivery-status` on the scope: the report operation's own formula, evaluated over its grants. The list uses it to name a quota-refused principal only in an environment that principal may report on (ADR D5), so a principal the environment never granted never appears there. Like DeliveryReporterLive it records no denial: the principal is not the caller.
func (*TxAuthorizer) DeliveryReporterLive ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) DeliveryReporterLive(ctx context.Context, principal domain.PrincipalID, scope domain.Scope, now time.Time) (bool, error)
DeliveryReporterLive reports whether a principal that owns a delivery-target row can still report on it (k8s-condition-reporting ADR D5): it holds `report-delivery-status` on the scope, and at least one live credential (an unrevoked, unexpired `hikyo-token` or an active federation binding).
It records no denial and applies no session policy: the principal is not the caller. It answers only about a principal that already owns a row in an environment the caller was authorized to list, so it discloses nothing the list does not already name.
func (*TxAuthorizer) DenialCaptureError ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) DenialCaptureError() error
DenialCaptureError reports a denial that could not even be captured (event-id mint failure). The transaction package MUST treat it exactly like a flush failure: loud refusal, never the uniform denial — a denial answer without its durable record is what fail-closed forbids.
func (*TxAuthorizer) DeveloperCredentialPolicy ¶
func (*TxAuthorizer) DeveloperDeliveryGrants ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) DeveloperDeliveryGrants(ctx context.Context, caller Identity) ([]domain.Grant, error)
DeveloperDeliveryGrants projects only the two capabilities delegated by this artifact. The human's historical, write and cross-environment grants never travel into developer delivery, including when whole-environment rules supply the human's current authority.
func (*TxAuthorizer) DisableWebAuthnCredential ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) DisableWebAuthnCredential(ctx context.Context, id string, rowVersion int64, at time.Time) (bool, error)
DisableWebAuthnCredential sets disabled_at under a CAS (the clone response); false means the row moved or was already disabled.
func (*TxAuthorizer) EnabledProviderByIssuer ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) EnabledProviderByIssuer(ctx context.Context, kind, issuer string) (OIDCProvider, error)
EnabledProviderByIssuer resolves the currently enabled provider for an issuer.
func (*TxAuthorizer) EnabledProviderBySlug ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) EnabledProviderBySlug(ctx context.Context, slug string) (OIDCProvider, error)
EnabledProviderBySlug resolves an enabled provider by slug, for start.
func (*TxAuthorizer) EnvironmentChainByID ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) EnvironmentChainByID(ctx context.Context, envID string) (EnvironmentChain, error)
EnvironmentChainByID resolves an environment's chain from its id, so LowerEffectiveWindow can build the grant-coverage predicate from an env id.
func (*TxAuthorizer) EnvironmentReauthSettings ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) EnvironmentReauthSettings(ctx context.Context, envID string) (EnvSetting, error)
EnvironmentReauthSettings reads an environment's protection state and its own reauthentication window, if it has one.
func (*TxAuthorizer) EnvironmentsInProject ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) EnvironmentsInProject(ctx context.Context, scope domain.Scope) ([]domain.EnvID, error)
EnvironmentsInProject is the universe the mint and widen reachability formulas range over.
func (*TxAuthorizer) ErasePrivacyAccount ¶
func (*TxAuthorizer) ExpiredRegistrationSignups ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) ExpiredRegistrationSignups(ctx context.Context, at time.Time) ([]ExpiredRegistrationSignup, error)
func (*TxAuthorizer) ExternalIdentitiesForAccount ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) ExternalIdentitiesForAccount(ctx context.Context, accountID string) ([]ExternalIdentity, error)
ExternalIdentitiesForAccount lists an account's linked identities.
func (*TxAuthorizer) ExternalIdentityByID ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) ExternalIdentityByID(ctx context.Context, id string) (ExternalIdentity, error)
ExternalIdentityByID resolves a link by id.
func (*TxAuthorizer) ExternalIdentityByKey ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) ExternalIdentityByKey(ctx context.Context, kind, issuer, subject string) (ExternalIdentity, error)
ExternalIdentityByKey resolves a byte-exact (kind, issuer, subject).
func (*TxAuthorizer) FederationIssuerByID ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) FederationIssuerByID(ctx context.Context, id string) (FederationIssuer, error)
func (*TxAuthorizer) FederationIssuerByIssuer ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) FederationIssuerByIssuer(ctx context.Context, issuer string) (FederationIssuer, error)
FederationIssuerByIssuer resolves a configuration by its BYTE-EXACT `iss`.
func (*TxAuthorizer) FederationIssuers ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) FederationIssuers(ctx context.Context) ([]FederationIssuer, error)
func (*TxAuthorizer) GetRule ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) GetRule(ctx context.Context, id string) (StoredRule, bool, error)
GetRule reads one stored rule, ungated; valid is false for a stored rule that no longer validates (the caller should delete it).
func (*TxAuthorizer) GrantLinesAtInstance ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) GrantLinesAtInstance(ctx context.Context) ([]GrantLine, error)
GrantLinesAtInstance lists the instance-scope membership surface.
func (*TxAuthorizer) GrantLinesInOrg ¶
GrantLinesInOrg lists the membership surface for one org.
func (*TxAuthorizer) GrantLinesInProject ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) GrantLinesInProject(ctx context.Context, org, project string) ([]GrantLine, error)
GrantLinesInProject lists the membership surface for one project.
func (*TxAuthorizer) GrantOriginCount ¶
GrantOriginCount reports how many origins still hold a grant row.
func (*TxAuthorizer) GrantOriginsFor ¶
GrantOriginsFor lists the origins holding one grant row.
func (*TxAuthorizer) GrantOriginsForPrincipal ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) GrantOriginsForPrincipal(ctx context.Context, p domain.PrincipalID) ([]GrantOriginRow, error)
GrantOriginsForPrincipal lists every origin holding every grant row of one principal, read at one instant. The SCIM release algorithm (#73 §2.4) decides per origin and then counts what remains per row; seeing the two tables at different instants would let a row be judged against origins that had already moved.
