Documentation
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Overview ¶
Package oidc is the relying party, and the only package in this repository that knows what JOSE is (ADR-0036).
Everything the library is good at happens here - discovery, the key set and its rotation, the signature check - and nothing of it escapes: the application layer holds `core/port/identityprovider` and its four plain structs, so replacing go-oidc tomorrow is an edit to one directory. `gate-architecture` proves that confinement rather than trusting it.
Index ¶
Constants ¶
const TargetClass = "identity_provider"
TargetClass labels the outbound calls this package makes, for the duration histogram. A class rather than a host, because the host is a tenant's choice (§3.2, rule 10).
Variables ¶
This section is empty.
Functions ¶
This section is empty.
Types ¶
type Provider ¶
type Provider struct {
// contains filtered or unexported fields
}
Provider is the relying party for every workspace on this installation.
One object, many workspaces: the configuration travels per call, and what is cached is keyed by issuer. Two workspaces pointed at the same provider share its discovery, which is right - the metadata belongs to the provider, not to whoever configured it.
func New ¶
New builds the relying party. The client must be the guarded one: an issuer is a URL a tenant administrator typed, so it is an egress channel exactly as a webhook target is (rule 6, T-07).
func (*Provider) AuthorizationURL ¶
func (p *Provider) AuthorizationURL( ctx context.Context, cfg port.Config, auth port.Authorization, ) (string, error)
AuthorizationURL performs discovery and builds the authorization request.
func (*Provider) Check ¶
Check confirms the issuer is one: reachable, and naming itself the same in its own metadata.
It shares the discovery cache with the flow, which is what makes configuring a provider warm the path the first sign-in takes.
func (*Provider) Exchange ¶
func (p *Provider) Exchange( ctx context.Context, cfg port.Config, exchange port.Exchange, ) (port.Identity, error)
Exchange trades the code and verifies what comes back.
Every failure below the transport answers one code. That is deliberate: which of the checks refused a token is a detail that helps whoever forged it and nobody else, and the trail carries the distinction for the people who are allowed to see it.
Source Files