Documentation
¶
Overview ¶
Package policy owns deterministic local decisions over sealed DKIM2 verification facts. Policy verdicts remain separate from the authoritative PASS, FAIL, PERMERROR, and TEMPERROR verification states.
Strict policy is the default. Permissive and testing modes are explicit, and continue is a non-terminal disposition rather than accept or PASS. Current verifier projections authenticate only the current passing hop. Draft-07 Section 10.10 removed the donotmodify and donotexplode flags; received spellings are inert unknown flags, so authenticated hop flags never produce compliance findings or change the verdict. Authenticated exploded markers are reported as informational findings only.
Feedback is bounded intent only. Feedhere requires an authenticated feedback request at the same or a lower sequence and exposes no route. The DNS key record t= tag is retired by draft-ietf-dkim-dkim2-dns-02 Section 3.4.1 and carries no policy meaning; only the explicitly configured local testing mode relaxes the verdict. Evaluation never reparses messages or public facts, returns exactly one action on success, and exposes no message, identity, key, provider, or route material.
Index ¶
- func IsErrorCode(err error, code ErrorCode) bool
- type Action
- type ActionKind
- type Config
- type Decision
- func (d Decision) Actions() []Action
- func (d Decision) FeedbackIntent() FeedbackIntent
- func (d Decision) Findings() []Finding
- func (d Decision) IsZero() bool
- func (d Decision) Mode() Mode
- func (d Decision) PrimaryReason() PolicyReason
- func (d Decision) Protocol() ProtocolClass
- func (d Decision) Valid() bool
- func (d Decision) Verdict() Verdict
- type Error
- type ErrorCode
- type Evaluator
- type FeedbackIntent
- type Finding
- type FindingSeverity
- type HistoryCoverage
- type HopFact
- type Limits
- type Mode
- type PolicyReason
- type PreTargetReason
- type Projection
- func NewChainFailureProjection(reason VerificationReason, target uint64) (Projection, error)
- func NewGroupedSelectedProjection(protocol ProtocolClass, reason VerificationReason, target uint64, ...) (Projection, error)
- func NewGroupedSelectedTargetProjection(protocol ProtocolClass, reason VerificationReason, target uint64, ...) (Projection, error)
- func NewHistoricalProjection(target uint64, coverage HistoryCoverage, hops []HopFact, limits Limits) (Projection, error)
- func NewRevisionFailureProjection(protocol ProtocolClass, reason VerificationReason, current Projection, ...) (Projection, error)
- func NewSelectedProjection(protocol ProtocolClass, reason VerificationReason, target uint64, ...) (Projection, error)
- func NewUnavailableProjection(reason PreTargetReason) (Projection, error)
- func (p Projection) Clone() Projection
- func (p Projection) CompleteOriginHistory(limits Limits) (Projection, error)
- func (p Projection) Form() TargetForm
- func (p Projection) HistoryCoverage() HistoryCoverage
- func (p Projection) Hops() []HopFact
- func (p Projection) IsZero() bool
- func (p Projection) PreTargetReason() PreTargetReason
- func (p Projection) Protocol() ProtocolClass
- func (p Projection) ReceivedDSN() (ReceivedDSNFacts, bool)
- func (p Projection) SignatureFacts() []SignatureFact
- func (p Projection) TargetSequence() uint64
- func (p Projection) Valid() bool
- func (p Projection) VerificationReason() VerificationReason
- func (p Projection) WithReceivedDSN(facts ReceivedDSNFacts) (Projection, error)
- type ProtocolClass
- type ReceivedDSNEmbedded
- type ReceivedDSNFacts
- func (f ReceivedDSNFacts) Embedded() ReceivedDSNEmbedded
- func (f ReceivedDSNFacts) LocalHop() ReceivedDSNLocalHop
- func (f ReceivedDSNFacts) OuterAlignment() ReceivedDSNOuterAlignment
- func (f ReceivedDSNFacts) RecipientLinkage() ReceivedDSNRecipientLinkage
- func (f ReceivedDSNFacts) Structure() ReceivedDSNStructure
- func (f ReceivedDSNFacts) Valid() bool
- type ReceivedDSNLocalHop
- type ReceivedDSNOuterAlignment
- type ReceivedDSNRecipientLinkage
- type ReceivedDSNStructure
- type SetAlgorithm
- type SetReason
- type SetStatus
- type SignatureFact
- type TargetForm
- type TargetHash
- type TransitionState
- type Verdict
- type VerificationReason
Constants ¶
This section is empty.