func (*TxAuthorizer) GrantRowsForPrincipal ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) GrantRowsForPrincipal(ctx context.Context, p domain.PrincipalID) ([]GrantRow, error)
GrantRowsForPrincipal lists a principal's grants with their row ids — the dedup read every create performs under the principal-row lock.
func (*TxAuthorizer) GrantsForResetTarget ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) GrantsForResetTarget(ctx context.Context, p domain.PrincipalID) ([]domain.Grant, error)
GrantsForResetTarget reads the credential-reset target's full grant set for the org-bounded test, under the row lock the reset holds.
func (*TxAuthorizer) GrantsOf ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) GrantsOf(ctx context.Context, p domain.PrincipalID) ([]domain.Grant, error)
GrantsOf returns a principal's full grant set — the pre-state input to the reachability diff.
func (*TxAuthorizer) GuardOAuth2ProviderForMint ¶
func (*TxAuthorizer) GuardProviderForMint ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) GuardProviderForMint(ctx context.Context, id string, rowVersion int64, issuer string) (bool, error)
GuardProviderForMint locks the pinned provider row inside a Phase-C mint tx and reports whether it still matches the Phase-A snapshot; false means the provider moved and the mint must refuse (A4 TOCTOU, sweep wins).
func (*TxAuthorizer) GuardSAMLProviderForMint ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) GuardSAMLProviderForMint(ctx context.Context, id string, rowVersion int64, entityID string) (bool, error)
GuardSAMLProviderForMint proves the provider still matches the Phase-A snapshot immediately before a session or reauth window is written.
func (*TxAuthorizer) HoldRestoredPKIIssuers ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) HoldRestoredPKIIssuers(ctx context.Context) error
func (*TxAuthorizer) HoldsInstanceCapability ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) HoldsInstanceCapability(ctx context.Context, caller Identity, op Operation) (bool, error)
HoldsInstanceCapability reports whether the caller's own grants satisfy an INSTANCE-scoped operation's formula and its assurance floor, WITHOUT recording an operation or a denial. It is the disclosure-safe "may I even attempt this instance surface" check the UI gates on; real authorization is still evaluated at the chokepoint per request.
It deliberately mirrors authorizeInstance rather than CallerHolds: an instance op evaluates its formula against the empty scope and resolves no tenant chain, so routing it through the scoped path (CallerHolds) would ask ResolveChain to resolve an empty scope and error. It refuses a non-instance op for the same reason — the caller would get a silently wrong answer.
func (*TxAuthorizer) IncompatiblePasswordKDFCount ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) IncompatiblePasswordKDFCount(ctx context.Context, kdf KDFParams) (int64, error)
IncompatiblePasswordKDFCount is for startup/configuration admission, not a public authentication route. It exposes only aggregate parameter metadata.
func (*TxAuthorizer) IndefiniteCredentials ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) IndefiniteCredentials(ctx context.Context) ([]AffectedCredential, error)
func (*TxAuthorizer) InstanceConnectionByID ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) InstanceConnectionByID(ctx context.Context, id string) (authn.InstanceConnection, error)
func (*TxAuthorizer) InstanceConnectionByPrincipal ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) InstanceConnectionByPrincipal(ctx context.Context, p domain.PrincipalID) (authn.InstanceConnection, error)
InstanceConnectionByPrincipal answers "which connection is this caller", which is what the directory serve needs to stamp last-used and to name the actor in its audit event.
func (*TxAuthorizer) InstanceConnections ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) InstanceConnections(ctx context.Context) ([]authn.InstanceConnection, error)
func (*TxAuthorizer) InstanceIdentity ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) InstanceIdentity(ctx context.Context) (string, error)
InstanceIdentity is this instance's own opaque id — the value a directory listing carries and the one self-connection refusal compares against.
func (*TxAuthorizer) InvalidateReauthWindowsForEnvironment ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) InvalidateReauthWindowsForEnvironment(ctx context.Context, environmentID string) (int64, error)
InvalidateReauthWindowsForEnvironment deletes every open window on one environment (the effective-window transition, B6) and returns the count.
func (*TxAuthorizer) InvalidateRestoredAdapterCredentials ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) InvalidateRestoredAdapterCredentials(ctx context.Context) error
func (*TxAuthorizer) InvalidateRestoredDynamicProviderCredentials ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) InvalidateRestoredDynamicProviderCredentials(ctx context.Context) error
func (*TxAuthorizer) InvalidateRestoredExternalCredentials ¶
func (*TxAuthorizer) IsProtectedOrg ¶
IsProtectedOrg reports whether org is the instance's own protected configuration organisation. It is the same resolver fact the formula conjunction uses and authorizes nothing.
func (*TxAuthorizer) ListDeveloperCredentials ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) ListDeveloperCredentials(ctx context.Context) ([]DeveloperCredential, error)
func (*TxAuthorizer) ListLiveOrgEmailInvitations ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) ListLiveOrgEmailInvitations(ctx context.Context, org domain.OrgID, at time.Time) ([]EmailInvitationListing, error)
func (*TxAuthorizer) ListOAuth2Providers ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) ListOAuth2Providers(ctx context.Context) ([]OAuth2Provider, error)
func (*TxAuthorizer) ListProviders ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) ListProviders(ctx context.Context) ([]OIDCProvider, error)
ListProviders lists every configured provider.
func (*TxAuthorizer) ListRemotePairingInvites ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) ListRemotePairingInvites(ctx context.Context) ([]RemotePairingInvite, error)
func (*TxAuthorizer) ListSAMLProviders ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) ListSAMLProviders(ctx context.Context) ([]SAMLProvider, error)
ListSAMLProviders lists all configured SAML providers.
func (*TxAuthorizer) LiveAccessGrants ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) LiveAccessGrants(ctx context.Context, p domain.PrincipalID, now time.Time) ([]AccessGrant, error)
LiveAccessGrants lists a principal's unexpired temporary grants.
