registry

Overview ¶

Package registry implements the registry-security & artifact-management capability (CAPABILITY_SPEC domain 13). Where the verify module (domain 9) proves that a signature/attestation is valid, this module audits the *trust posture* of the registry an artifact is pulled from: is it an allowlisted, private source; is the pull pinned to an immutable digest; is the connection plaintext; does the image name look like a typosquat of a popular one.

It is deterministic and offline: every check reasons over image references extracted from the target (Dockerfile FROM lines, an image ref, or a registry target) plus optional policy supplied through the target Metadata. It reads neither the wall clock nor the network, so the same inputs always yield the same findings — the golden path the tests pin.

Configuration travels via the target Metadata so the module stays a pure function of its inputs:

registry.allow      comma-separated trusted registry hosts (enables allowlist mode)
registry.insecure   comma-separated hosts known to be served over plaintext HTTP

With no allowlist configured the module runs in advisory mode: it recommends pinning, an allowlist, and a private/pull-through source rather than failing a build outright.