Variables ¶
This section is empty.
Functions ¶
func IsErrorCode ¶
IsErrorCode reports whether err carries the requested closed code.
Types ¶
type Action ¶
type Action struct {
// contains filtered or unexported fields
}
Action stores one immutable local disposition.
func (Action) Kind ¶
func (a Action) Kind() ActionKind
Kind returns the closed disposition action kind.
type ActionKind ¶
type ActionKind string
ActionKind identifies the single disposition action matching a verdict.
const ( // ActionAccept matches an accept verdict. ActionAccept ActionKind = "accept" // ActionReject matches a reject verdict. ActionReject ActionKind = "reject" // ActionTempfail matches a temporary-failure verdict. ActionTempfail ActionKind = "tempfail" // ActionContinue matches a non-terminal continue verdict. ActionContinue ActionKind = "continue" )
func (ActionKind) Known ¶
func (a ActionKind) Known() bool
Known reports whether the action belongs to the closed policy vocabulary.
type Config ¶
Config contains immutable evaluator policy and resource limits.
func DefaultConfig ¶
func DefaultConfig() Config
DefaultConfig returns strict policy with hard-bounded defaults.
type Decision ¶
type Decision struct {
// contains filtered or unexported fields
}
Decision stores one immutable local policy outcome separate from verification.
func (Decision) FeedbackIntent ¶
func (d Decision) FeedbackIntent() FeedbackIntent
FeedbackIntent returns bounded authenticated feedback intent by value.
func (Decision) PrimaryReason ¶
func (d Decision) PrimaryReason() PolicyReason
PrimaryReason returns the deterministic decision reason.
func (Decision) Protocol ¶
func (d Decision) Protocol() ProtocolClass
Protocol returns the unchanged authoritative verification class.
type Error ¶
type Error struct {
// contains filtered or unexported fields
}
Error stores bounded cause-free policy failure metadata.
func (*Error) ConfiguredLimit ¶
ConfiguredLimit returns the configured limit without input content.
func (*Error) ObservedCount ¶
ObservedCount returns the bounded observed count.
type ErrorCode ¶
type ErrorCode string
ErrorCode identifies one bounded policy API failure.
const ( // ErrorInvalidConfig reports unknown or unsafe evaluator configuration. ErrorInvalidConfig ErrorCode = "invalid_config" // ErrorInvalidInput reports unknown or incoherent policy input. ErrorInvalidInput ErrorCode = "invalid_input" // ErrorLimitExceeded reports a configured policy resource limit. ErrorLimitExceeded ErrorCode = "limit_exceeded" // ErrorInternalContract reports impossible internal policy state. ErrorInternalContract ErrorCode = "internal_contract" )
type Evaluator ¶
type Evaluator struct {
// contains filtered or unexported fields
}
Evaluator applies deterministic local policy over sealed verification facts.
func NewEvaluator ¶
NewEvaluator validates and constructs one immutable policy evaluator.
func (Evaluator) EvaluateAuthenticationProjection ¶
func (e Evaluator) EvaluateAuthenticationProjection(projection Projection, protocol ProtocolClass) (Decision, error)
EvaluateAuthenticationProjection applies non-overridable replay failure after deriving authenticated policy facts.
func (Evaluator) EvaluateProjection ¶
func (e Evaluator) EvaluateProjection(projection Projection) (Decision, error)
EvaluateProjection applies policy to one service-sealed internal projection.
type FeedbackIntent ¶
type FeedbackIntent struct {
// contains filtered or unexported fields
}
FeedbackIntent stores bounded authenticated feedback routing intent.
func (FeedbackIntent) HistoryCoverage ¶
func (i FeedbackIntent) HistoryCoverage() HistoryCoverage
HistoryCoverage returns the explicit feedback-history coverage.
func (FeedbackIntent) RelayRequired ¶
func (i FeedbackIntent) RelayRequired() bool
RelayRequired reports whether an authenticated eligible relay exists.
func (FeedbackIntent) RelaySequence ¶
func (i FeedbackIntent) RelaySequence() uint64
RelaySequence returns the highest eligible relay sequence or zero.
func (FeedbackIntent) Requested ¶
func (i FeedbackIntent) Requested() bool
Requested reports whether authenticated feedback was requested.
func (FeedbackIntent) Valid ¶
func (i FeedbackIntent) Valid() bool
Valid reports whether feedback intent is internally coherent.