func (*TxAuthorizer) LiveMachineCredentialCount ¶
func (*TxAuthorizer) LiveMachineCredentialCounts ¶
func (*TxAuthorizer) LockCredentialPolicy ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) LockCredentialPolicy(ctx context.Context) error
LockCredentialPolicy serializes a mint against a concurrent tightening.
func (*TxAuthorizer) LockInstanceIdentityRow ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) LockInstanceIdentityRow(ctx context.Context) error
func (*TxAuthorizer) LockMachinePrincipal ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) LockMachinePrincipal(ctx context.Context, p domain.PrincipalID) error
LockMachinePrincipal takes a service account's principal-row lock — THE SAME LOCK the grant writers take — so a mint and a grant landing on that principal serialize. Without it a grant can widen the account between the mint's post-state check and its insert, producing a token whose authority never passed the gate.
func (*TxAuthorizer) LockOAuth2ProviderForDelete ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) LockOAuth2ProviderForDelete(ctx context.Context, id string) error
func (*TxAuthorizer) LockProviderForDelete ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) LockProviderForDelete(ctx context.Context, id string) error
LockProviderForDelete locks the provider row inside the delete tx so the session sweep runs with the row held and a concurrent mint guard serializes behind it (A14). ErrNotFound means a concurrent delete already removed it.
func (*TxAuthorizer) LockSAMLProviderForDelete ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) LockSAMLProviderForDelete(ctx context.Context, id string) error
LockSAMLProviderForDelete serializes provider deletion against Phase-C mints.
func (*TxAuthorizer) LockTargetPrincipal ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) LockTargetPrincipal(ctx context.Context, p domain.PrincipalID) error
LockTargetPrincipal takes the target principal's row lock so the org-bounded test and every grant mutation serialize on the same row (B14).
func (*TxAuthorizer) LockWorkspaceOrigin ¶
LockWorkspaceOrigin and LockInstanceIdentityRow are the two row locks the serving side's read-then-write decisions serialize on under postgres' READ COMMITTED semantics.
func (*TxAuthorizer) LockoutRetentions ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) LockoutRetentions(ctx context.Context) ([]LockoutRetention, error)
LockoutRetentions lists every `lockout-retention` origin in the instance, which is what the deterministic cure sweep walks (#73 §2.4).
func (*TxAuthorizer) LockoutRetentionsInOrg ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) LockoutRetentionsInOrg(ctx context.Context, org domain.OrgID) ([]LockoutRetention, error)
LockoutRetentionsInOrg is the org-bounded cure sweep.
func (*TxAuthorizer) LoginChallengeByID ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) LoginChallengeByID(ctx context.Context, id string) (LoginChallenge, error)
LoginChallengeByID resolves a login challenge, or domain.ErrNotFound.
func (*TxAuthorizer) MachineCredentialsFor ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) MachineCredentialsFor(ctx context.Context, serviceAccountID string) ([]MachineCredential, error)
func (*TxAuthorizer) MachineRevealOptIn ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) MachineRevealOptIn(ctx context.Context, caller Identity, project domain.ProjectID) (bool, int64, error)
MachineRevealOptIn reports the project's machine-reveal opt-in for callers that project grants per key (the delivery path) rather than per formula, together with the opt-in's GENERATION - a counter every flip advances, so a cursor bound to it moves on every flip (machine-identities ADR: "any authorization movement invalidates the cursor", naming the opt-in change), including for a principal whose grant rows make the flip invisible and across an off-on-off pair between two polls. A machine identity without the opt-in is delivered secret presence only, whatever reveal rows it holds. Humans always answer true at generation 0: the flag governs machine disclosure and nothing else.
func (*TxAuthorizer) ManageMembersHolders ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) ManageMembersHolders(ctx context.Context, org string) ([]domain.PrincipalID, error)
ManageMembersHolders is the lockout invariant's census at one org, or at instance scope when org is empty.
func (*TxAuthorizer) MarkSAMLSPKeyRetiring ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) MarkSAMLSPKeyRetiring(ctx context.Context, id string, rowVersion int64) (bool, error)
MarkSAMLSPKeyRetiring compare-and-swaps an active key into overlap state.
func (*TxAuthorizer) MintAuthority ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) MintAuthority(ctx context.Context, n NewCredentialAuthority) error
MintAuthority writes a new credential-establishment authority.
func (*TxAuthorizer) MintInstanceConnection ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) MintInstanceConnection(ctx context.Context, n authn.NewInstanceConnection) error
func (*TxAuthorizer) MintSession ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) MintSession(ctx context.Context, s NewSession) error
MintSession writes a session row.
func (*TxAuthorizer) OAuth2ProviderBySlug ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) OAuth2ProviderBySlug(ctx context.Context, slug string) (OAuth2Provider, error)
func (*TxAuthorizer) OAuth2ProviderForCallback ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) OAuth2ProviderForCallback(ctx context.Context, id string) (OAuth2Provider, error)
func (*TxAuthorizer) OAuth2TransactionByState ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) OAuth2TransactionByState(ctx context.Context, stateVerifier []byte) (OAuth2Transaction, error)
func (*TxAuthorizer) OIDCTransactionByState ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) OIDCTransactionByState(ctx context.Context, stateVerifier []byte) (OIDCTransaction, error)
OIDCTransactionByState resolves a transaction by its state verifier.
func (*TxAuthorizer) OpenReauthWindow ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) OpenReauthWindow(ctx context.Context, w NewReauthWindow) error
OpenReauthWindow opens a reauthentication window over one environment.
func (*TxAuthorizer) OrgEmailInvitationByVerifier ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) OrgEmailInvitationByVerifier(ctx context.Context, verifier []byte) (EmailInvitation, error)
func (*TxAuthorizer) OrgEmailInvitationInOrg ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) OrgEmailInvitationInOrg(ctx context.Context, id string, org domain.OrgID) (EmailInvitation, error)
func (*TxAuthorizer) OrgEmailInvitationOrgName ¶
func (*TxAuthorizer) OrgImageVisibleTo ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) OrgImageVisibleTo(ctx context.Context, caller Identity, org domain.OrgID) (OrgImage, error)
OrgImageVisibleTo reads an org's uploaded avatar for a caller with the org in their OrgsForPrincipal projection, so the rail's avatar bytes follow the rail itself (a project-scoped member holds no read@org yet sees the org). That projection omits instance-scoped principals, so a caller outside it needs org.get, the same read their settings page already holds. It mints no proof. domain.ErrNotFound when not visible or no image is stored.
