aat

type BroadeningError struct {
	// Tool is the draft §3.3 tool identifier, empty when the finding did not
	// come from the draft's rules.
	Tool string
	// Argument is the constraint map key, empty for a tool-level finding —
	// a tool the parent never granted, or a closed-world key set that changed
	// shape.
	Argument string
	// ParentConstraint and DerivedConstraint are the two `constraint_type`
	// values, empty where one side had no constraint at all.
	ParentConstraint  string
	DerivedConstraint string
	// Reason is the comparator's explanation, citing the draft section.
	Reason string
}

type Claims struct {
	DelDepth             int                  `json:"del_depth"`
	DelMaxDepth          int                  `json:"del_max_depth"`
	ParHash              string               `json:"par_hash"`
	Cnf                  receipt.Cnf          `json:"cnf"`
	AuthorizationDetails []map[string]any     `json:"authorization_details"`
	Exp                  int64                `json:"exp"`
	JTI                  string               `json:"jti"`
	Credential           receipt.Credential   `json:"credential"`
	RootPrincipalBinding *receipt.RootBinding `json:"root_principal_binding,omitempty"`
	Trigger              *receipt.Trigger     `json:"trigger,omitempty"`
}

type Hop struct {
	Claims Claims
	Raw    []byte
	JWS    string
}

type HopResult struct {
	Status      string
	Method      string
	EvidenceRef string
	Reason      string

	// Attenuation is this hop's grant compared against its parent's, by
	// internal/why's comparator (Q13). Empty at depth 0, which has no parent
	// to be compared against.
	Attenuation why.Attenuation
	// AttenuationReason is the comparator's explanation for the outcomes
	// that need one — `unknown` above all, which is recorded and flagged,
	// never swallowed, and which keeps the hop out of `verified` (D8.7).
	AttenuationReason string
}

type MintParams struct {
	// Subject is the hop's own public key. It becomes cnf.jwk, and it is the
	// key the next hop's signature must verify under.
	Subject ed25519.PublicKey
	// MaxDepth sets del_max_depth at depth 0. Above the root it is inherited
	// from the parent and must be left zero or repeated exactly: a hop that
	// could raise its own depth budget would have no budget.
	MaxDepth int
	// AuthorizationDetails is the raw RFC 9396 grant, captured verbatim
	// (Q11). At least one object is required.
	AuthorizationDetails []map[string]any
	// Exp is the per-hop expiry, verbatim (Q11, Q23). Above the root it must
	// not outlive the parent.
	Exp int64
	// JTI is the per-hop token id — the behalf extension submitted upstream
	// per D8.6, and the other half of the revocation-window join (Q23).
	JTI string
	// Credential is the canonical credential reference — never the token
	// itself (Q23).
	Credential receipt.Credential
	// RootPrincipalBinding is the depth-0 OIDC nonce-thumbprint binding
	// (D5). Required at depth 0 unless Trigger is set; refused above it.
	RootPrincipalBinding *receipt.RootBinding
	// Trigger marks an autonomous depth-0 root (Q14). Refused above depth 0.
	Trigger *receipt.Trigger
}

type RootMaterial struct {
	// Report is oidclogin.VerifyRoot's outcome over the customer's state
	// directory — the D5 three checks, run offline against persisted
	// material and reused verbatim here (Q17, Q18). Nil means no usable
	// login: the root hop is asserted and everything above it stays
	// asserted.
	Report *oidclogin.Report
	// Absent explains a nil Report in plain language.
	Absent string
	// At is the instant verification runs — capture time for the proxy.
	// Zero disables the wall-clock freshness check, which is what offline
	// re-verification wants: the record already states what was true at
	// capture, and re-reading it years later must not turn a then-valid
	// token into a finding (the same reasoning as D5's deliberate
	// no-expiry-check on the root).
	At time.Time
}