type Finding ¶
type Finding struct {
// contains filtered or unexported fields
}
Finding records one bounded deterministic policy fact.
func (Finding) Reason ¶
func (f Finding) Reason() PolicyReason
Reason returns the closed finding reason.
func (Finding) Severity ¶
func (f Finding) Severity() FindingSeverity
Severity returns the frozen severity for the reason.
type FindingSeverity ¶
type FindingSeverity string
FindingSeverity identifies one bounded policy finding severity.
const ( // SeverityInfo reports informational authenticated state. SeverityInfo FindingSeverity = "info" // SeverityWarning reports non-terminal policy concern or override. SeverityWarning FindingSeverity = "warning" // SeverityPermanent reports a permanent failure or violation. SeverityPermanent FindingSeverity = "permanent" // SeverityTemporary reports a retryable verification failure. SeverityTemporary FindingSeverity = "temporary" )
func (FindingSeverity) Known ¶
func (s FindingSeverity) Known() bool
Known reports whether the severity belongs to the closed vocabulary.
type HistoryCoverage ¶
type HistoryCoverage string
HistoryCoverage identifies the authenticated history represented by a projection.
const ( // HistoryNotEvaluated records the current verifier's deliberately unevaluated history. HistoryNotEvaluated HistoryCoverage = "not_evaluated" // HistoryComplete records exact contiguous authenticated coverage through the target. HistoryComplete HistoryCoverage = "complete" // HistoryIndeterminate records explicitly partial authenticated coverage. HistoryIndeterminate HistoryCoverage = "indeterminate" )
func (HistoryCoverage) Known ¶
func (h HistoryCoverage) Known() bool
Known reports whether coverage belongs to the closed vocabulary.
type HopFact ¶
type HopFact struct {
// contains filtered or unexported fields
}
HopFact stores one authenticated flag and transition fact.
func NewAuthenticatedHopFact ¶
func NewAuthenticatedHopFact(sequence uint64, transition TransitionState, feedback, feedHere, exploded bool) (HopFact, error)
NewAuthenticatedHopFact constructs one authenticated fact for service-owned minting.
func (HopFact) Transition ¶
func (h HopFact) Transition() TransitionState
Transition returns the authenticated transition state.
type Limits ¶
Limits bounds authenticated facts and retained policy output.
func DefaultLimits ¶
func DefaultLimits() Limits
DefaultLimits returns the restrictive policy hard maxima.
type Mode ¶
type Mode string
Mode identifies one explicit local policy posture.
const ( // ModeStrict enforces DKIM2 failure and proven policy violations. ModeStrict Mode = "strict" // ModePermissive accepts permanent DKIM2 failure while retaining findings. ModePermissive Mode = "permissive" // ModeTesting observes DKIM2 outcomes without a terminal DKIM2 decision. ModeTesting Mode = "testing" )
type PolicyReason ¶
type PolicyReason string
PolicyReason identifies one closed decision, finding, or error reason.
const ( ReasonInvalidInput PolicyReason = "invalid_input" ReasonLimitExceeded PolicyReason = "limit_exceeded" ReasonInternalContract PolicyReason = "internal_contract" ReasonProtocolPass PolicyReason = "protocol_pass" ReasonProtocolFail PolicyReason = "protocol_fail" ReasonProtocolPermerror PolicyReason = "protocol_permerror" ReasonProtocolTemperror PolicyReason = "protocol_temperror" ReasonPermissiveOverride PolicyReason = "permissive_override" ReasonTestingModeObserve PolicyReason = "testing_mode_observe" ReasonFeedbackRequested PolicyReason = "feedback_requested" ReasonFeedbackRelaySelected PolicyReason = "feedback_relay_selected" ReasonFeedHereInert PolicyReason = "feedhere_inert" ReasonExplodedReported PolicyReason = "exploded_reported" ReasonReceivedDSNOuterPolicy PolicyReason = "received_dsn_outer_policy" ReasonReceivedDSNStructureInvalid PolicyReason = "received_dsn_structure_invalid" ReasonReceivedDSNEmbeddedUnverified PolicyReason = "received_dsn_embedded_unverified" ReasonReceivedDSNEmbeddedAbsent PolicyReason = "received_dsn_embedded_absent" ReasonReceivedDSNTemporaryFailure PolicyReason = "received_dsn_temporary_failure" ReasonReceivedDSNIdentityMismatch PolicyReason = "received_dsn_identity_mismatch" ReasonReceivedDSNNotLocal PolicyReason = "received_dsn_not_local" ReasonReceivedDSNRecipientUnlinked PolicyReason = "received_dsn_recipient_unlinked" ReasonReceivedDSNLinked PolicyReason = "received_dsn_linked" )
Frozen policy reason constants shared by decisions, findings, and errors.