func (*TxAuthorizer) OrgsForPrincipal ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) OrgsForPrincipal(ctx context.Context, caller Identity) ([]OrgIdentity, error)
OrgsForPrincipal projects the caller's OWN grants onto the organisations they name. It authorizes nothing and needs no proof: the result set is defined by the caller's own grant rows, so it can disclose nothing they do not already hold. See the resolver for why an instance-scoped principal correctly gets an empty set. Protected instance configuration additionally requires the caller's current MFA assurance before its org enters navigation.
func (*TxAuthorizer) PasswordCredentialFor ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) PasswordCredentialFor(ctx context.Context, accountID string) (PasswordCredential, error)
PasswordCredentialFor reads an account's verifier row.
func (*TxAuthorizer) PeekDeveloperCredentialPolicy ¶
func (*TxAuthorizer) PendingDenials ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) PendingDenials() []Denial
PendingDenials hands the attempt's captured denials to the transaction package. The authorizer lives exactly one attempt, so there is no reset.
func (*TxAuthorizer) PendingTOTP ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) PendingTOTP(ctx context.Context, accountID string) (TOTPCredential, error)
PendingTOTP resolves an account's in-progress enrolment.
func (*TxAuthorizer) PersonalEligible ¶
PersonalEligible counts the humans who currently hold read and reveal over the whole of the counts proof's environment: the matrix denominator (personal-values ADR, One complete surface). Each candidate is evaluated with the same grant and member-access-rule formula that decides developer delivery, so the count can never disagree with who could receive a value.
func (*TxAuthorizer) PersonalOwnerHasAccess ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) PersonalOwnerHasAccess(ctx context.Context, owner domain.PrincipalID, scope domain.Scope) (bool, error)
PersonalOwnerHasAccess answers, live, whether owner still holds read and reveal over the whole environment, from grants or whole-environment rules: the access half of the personal-value retention predicate (#1235). An environment that no longer resolves is answered false.
func (*TxAuthorizer) PersonalValueOwners ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) PersonalValueOwners(ctx context.Context) ([]domain.PrincipalID, error)
PersonalValueOwners lists every principal holding a personal value, so a restore purges those owners rather than visiting every principal.
func (*TxAuthorizer) PinGeneration ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) PinGeneration(ctx context.Context, p domain.PrincipalID, env domain.EnvID) (int64, error)
PinGeneration reads the conditional cursor's pin component.
func (*TxAuthorizer) PollCLILogin ¶
func (*TxAuthorizer) PrincipalClass ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) PrincipalClass(ctx context.Context, p domain.PrincipalID) (domain.PrincipalClass, error)
PrincipalClass resolves a principal's class for the normative machine allowlists.
func (*TxAuthorizer) PrincipalFootprintOrgs ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) PrincipalFootprintOrgs(ctx context.Context, p domain.PrincipalID) ([]domain.OrgID, error)
PrincipalFootprintOrgs lists every org holding any row about a principal.
func (*TxAuthorizer) PrincipalGeneration ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) PrincipalGeneration(ctx context.Context, p domain.PrincipalID) (int64, error)
PrincipalGeneration reads the principal's current session generation, so a freshly minted session records the generation it was born under.
func (*TxAuthorizer) PrivacyAccount ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) PrivacyAccount(ctx context.Context, p string) (PrivacyAccountView, error)
func (*TxAuthorizer) PrivacyActivity ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) PrivacyActivity(ctx context.Context, p string) ([]PrivacyActivity, error)
func (*TxAuthorizer) PrivacySessions ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) PrivacySessions(ctx context.Context, p string) ([]PrivacySession, error)
func (*TxAuthorizer) ProjectMachineReveal ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) ProjectMachineReveal(ctx context.Context, projectID string) (authn.MachineRevealState, error)
ProjectMachineReveal reads the per-project machine-reveal opt-in (source-of-truth ADR). ErrNotFound for an unknown project.
func (*TxAuthorizer) ProviderBySlug ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) ProviderBySlug(ctx context.Context, slug string) (OIDCProvider, error)
ProviderBySlug resolves a provider by slug for administration (any state). The mutation that follows is authorized at the chokepoint first.
func (*TxAuthorizer) ProviderForCallback ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) ProviderForCallback(ctx context.Context, id string) (OIDCProvider, error)
ProviderForCallback resolves the provider a transaction pinned, by id.
func (*TxAuthorizer) PruneCLILogins ¶
func (*TxAuthorizer) PruneExpiredOrgEmailInvitations ¶
func (*TxAuthorizer) PruneExpiredRegistrationSignup ¶
func (*TxAuthorizer) PruneRemotePairingState ¶
func (*TxAuthorizer) PurgePersonalValues ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) PurgePersonalValues(ctx context.Context, owner domain.PrincipalID, cause string, at time.Time) (int64, error)
PurgePersonalValues deletes an owner's personal values everywhere and leaves a notice for each, inside the credential change that cost the owner qualification (#1235).
func (*TxAuthorizer) ReactivateBinding ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) ReactivateBinding(ctx context.Context, id string, at time.Time) (bool, error)
ReactivateBinding records a restore-time re-validation (§ Restore). #76 owns the operator ceremony; the write exists here because the refusal it drives exists now.
func (*TxAuthorizer) ReauthWindowFor ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) ReauthWindowFor(ctx context.Context, sessionID, environmentID string) (ReauthWindow, error)
ReauthWindowFor resolves the window over one environment for one session.
func (*TxAuthorizer) RebindSAMLExternalIdentityProvider ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) RebindSAMLExternalIdentityProvider(ctx context.Context, id, expectedProviderID, newProviderID string) (bool, error)
RebindSAMLExternalIdentityProvider compare-and-swaps provider provenance after the same byte-exact entity has been removed and configured again.
func (*TxAuthorizer) ReconcilePrincipal ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) ReconcilePrincipal(ctx context.Context, p domain.PrincipalID) (bool, error)
ReconcilePrincipal commits ONE principal's reconciliation. The signature is the guarantee: one id in, one answer out. There is no set-taking sibling of this method anywhere in the module, and the drill asserts that.
func (*TxAuthorizer) RecordAuthEvent ¶
RecordAuthEvent writes an authentication audit event through the resolution surface's proof-free path. Authentication events cannot carry a proof: they are what produces the principal a proof would be minted for, and credential establishment deliberately produces no session at all.
