Documentation
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Overview ¶
Package proxy is the egress gateway's transparent SNI/Host proxy (plans/egress-domain-filtering.md §5.5). nft redirects a gateway-mode sandbox's TCP 80/443 here; the proxy decides on the outer SNI (443) or each request's Host (80), dials the name itself through the shared dial guard, and splices bytes without terminating TLS.
Index ¶
Constants ¶
const ( // after every gateway start), so the connection is refused, never // passed through unchecked. ReasonInspectUnavailable = "inspect_unavailable" // ReasonHostMismatch: an inspected request's Host is not the TLS server // name, the domain-fronting shape (EF-53). ReasonHostMismatch = "host_mismatch" // ReasonBodyTooLarge: an inspected request body is over the cap. ReasonBodyTooLarge = "body_too_large" // ReasonSecretMissing: an inject rule's value hasn't reached the gateway // (P3-2), so the request is refused rather than sent with the // placeholder. ReasonSecretMissing = "secret_missing" )
Inspection denial reasons.
const ( DefaultMaxConns = 16384 DefaultMaxConnsPerSandbox = 512 DefaultIdleTimeout = 30 * time.Minute )
Defaults (SB_EGRESS_PROXY_MAX_CONNS[_PER_SANDBOX] and timeouts).
const ( ReasonSNINotAllowed = "sni_not_allowed" ReasonHostNotAllowed = "host_not_allowed" ReasonNoSNI = "no_sni" ReasonBlockedIP = "blocked_ip" ReasonBlocked = "blocked" ReasonConnCap = "conn_cap" ReasonUpstreamProxy = "upstream_proxy_unavailable" ReasonUnknownSource = "unknown_source" ReasonDialFailed = "dial_failed" ReasonBadRequest = "bad_request" // ReasonBinaryNotAllowed: a per-binary rule covers the destination and // the connection's executable isn't listed (P3-3). ReasonBinaryNotAllowed = "binary_not_allowed" // ReasonBinaryUnknown: the connection couldn't be traced to an // executable, so a per-binary rule can't admit it. ReasonBinaryUnknown = "binary_unknown" // ReasonRuleDenied: a ruled host's request matched no rule (P3-1). ReasonRuleDenied = "rule_denied" // ReasonPathNotCanonical: a ruled host's request path could be read two // ways (dot segments, encoded slashes), so no rule can vouch for it. ReasonPathNotCanonical = "path_not_canonical" )
Denial reasons (audit and explainable denials, CEO D4/D10).
const DefaultInspectMaxBody = 256 << 20
DefaultInspectMaxBody caps an inspected request body (SB_EGRESS_INSPECT_MAX_BODY_BYTES).
Variables ¶
This section is empty.
Functions ¶
Types ¶
type Config ¶
type Config struct {
MaxConns int
MaxConnsPerSandbox int
IdleTimeout time.Duration
DialTimeout time.Duration
HelloTimeout time.Duration
Guard egresspolicy.DialGuard
// OriginalDst returns the pre-REDIRECT destination (SO_ORIGINAL_DST).
OriginalDst func(net.Conn) (netip.AddrPort, error)
Dialer Dialer
Logger *slog.Logger
// Upstream chains allowed names through the operator's proxy
// (§5.10 PC-4); nil dials direct.
Upstream *egresspolicy.Upstream
// UpstreamRoots verifies the real host behind an inspected connection;
// nil is the gateway host's system roots.
UpstreamRoots *x509.CertPool
// InspectMaxBody caps an inspected request body (P3-1).
InspectMaxBody int64
// Identify traces connections for per-binary rules (P3-3); nil refuses
// every connection a per-binary rule covers.
Identify Identifier
}
Config tunes a Proxy.
type Decision ¶
type Decision struct {
SandboxID string
Host string
Port uint16
Allowed bool
Reason string
Rule string
Mode egress.Mode
}
Decision is one decided connection or request, for audit and learn mode.
type Dialer ¶
type Dialer interface {
DialContext(ctx context.Context, d *net.Dialer, network, address string) (net.Conn, error)
}
Dialer opens the upstream connection. The default dials directly through the host resolver; the private-cloud upstream proxy chain (§5.10 PC-4) plugs in here.
type Identifier ¶
type Identifier func(sandboxID string, pid int, local, remote netip.AddrPort, paths []string) (is func(path string) bool, err error)
Identifier traces a sandbox connection local→remote to its executable (P3-3): is(path) reports whether the connection's process is the binary at path inside the sandbox, for the paths its rules list. In production sandboxd answers it (procid.Client): the gateway can't read the sandbox's /proc itself (review finding 16).
type Inspector ¶
type Inspector interface {
Leaf(host string) (*tls.Certificate, error)
}
Inspector issues the certificate the proxy presents for an inspected name (*inspect.Authority).
type Proxy ¶
type Proxy struct {
// contains filtered or unexported fields
}
Proxy serves redirected connections.
func (*Proxy) InspectorForTest ¶ added in v0.6.9
InspectorForTest is the installed inspector, for tests of the code that installs and removes it.
func (*Proxy) SetInspector ¶
SetInspector installs the node CA's issuer; nil removes it.
func (*Proxy) SetOperator ¶
func (p *Proxy) SetOperator(g egresspolicy.DialGuard, up *egresspolicy.Upstream)
SetOperator replaces the dial guard and upstream chain from a reloaded operator file; dials after it use the new ones. Connections already open are revalidated by the gateway (Gateway.RevalidateConns).
type Sources ¶
type Sources interface {
Source(netip.Addr) (egress.Source, bool)
Track(id, host string, port uint16, conn net.Conn) *egress.TrackedConn
// BinName names the host a redirected per-binary flow is for (P3-3).
BinName(id string, dst netip.AddrPort) (string, bool)
}
Sources resolves a peer IP to its sandbox and registers live connections (*egress.Gateway).