func (PolicyReason) Known ¶
func (r PolicyReason) Known() bool
Known reports whether the reason belongs to the frozen policy vocabulary.
type PreTargetReason ¶
type PreTargetReason string
PreTargetReason identifies why no authoritative target was available.
const ( // PreTargetLimitExceeded reports a pre-target resource limit. PreTargetLimitExceeded PreTargetReason = "limit_exceeded" // PreTargetMalformedMessage reports malformed RFC 5322 input. PreTargetMalformedMessage PreTargetReason = "malformed_message" // PreTargetMalformedProtocol reports malformed DKIM2 input. PreTargetMalformedProtocol PreTargetReason = "malformed_protocol" // PreTargetDuplicateHashAlgorithm reports a repeated h= algorithm before target selection. PreTargetDuplicateHashAlgorithm PreTargetReason = "duplicate_hash_algorithm" // PreTargetDuplicateSelector reports a repeated selector before target selection. PreTargetDuplicateSelector PreTargetReason = "duplicate_selector" // PreTargetMissingProtocol reports absent required DKIM2 state. PreTargetMissingProtocol PreTargetReason = "missing_protocol" // PreTargetSequenceInvalid reports invalid DKIM2 sequencing. PreTargetSequenceInvalid PreTargetReason = "sequence_invalid" // PreTargetInternalContract reports an impossible internal state. PreTargetInternalContract PreTargetReason = "internal_contract" )
func (PreTargetReason) Known ¶
func (r PreTargetReason) Known() bool
Known reports whether reason belongs to the closed pre-target vocabulary.
type Projection ¶
type Projection struct {
// contains filtered or unexported fields
}
Projection is an immutable authenticated policy input sealed by verification service code.
func NewChainFailureProjection ¶
func NewChainFailureProjection(reason VerificationReason, target uint64) (Projection, error)
NewChainFailureProjection seals a selected target whose Draft-09 Section 14.4 Chain of Custody check failed before any signature was evaluated. The result is FAIL with custody_mismatch, next_domain_mismatch, or domain_alignment_mismatch; it carries no signature facts and no authenticated hops, so no policy finding can be derived from unverified flags.
func NewGroupedSelectedProjection ¶
func NewGroupedSelectedProjection(protocol ProtocolClass, reason VerificationReason, target uint64, hops []HopFact, signatures []SignatureFact, layout combine.Layout, limits Limits) (Projection, error)
NewGroupedSelectedProjection seals a selected target whose signature facts are in field order under the parsed Draft-09 sig-any/sig-all layout. The layout lets validation recompute the Section 14.6 combination exactly. The target hash combination is recorded as checkable, so an unsupported_algorithm reason must come from the decisive set.
func NewGroupedSelectedTargetProjection ¶
func NewGroupedSelectedTargetProjection(protocol ProtocolClass, reason VerificationReason, target uint64, hops []HopFact, signatures []SignatureFact, layout combine.Layout, hash TargetHash, limits Limits) (Projection, error)
NewGroupedSelectedTargetProjection seals a selected target like NewGroupedSelectedProjection and additionally records the target hash class, the only non-set source of a PERMERROR unsupported_algorithm.
func NewHistoricalProjection ¶
func NewHistoricalProjection(target uint64, coverage HistoryCoverage, hops []HopFact, limits Limits) (Projection, error)
NewHistoricalProjection constructs an authenticated all-hop policy projection.
func NewRevisionFailureProjection ¶
func NewRevisionFailureProjection(protocol ProtocolClass, reason VerificationReason, current Projection, limits Limits) (Projection, error)
NewRevisionFailureProjection seals a selected target whose current signature sets passed before inherited history failed.
func NewSelectedProjection ¶
func NewSelectedProjection(protocol ProtocolClass, reason VerificationReason, target uint64, hops []HopFact, signatures []SignatureFact, limits Limits) (Projection, error)
NewSelectedProjection seals a selected target with aggregate reason provenance whose signature facts form one sig-all group, the layout of an s= value without "|".