The event commits with the transaction that caused it, so a login without its durable record does not complete — the same durability discipline domain writes follow.
func (*TxAuthorizer) RecordedPrincipalHolds ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) RecordedPrincipalHolds(ctx context.Context, caller Identity, principal domain.PrincipalID, op Operation, scope domain.Scope) (bool, error)
RecordedPrincipalHolds checks the grant formula for a principal recorded as authority on a standing delegation. It deliberately does not synthesize a caller identity or apply session policy: the principal is not the caller, and the delegation's own fetch path records the decision and its outcome.
func (*TxAuthorizer) RecoveryCodesFor ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) RecoveryCodesFor(ctx context.Context, accountID string) (RecoveryBatch, error)
RecoveryCodesFor resolves an account's batch.
func (*TxAuthorizer) RegistrationAuthorityHolds ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) RegistrationAuthorityHolds(ctx context.Context, principal domain.PrincipalID, op Operation, scope domain.Scope) (bool, error)
RegistrationAuthorityHolds re-checks a policy's standing delegation (#579 d4): does the recorded authority principal's CURRENT grant set satisfy op's formula at scope? It is a pure evaluation. It records no operation and no denial, because it runs where no caller is acting as that principal (the Members panel render, the public sign-up door); the principal comes from the policy row, never from the request, so it is not the unaudited "what can THEY do?" oracle CallerHolds refuses to be. A sign-up that acts on the answer records its own refusal cause.
Instance operations evaluate against the empty scope (authorizeInstance's shape); tenant operations resolve the chain first, and an unresolvable scope holds nothing.
func (*TxAuthorizer) RegistrationPolicyFor ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) RegistrationPolicyFor(ctx context.Context, org domain.OrgID) (RegistrationPolicy, error)
RegistrationPolicyFor resolves the policy of one scope ("" = instance).
func (*TxAuthorizer) RegistrationSignupByEmail ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) RegistrationSignupByEmail(ctx context.Context, email string) (RegistrationSignup, error)
func (*TxAuthorizer) RegistrationSignupByVerifier ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) RegistrationSignupByVerifier(ctx context.Context, verifier []byte) (RegistrationSignup, error)
func (*TxAuthorizer) RegistrationSignupsForPolicy ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) RegistrationSignupsForPolicy(ctx context.Context, policyID string) ([]RegistrationSignupRef, error)
RegistrationSignupsForPolicy lists a policy's pending local sign-ups.
func (*TxAuthorizer) ReissueRegistrationSignup ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) ReissueRegistrationSignup(ctx context.Context, n NewRegistrationSignup) error
func (*TxAuthorizer) ReleaseGrantOrigin ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) ReleaseGrantOrigin(ctx context.Context, grantID string, p domain.PrincipalID, o Origin) (bool, error)
ReleaseGrantOrigin releases one origin, reporting whether it held the row.
func (*TxAuthorizer) RemotePairedConnectionByID ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) RemotePairedConnectionByID(ctx context.Context, id string) (RemotePairedConnection, error)
func (*TxAuthorizer) RemotePairingExchangeByID ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) RemotePairingExchangeByID(ctx context.Context, id string) (RemotePairingExchange, error)
func (*TxAuthorizer) RemotePairingInviteByCapability ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) RemotePairingInviteByCapability(ctx context.Context, v []byte) (RemotePairingInvite, error)
func (*TxAuthorizer) RemotePairingInviteByID ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) RemotePairingInviteByID(ctx context.Context, id string) (RemotePairingInvite, error)
func (*TxAuthorizer) RemoveExternalIdentity ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) RemoveExternalIdentity(ctx context.Context, id string) error
RemoveExternalIdentity removes a link (unlink).
func (*TxAuthorizer) RemoveTOTPForAccount ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) RemoveTOTPForAccount(ctx context.Context, accountID string) error
RemoveTOTPForAccount deletes every TOTP row of an account.
func (*TxAuthorizer) RemoveWorkspaceOrigin ¶
RemoveWorkspaceOrigin and RevokeWorkspaceSessionsForOrigin are ONE ACT in two statements and must be called in one transaction. That pairing is the ADR's atomic kill switch; splitting it leaves a window in which an origin is de-allowlisted and its sessions still authenticate.
func (*TxAuthorizer) ReplacePasswordCredential ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) ReplacePasswordCredential(ctx context.Context, c PasswordCredential, at time.Time) (bool, error)
ReplacePasswordCredential compare-and-swaps an existing verifier. False means the row moved underneath and the caller must not write a stale verifier back.
func (*TxAuthorizer) ReplaceRecoveryCodes ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) ReplaceRecoveryCodes(ctx context.Context, b RecoveryBatch, at time.Time) (bool, error)
ReplaceRecoveryCodes compare-and-swaps the batch; false means it moved.
func (*TxAuthorizer) ReplaceRegistrationPolicy ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) ReplaceRegistrationPolicy(ctx context.Context, p RegistrationPolicy, expected int64) (bool, error)
ReplaceRegistrationPolicy compare-and-swaps a policy and replaces its children.
func (*TxAuthorizer) ResolveChain ¶
ResolveChain answers "is this (org, project, environment) a real chain" — the same single-query resolution authorize() itself performs, exposed for the one caller that must ask about a scope it is NOT currently authorizing: a SCIM mapping row names a scope at AUTHORING time and expands it at every sync, and a row whose environment does not belong to its project would write grants against a chain that never existed. It mints no proof and reveals nothing a caller could not learn by addressing the scope: an unresolvable chain answers domain.ErrNotFound uniformly, whether the link is missing or foreign.
func (*TxAuthorizer) RestoreState ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) RestoreState(ctx context.Context) (RestoreState, error)
RestoreState reads the instance's restore posture.
func (*TxAuthorizer) RestrictPrivacyPrincipal ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) RestrictPrivacyPrincipal(ctx context.Context, p, state string) error
func (*TxAuthorizer) RevokeAllSessionsFor ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) RevokeAllSessionsFor(ctx context.Context, p domain.PrincipalID) error
RevokeAllSessionsFor deletes every session of a principal.
func (*TxAuthorizer) RevokeDeveloperCredentials ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) RevokeDeveloperCredentials(ctx context.Context, authority domain.PrincipalID, scope domain.Scope, id string, at time.Time) ([]DeveloperCredential, error)
func (*TxAuthorizer) RevokeDeveloperCredentialsByProvenance ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) RevokeDeveloperCredentialsByProvenance(ctx context.Context, kind, id string, at time.Time) ([]DeveloperCredential, error)
func (*TxAuthorizer) RevokeInstanceConnection ¶
func (*TxAuthorizer) RevokeInvalidDeveloperCredentials ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) RevokeInvalidDeveloperCredentials(ctx context.Context, authority domain.PrincipalID, org domain.OrgID, at time.Time) ([]DeveloperCredential, error)
func (*TxAuthorizer) RevokeMachineCredential ¶
func (*TxAuthorizer) RevokeRemotePairingInvite ¶
func (*TxAuthorizer) RevokeSession ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) RevokeSession(ctx context.Context, id string) error
RevokeSession deletes one session in this transaction.
func (*TxAuthorizer) RevokeSessionForPrincipal ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) RevokeSessionForPrincipal(ctx context.Context, id string, p domain.PrincipalID) (bool, error)
func (*TxAuthorizer) RevokeWorkspaceSessionsForOrigin ¶
func (*TxAuthorizer) RotateSessionFactors ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) RotateSessionFactors(ctx context.Context, id string, verifier []byte, factors string) error
RotateSessionFactors rotates the acting session token and rewrites its factor set on step-up, preserving the original authentication attribution.
func (*TxAuthorizer) RuleCapabilityHeld ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) RuleCapabilityHeld(ctx context.Context, caller Identity, target domain.Rule, project domain.ProjectID) (bool, error)
RuleCapabilityHeld is the grantor bound. A selector may not confer a capability beyond the grantor's own reach, including future objects on an all-except axis. This is separate from the management proof: possessing Manage access never implies Reveal or Publish.
func (*TxAuthorizer) RuleIDsForEnvironment ¶
func (*TxAuthorizer) RuleIDsForKey ¶
func (*TxAuthorizer) RuleIDsForOrg ¶
func (*TxAuthorizer) RuleIDsForProject ¶
func (*TxAuthorizer) RuleKeyExists ¶
RuleKeyExists reports ErrNotFound unless the key id exists in the project scope names; the rule writer uses it to refuse a dangling key item clearly.
func (*TxAuthorizer) RuleLinesInOrg ¶
RuleLinesInOrg lists the rule surface for one org.
func (*TxAuthorizer) RuleLinesInProject ¶
RuleLinesInProject lists the rule surface for one project, reading only that project's items.
func (*TxAuthorizer) RulesForProject ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) RulesForProject(ctx context.Context, org domain.OrgID, project domain.ProjectID) ([]domain.Rule, error)
RulesForProject is the folder-move widening census: every rule of a human principal naming this project, a superset of what the chokepoint honours (a currently restricted principal is still named).
func (*TxAuthorizer) RulesManageable ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) RulesManageable(ctx context.Context, caller Identity, targets []domain.Rule, project domain.ProjectID) ([]bool, error)
RulesManageable evaluates a listing against one live authorization snapshot. Key metadata is shared only inside this call, never across later mutations.
func (*TxAuthorizer) SAMLProviderBySlug ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) SAMLProviderBySlug(ctx context.Context, slug string) (SAMLProvider, error)
SAMLProviderBySlug resolves a provider in any state for administration.
func (*TxAuthorizer) SAMLProviderForCallback ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) SAMLProviderForCallback(ctx context.Context, id string) (SAMLProvider, error)
SAMLProviderForCallback resolves the provider pinned by a transaction.
func (*TxAuthorizer) SAMLSPKeys ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) SAMLSPKeys(ctx context.Context) ([]SAMLSPKey, error)
SAMLSPKeys lists active and overlap-retiring public material.
func (*TxAuthorizer) SAMLTransactionByRelayState ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) SAMLTransactionByRelayState(ctx context.Context, verifier []byte) (SAMLTransaction, error)
SAMLTransactionByRelayState resolves the opaque front-channel handle before the strict wrapper's single response-validation pass.
func (*TxAuthorizer) SCIMCredentialByVerifier ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) SCIMCredentialByVerifier(ctx context.Context, presented []byte) (SCIMCredential, error)
func (*TxAuthorizer) ScopedSystemAuthority ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) ScopedSystemAuthority(ctx context.Context, site SystemSite, scope domain.Scope) (Proof, error)
ScopedSystemAuthority mints system authority carrying a database-resolved tenant chain. It exists for system jobs whose durable audit rows belong to the acted-on tenant trail: callers may supply identifiers, but the proof carries only the canonical chain resolved inside this transaction.
func (*TxAuthorizer) SelfConfigRecoveryAuthority ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) SelfConfigRecoveryAuthority(ctx context.Context, revision int64) (Proof, error)
SelfConfigRecoveryAuthority is a host-local, exact-revision recovery reader. It cannot use the runtime worker's retained-root privilege as a general read.