func NewUnavailableProjection ¶
func NewUnavailableProjection(reason PreTargetReason) (Projection, error)
NewUnavailableProjection seals one exact pre-target permanent-error projection.
func (Projection) Clone ¶
func (p Projection) Clone() Projection
Clone returns an independent projection value with cloned collections.
func (Projection) CompleteOriginHistory ¶
func (p Projection) CompleteOriginHistory(limits Limits) (Projection, error)
CompleteOriginHistory atomically upgrades authenticated current origin evidence to complete one-hop history.
func (Projection) HistoryCoverage ¶
func (p Projection) HistoryCoverage() HistoryCoverage
HistoryCoverage returns the authenticated history coverage state.
func (Projection) Hops ¶
func (p Projection) Hops() []HopFact
Hops returns an independent authenticated-fact clone.
func (Projection) IsZero ¶
func (p Projection) IsZero() bool
IsZero reports whether the projection is uninitialized.
func (Projection) PreTargetReason ¶
func (p Projection) PreTargetReason() PreTargetReason
PreTargetReason returns the bounded unavailable-target reason.
func (Projection) Protocol ¶
func (p Projection) Protocol() ProtocolClass
Protocol returns the authoritative protocol class.
func (Projection) ReceivedDSN ¶
func (p Projection) ReceivedDSN() (ReceivedDSNFacts, bool)
ReceivedDSN returns the received-DSN facts and whether the projection carries them.
func (Projection) SignatureFacts ¶
func (p Projection) SignatureFacts() []SignatureFact
SignatureFacts returns an independent pre-retention signature-fact clone.
func (Projection) TargetSequence ¶
func (p Projection) TargetSequence() uint64
TargetSequence returns the authoritative target sequence.
func (Projection) Valid ¶
func (p Projection) Valid() bool
Valid reports whether the projection satisfies hard-limit invariants.
func (Projection) VerificationReason ¶
func (p Projection) VerificationReason() VerificationReason
VerificationReason returns the authoritative aggregate reason for selected targets.
func (Projection) WithReceivedDSN ¶
func (p Projection) WithReceivedDSN(facts ReceivedDSNFacts) (Projection, error)
WithReceivedDSN returns a copy of the sealed verification projection that also carries the closed received-DSN facts of the same inbound message, so that one evaluation yields one decision covering both.
type ProtocolClass ¶
type ProtocolClass string
ProtocolClass mirrors one authoritative four-state verification outcome.
const ( // ProtocolPASS reports successful verification. ProtocolPASS ProtocolClass = "PASS" // ProtocolFAIL reports a supported integrity mismatch. ProtocolFAIL ProtocolClass = "FAIL" // ProtocolPERMERROR reports a permanent verification error. ProtocolPERMERROR ProtocolClass = "PERMERROR" // ProtocolTEMPERROR reports a temporary verification error. ProtocolTEMPERROR ProtocolClass = "TEMPERROR" )
func ProtocolForVerificationReason ¶
func ProtocolForVerificationReason(reason VerificationReason) (ProtocolClass, bool)
ProtocolForVerificationReason is the single owner of the Draft-09 Section 14.1 state of every verification reason. PASS carries only none. FAIL means verification completed and the message is not a Fully Verified DKIM2 Message: hash and signature mismatches (Sections 14.6 and 14.7), timestamp failures (14.3), Chain of Custody failures including the envelope, MAIL FROM and d= alignment, next-domain, custody adjacency, and unmet out-of-band arrangements (14.4 and 13.2), an inauthentic From, and a From whose strict Domain Policy Record forbids subdomain signing (14.8 and 3.8). TEMPERROR is a temporary inability to retrieve a DNS record (14.1): a temporary key-provider failure or an unavailable Domain Policy Record (3.8). Every other reason, including malformed, missing, duplicate, sequence, algorithm, key, Recipe, limit, and internal failures (14.2 and 14.5), multiple Domain Policy Records (3.8), and an invalid Domain Policy Record (local interpretation D1), is PERMERROR; a history whose body cannot be checked below a null Recipe is the Section 14.2 "has a null recipe" PERMERROR.
func (ProtocolClass) Known ¶
func (p ProtocolClass) Known() bool
Known reports whether the class belongs to the closed verification vocabulary.
type ReceivedDSNEmbedded ¶
type ReceivedDSNEmbedded string
ReceivedDSNEmbedded mirrors the closed embedded member of a received-DSN evaluation.
const ( // ReceivedDSNEmbeddedVerified reports a verified complete embedded original. ReceivedDSNEmbeddedVerified ReceivedDSNEmbedded = "verified" // ReceivedDSNEmbeddedVerifiedHeadersOnly reports verified header-only embedded evidence. ReceivedDSNEmbeddedVerifiedHeadersOnly ReceivedDSNEmbedded = "verified_headers_only" // ReceivedDSNEmbeddedUnverified reports permanent embedded verification failure. ReceivedDSNEmbeddedUnverified ReceivedDSNEmbedded = "unverified" // ReceivedDSNEmbeddedTemperror reports a temporary DNS or key failure. ReceivedDSNEmbeddedTemperror ReceivedDSNEmbedded = "temperror" // ReceivedDSNEmbeddedAbsent reports an embedded original without any DKIM2-Signature. ReceivedDSNEmbeddedAbsent ReceivedDSNEmbedded = "absent" // ReceivedDSNEmbeddedNotEvaluated reports that the structure stage stopped // the evaluation before any embedded evidence could be assessed. ReceivedDSNEmbeddedNotEvaluated ReceivedDSNEmbedded = "not_evaluated" )
func (ReceivedDSNEmbedded) Known ¶
func (e ReceivedDSNEmbedded) Known() bool
Known reports whether the value belongs to the closed vocabulary.
type ReceivedDSNFacts ¶
type ReceivedDSNFacts struct {
// contains filtered or unexported fields
}
ReceivedDSNFacts is the immutable, content-free projection of one received-DSN evaluation that the policy engine maps through the received-DSN row table. It carries only the closed stage members; propagation is informational and never a policy input.
func NewReceivedDSNFacts ¶
func NewReceivedDSNFacts(structure ReceivedDSNStructure, embedded ReceivedDSNEmbedded, localHop ReceivedDSNLocalHop, alignment ReceivedDSNOuterAlignment, linkage ReceivedDSNRecipientLinkage) (ReceivedDSNFacts, error)
NewReceivedDSNFacts seals one stage-coherent received-DSN projection.
func (ReceivedDSNFacts) Embedded ¶
func (f ReceivedDSNFacts) Embedded() ReceivedDSNEmbedded
Embedded returns the closed embedded member, which is ReceivedDSNEmbeddedNotEvaluated when the structure stage stopped the evaluation.
func (ReceivedDSNFacts) LocalHop ¶
func (f ReceivedDSNFacts) LocalHop() ReceivedDSNLocalHop
LocalHop returns the closed local_hop member.
func (ReceivedDSNFacts) OuterAlignment ¶
func (f ReceivedDSNFacts) OuterAlignment() ReceivedDSNOuterAlignment
OuterAlignment returns the closed outer_alignment member.
func (ReceivedDSNFacts) RecipientLinkage ¶
func (f ReceivedDSNFacts) RecipientLinkage() ReceivedDSNRecipientLinkage
RecipientLinkage returns the closed recipient_linkage member.
func (ReceivedDSNFacts) Structure ¶
func (f ReceivedDSNFacts) Structure() ReceivedDSNStructure
Structure returns the closed structure member.
func (ReceivedDSNFacts) Valid ¶
func (f ReceivedDSNFacts) Valid() bool
Valid reports whether the members are known and coherent with the stop-at-first-failure stage order of the evaluation.
type ReceivedDSNLocalHop ¶
type ReceivedDSNLocalHop string
ReceivedDSNLocalHop mirrors the closed local_hop member of a received-DSN evaluation.
const ( // ReceivedDSNLocalHopLocal reports a verified, datasource-local completion signature bound to the outer recipient. ReceivedDSNLocalHopLocal ReceivedDSNLocalHop = "local" // ReceivedDSNLocalHopNotLocal reports a completion signature under a domain the tenant does not control. ReceivedDSNLocalHopNotLocal ReceivedDSNLocalHop = "not_local" // ReceivedDSNLocalHopMismatch reports a local domain whose mf= does not bind to the outer recipient or its d=. ReceivedDSNLocalHopMismatch ReceivedDSNLocalHop = "mismatch" // ReceivedDSNLocalHopTemperror reports a temporary datasource failure. ReceivedDSNLocalHopTemperror ReceivedDSNLocalHop = "temperror" // ReceivedDSNLocalHopNotEvaluated reports that an earlier stage stopped or that no tenant was available. ReceivedDSNLocalHopNotEvaluated ReceivedDSNLocalHop = "not_evaluated" )
func (ReceivedDSNLocalHop) Known ¶
func (l ReceivedDSNLocalHop) Known() bool
Known reports whether the value belongs to the closed vocabulary.