func (*TxAuthorizer) SelfConfigRuntimeAuthority ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) SelfConfigRuntimeAuthority(ctx context.Context, snapshotID string) (Proof, error)
SelfConfigRuntimeAuthority selects only the local binding's retained snapshot. No network operation can mint this authority, even with valid admin grants. An empty snapshot ID selects the durable desired revision.
func (*TxAuthorizer) SelfConfigSeedAuthority ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) SelfConfigSeedAuthority(ctx context.Context) (Proof, error)
SelfConfigSeedAuthority is the boot worker's encrypted-input exchange before adoption. The repository refuses access once a binding exists. Network callers use their ordinary MFA-protected adoption proof for preview reads; they cannot mint this writer or replace another node's startup inputs.
func (*TxAuthorizer) ServiceAccountAt ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) ServiceAccountAt(ctx context.Context, scope domain.Scope, id string) (ServiceAccount, error)
ServiceAccountAt resolves one service account within an addressed project; an id from another project answers domain.ErrNotFound.
func (*TxAuthorizer) ServiceAccountByID ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) ServiceAccountByID(ctx context.Context, id string) (ServiceAccount, error)
ServiceAccountByID resolves a service account from an id already disclosed on a row the caller may read, to name it for display. The id must never come from a request.
func (*TxAuthorizer) ServiceAccountByPrincipal ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) ServiceAccountByPrincipal(ctx context.Context, p domain.PrincipalID) (ServiceAccount, error)
ServiceAccountByPrincipal resolves the service account a machine principal is, for the grant surface's subtree confinement.
func (*TxAuthorizer) ServiceAccountsIn ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) ServiceAccountsIn(ctx context.Context, scope domain.Scope) ([]ServiceAccount, error)
func (*TxAuthorizer) SessionsForPrincipal ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) SessionsForPrincipal(ctx context.Context, p domain.PrincipalID) ([]authn.SessionSummary, error)
SessionsForPrincipal and RevokeSessionForPrincipal are the self-scoped active-session surface (#71 criterion 5). The principal conjunct is in the SQL, so one caller structurally cannot reach another's row.
func (*TxAuthorizer) SetClock ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) SetClock(now time.Time)
SetClock fixes the instant time-bound grants are evaluated against for the rest of this transaction. The service layer's authorize prelude sets it from the service clock, so expiry is judged by one clock per operation. Zero restores wall-clock evaluation at each lookup.
func (*TxAuthorizer) SetCredentialPolicy ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) SetCredentialPolicy(ctx context.Context, p CredentialPolicy, actor domain.PrincipalID, at time.Time) error
func (*TxAuthorizer) SetDeveloperCredentialPolicy ¶
func (*TxAuthorizer) SetLocalAccountEmail ¶
func (*TxAuthorizer) SetPinGeneration ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) SetPinGeneration(ctx context.Context, p domain.PrincipalID, env domain.EnvID, generation int64) error
SetPinGeneration advances it. #52 owns pin creation, reassignment and release.
func (*TxAuthorizer) SetWebAuthnUserHandle ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) SetWebAuthnUserHandle(ctx context.Context, accountID string, handle []byte) (bool, error)
SetWebAuthnUserHandle sets the opaque handle once; false means one already exists (the caller reads it back rather than rotating).
func (*TxAuthorizer) SlideReauthWindow ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) SlideReauthWindow(ctx context.Context, id string, windowExpires time.Time) (bool, error)
SlideReauthWindow advances a sliding window's idle clock; false means the row moved and the caller must not extend it.
func (*TxAuthorizer) SlideSession ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) SlideSession(ctx context.Context, id string, seen, idleExpires time.Time) error
SlideSession advances the idle clock only. The absolute lifetime is never extended by activity — two independent clocks is the design.
func (*TxAuthorizer) StampCredentialEstablish ¶
func (*TxAuthorizer) StrandedRevealPrincipals ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) StrandedRevealPrincipals(ctx context.Context, org, project, env string) ([]domain.PrincipalID, error)
StrandedRevealPrincipals enumerates the reveal-holding principals a 0 effective window would strand on the given environment chain (B6).
func (*TxAuthorizer) SweepExpiredWorkspaceHandoffs ¶
func (*TxAuthorizer) SweepSessionsForProvider ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) SweepSessionsForProvider(ctx context.Context, providerID string) (int64, error)
SweepSessionsForProvider deletes every session minted through a provider and returns the count for audit (A4).
func (*TxAuthorizer) SweepSessionsForSAMLProvider ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) SweepSessionsForSAMLProvider(ctx context.Context, providerID string) (int64, error)
SweepSessionsForSAMLProvider deletes all sessions minted through a SAML IdP.
func (*TxAuthorizer) SweepSessionsForWebAuthnCredential ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) SweepSessionsForWebAuthnCredential(ctx context.Context, credentialID string) (int64, error)
SweepSessionsForWebAuthnCredential deletes every session a passkey login minted through a credential and returns the count for audit (B9 clone sweep).
func (*TxAuthorizer) Token ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) Token() *TxToken
Token exposes the attempt's transaction identity to the enumerated system mint sites (boot's keyring reads and writes), which have no principal to authorize and therefore call SystemAuthority instead of Authorize. A token alone authorizes nothing — minting the proof is what is privileged, and SystemAuthority checks the site registry.
func (*TxAuthorizer) TouchInstanceConnection ¶
func (*TxAuthorizer) TouchMachineCredential ¶
func (*TxAuthorizer) TouchSCIMCredential ¶
func (*TxAuthorizer) UnreconciledPrincipals ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) UnreconciledPrincipals(ctx context.Context) ([]PrincipalRef, error)
UnreconciledPrincipals lists who is still inert.
func (*TxAuthorizer) UpdateAccountProfile ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) UpdateAccountProfile(ctx context.Context, accountID string, profile AccountProfile) error
func (*TxAuthorizer) UpdateFederationIssuer ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) UpdateFederationIssuer(ctx context.Context, id string, source jwkssource.KeySource, refused []string, caBundle string, actor domain.PrincipalID, at time.Time) (bool, error)
func (*TxAuthorizer) UpdateOAuth2Provider ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) UpdateOAuth2Provider(ctx context.Context, u OAuth2ProviderUpdate) (bool, error)
func (*TxAuthorizer) UpdateProvider ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) UpdateProvider(ctx context.Context, u ProviderUpdate) (bool, error)
UpdateProvider compare-and-swaps a provider; false means the row moved.
func (*TxAuthorizer) UpdateRequestRefusals ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) UpdateRequestRefusals(ctx context.Context, sample *audit.RefusalSample) (int64, error)
func (*TxAuthorizer) UpdateSAMLProvider ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) UpdateSAMLProvider(ctx context.Context, provider SAMLProviderUpdate) (bool, error)
UpdateSAMLProvider compare-and-swaps a provider configuration.
func (*TxAuthorizer) UpsertOrgEmailInvitation ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) UpsertOrgEmailInvitation(ctx context.Context, n EmailInvitation) (string, error)
Email invitations of existing accounts (#1207).
func (*TxAuthorizer) VerifiedAccountEmailExists ¶
func (*TxAuthorizer) WebAuthnCeremonyByChallenge ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) WebAuthnCeremonyByChallenge(ctx context.Context, challengeVerifier []byte) (WebAuthnCeremony, error)
WebAuthnCeremonyByChallenge resolves a ceremony by its challenge verifier.
func (*TxAuthorizer) WebAuthnCeremonyByID ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) WebAuthnCeremonyByID(ctx context.Context, id string) (WebAuthnCeremony, error)
WebAuthnCeremonyByID resolves a ceremony by id, for single-decision window unit matching at disclosure.
func (*TxAuthorizer) WebAuthnCredentialByCredentialID ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) WebAuthnCredentialByCredentialID(ctx context.Context, credentialID []byte) (WebAuthnCredential, error)
WebAuthnCredentialByCredentialID resolves the row a passkey assertion names.
func (*TxAuthorizer) WebAuthnCredentialByID ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) WebAuthnCredentialByID(ctx context.Context, id string) (WebAuthnCredential, error)
WebAuthnCredentialByID resolves a credential by its surrogate id.
func (*TxAuthorizer) WebAuthnCredentialsForAccount ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) WebAuthnCredentialsForAccount(ctx context.Context, accountID string) ([]WebAuthnCredential, error)
WebAuthnCredentialsForAccount lists an account's passkeys.
func (*TxAuthorizer) WebAuthnUserHandle ¶
WebAuthnUserHandle reads an account's opaque handle, or nil when unset.
func (*TxAuthorizer) WorkloadPinState ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) WorkloadPinState(ctx context.Context, p domain.PrincipalID, env domain.EnvID) (WorkloadPinState, error)
WorkloadPinState reads the conditional reveal-history admission fact.
func (*TxAuthorizer) WorkspaceHandoffByCode ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) WorkspaceHandoffByCode(ctx context.Context, verifier []byte) (authn.WorkspaceHandoff, error)
func (*TxAuthorizer) WorkspaceHandoffByState ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) WorkspaceHandoffByState(ctx context.Context, verifier []byte) (authn.WorkspaceHandoff, error)
func (*TxAuthorizer) WorkspaceOriginAllowed ¶
func (*TxAuthorizer) WorkspaceOrigins ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) WorkspaceOrigins(ctx context.Context) ([]authn.WorkspaceOrigin, error)
func (*TxAuthorizer) WritePasswordCredential ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) WritePasswordCredential(ctx context.Context, c PasswordCredential, at time.Time) error
WritePasswordCredential inserts the first verifier for an account.
func (*TxAuthorizer) WriteRecoveryCodes ¶
func (a *TxAuthorizer) WriteRecoveryCodes(ctx context.Context, b RecoveryBatch, at time.Time) error
WriteRecoveryCodes writes the first batch for an account.
type TxToken ¶
type TxToken struct {
// contains filtered or unexported fields
}
TxToken is the transaction identity a proof is bound to. The transaction package mints one per transaction attempt and invalidates it at commit or rollback; a proof presented under any other token — a later retry attempt, a different transaction, or after its own transaction ended — dies at the store boundary. Constructing tokens is not privileged (a token without a matching proof authorizes nothing); minting proofs is.
func (*TxToken) Invalidate ¶
func (t *TxToken) Invalidate()
Invalidate marks the transaction ended. Idempotent; only ever tightens.
type WebAuthnCeremony ¶
type WebAuthnCeremony = authn.WebAuthnCeremony
WebAuthnCeremony is a resolved ceremony row.
type WebAuthnCredential ¶
type WebAuthnCredential = authn.WebAuthnCredential
WebAuthnCredential is a resolved registered passkey.
type WorkloadPinState ¶
type WorkloadPinState = authn.WorkloadPinState
Re-exported so the service layer never names the resolution-surface package.
type WorkspaceHandoff ¶
type WorkspaceHandoff = authn.WorkspaceHandoff
The workspace tier's carrier types, re-exported so the service layer never names internal/store/authn — the import-boundary test enforces that the resolution surface is reachable only through this package.
type WorkspaceOrigin ¶
type WorkspaceOrigin = authn.WorkspaceOrigin
The workspace tier's carrier types, re-exported so the service layer never names internal/store/authn — the import-boundary test enforces that the resolution surface is reachable only through this package.
Source Files
¶
- activity.go
- approval_rules.go
- artifact_admission.go
- authorize.go
- classify.go
- delivery_target.go
- denial.go
- developer.go
- email_invitation.go
- federation.go
- forwarders.go
- forwarders_gen.go
- grants.go
- humanauth.go
- key_definition_affordance.go
- machine.go
- may.go
- personal_authn.go
- personal_eligible.go
- privacy.go
- profile.go
- proof.go
- registration.go
- registry.go
- remote_pairing.go
- restore.go
- rule_delegation.go
- rule_navigation.go
- rules.go
- self_config.go
- session.go
- verify.go
- wire_registry_gen.go