type ReceivedDSNOuterAlignment ¶
type ReceivedDSNOuterAlignment string
ReceivedDSNOuterAlignment mirrors the closed outer_alignment member of a received-DSN evaluation.
const ( // ReceivedDSNOuterAlignmentAligned reports that the outer signer relaxed-matches a completion rt= domain. ReceivedDSNOuterAlignmentAligned ReceivedDSNOuterAlignment = "aligned" // ReceivedDSNOuterAlignmentMisaligned reports that no completion rt= domain relaxed-matches the outer signer. ReceivedDSNOuterAlignmentMisaligned ReceivedDSNOuterAlignment = "misaligned" // ReceivedDSNOuterAlignmentNotEvaluated reports that an earlier stage stopped the evaluation. ReceivedDSNOuterAlignmentNotEvaluated ReceivedDSNOuterAlignment = "not_evaluated" )
func (ReceivedDSNOuterAlignment) Known ¶
func (a ReceivedDSNOuterAlignment) Known() bool
Known reports whether the value belongs to the closed vocabulary.
type ReceivedDSNRecipientLinkage ¶
type ReceivedDSNRecipientLinkage string
ReceivedDSNRecipientLinkage mirrors the closed recipient_linkage member of a received-DSN evaluation.
const ( // ReceivedDSNRecipientLinkageLinked reports at least one recipient group naming an authenticated completion rt= path. ReceivedDSNRecipientLinkageLinked ReceivedDSNRecipientLinkage = "linked" // ReceivedDSNRecipientLinkageUnlinked reports that no recipient group names an authenticated completion rt= path. ReceivedDSNRecipientLinkageUnlinked ReceivedDSNRecipientLinkage = "unlinked" // ReceivedDSNRecipientLinkageNotEvaluated reports that an earlier stage stopped the evaluation. ReceivedDSNRecipientLinkageNotEvaluated ReceivedDSNRecipientLinkage = "not_evaluated" )
func (ReceivedDSNRecipientLinkage) Known ¶
func (l ReceivedDSNRecipientLinkage) Known() bool
Known reports whether the value belongs to the closed vocabulary.
type ReceivedDSNStructure ¶
type ReceivedDSNStructure string
ReceivedDSNStructure mirrors the closed structure member of a received-DSN evaluation.
const ( // ReceivedDSNStructureValid reports exact RFC 6522 framing and a strict RFC 3464 body. ReceivedDSNStructureValid ReceivedDSNStructure = "valid" // ReceivedDSNStructureMalformed reports framing or delivery-status syntax outside the profile. ReceivedDSNStructureMalformed ReceivedDSNStructure = "malformed" // ReceivedDSNStructureLimitExceeded reports a DSN parser resource limit violation. ReceivedDSNStructureLimitExceeded ReceivedDSNStructure = "limit_exceeded" )
func (ReceivedDSNStructure) Known ¶
func (s ReceivedDSNStructure) Known() bool
Known reports whether the value belongs to the closed vocabulary.
type SetAlgorithm ¶
type SetAlgorithm string
SetAlgorithm identifies a bounded signature algorithm family.
const ( // SetAlgorithmRSA identifies RSA-SHA256. SetAlgorithmRSA SetAlgorithm = "rsa-sha256" // SetAlgorithmEd25519 identifies Ed25519-SHA256. SetAlgorithmEd25519 SetAlgorithm = "ed25519-sha256" // SetAlgorithmMLDSA44 identifies pure ML-DSA-44. SetAlgorithmMLDSA44 SetAlgorithm = "mldsa44" // SetAlgorithmUnknown identifies an unknown algorithm. SetAlgorithmUnknown SetAlgorithm = "unknown" )
func (SetAlgorithm) Known ¶
func (a SetAlgorithm) Known() bool
Known reports whether algorithm belongs to the closed vocabulary.
type SetReason ¶
type SetReason string
SetReason identifies a bounded signature-set reason.
const ( SetReasonNone SetReason = "none" SetReasonSignatureMismatch SetReason = "signature_mismatch" SetReasonUnsupportedAlgorithm SetReason = "unsupported_algorithm" SetReasonMissingKey SetReason = "missing_key" SetReasonInvalidKey SetReason = "invalid_key" SetReasonAmbiguousKey SetReason = "ambiguous_key" SetReasonRevokedKey SetReason = "revoked_key" SetReasonUnsupportedKeyType SetReason = "unsupported_key_type" SetReasonKeyAlgorithmMismatch SetReason = "key_algorithm_mismatch" SetReasonProviderTemporary SetReason = "provider_temporary" SetReasonProviderPermanent SetReason = "provider_permanent" SetReasonProviderContract SetReason = "provider_contract" SetReasonInternalContract SetReason = "internal_contract" )
Closed signature-set reason constants retained by the policy projection.
type SetStatus ¶
type SetStatus string
SetStatus identifies one sealed signature-set outcome.
const ( // SetStatusPass reports a supported signature pass. SetStatusPass SetStatus = "pass" // SetStatusFail reports a supported signature mismatch. SetStatusFail SetStatus = "fail" // SetStatusPermerror reports a permanent set failure. SetStatusPermerror SetStatus = "permerror" // SetStatusTemperror reports a temporary provider failure. SetStatusTemperror SetStatus = "temperror" )
type SignatureFact ¶
type SignatureFact struct {
// contains filtered or unexported fields
}
SignatureFact stores bounded pre-retention signature-set outcome facts.
func NewSignatureFact ¶
func NewSignatureFact(algorithm SetAlgorithm, status SetStatus, reason SetReason) (SignatureFact, error)
NewSignatureFact constructs one coherent sealed signature-set fact.
func (SignatureFact) Algorithm ¶
func (f SignatureFact) Algorithm() SetAlgorithm
Algorithm returns the bounded algorithm family.
func (SignatureFact) Reason ¶
func (f SignatureFact) Reason() SetReason
Reason returns the bounded set reason.
func (SignatureFact) Status ¶
func (f SignatureFact) Status() SetStatus
Status returns the bounded set outcome.
func (SignatureFact) Valid ¶
func (f SignatureFact) Valid() bool
Valid reports whether the fact has coherent closed dimensions.
type TargetForm ¶
type TargetForm string
TargetForm identifies whether verification selected an authoritative target.
const ( // TargetSelected reports a positive authoritative target sequence. TargetSelected TargetForm = "target_selected" TargetUnavailable TargetForm = "target_unavailable" )
func (TargetForm) Known ¶
func (t TargetForm) Known() bool
Known reports whether the target form belongs to the closed vocabulary.
type TargetHash ¶
type TargetHash string
TargetHash is the sealed class of the selected target's Draft-09 Section 14.7 hash combination as far as the aggregate reason depends on it.
const ( // TargetHashCheckable reports a hash combination that is PASS or FAIL. TargetHashCheckable TargetHash = "checkable" // TargetHashUnsupported reports a PERMERROR hash combination: no // hash-all group of implemented algorithms decided it. TargetHashUnsupported TargetHash = "unsupported" )
func (TargetHash) Known ¶
func (h TargetHash) Known() bool
Known reports whether h belongs to the closed vocabulary.
type TransitionState ¶
type TransitionState string
TransitionState identifies one authenticated message-state transition.
const ( // TransitionOrigin identifies the first authenticated message state. TransitionOrigin TransitionState = "origin" // TransitionUnchanged reports no covered content change. TransitionUnchanged TransitionState = "unchanged" // TransitionBodyChanged reports a body-hash-changing transition. TransitionBodyChanged TransitionState = "body_changed" // TransitionHeadersChanged reports removed or changed header fields. TransitionHeadersChanged TransitionState = "headers_removed_or_changed" // TransitionBodyAndHeadersChanged reports both prohibited change classes. TransitionBodyAndHeadersChanged TransitionState = "body_and_headers_changed" // TransitionHeaderAdditionOnly reports only permitted header additions. TransitionHeaderAdditionOnly TransitionState = "header_addition_only" // TransitionIndeterminate reports incomplete transition evidence. TransitionIndeterminate TransitionState = "indeterminate" // TransitionNotEvaluated reports that transition evaluation did not run. TransitionNotEvaluated TransitionState = "not_evaluated" )
func (TransitionState) Known ¶
func (s TransitionState) Known() bool
Known reports whether the transition belongs to the closed vocabulary.
type Verdict ¶
type Verdict string
Verdict identifies one local policy disposition.
const ( // VerdictAccept authorizes normal continuation under DKIM2 policy. VerdictAccept Verdict = "accept" // VerdictReject reports permanent local-policy rejection. VerdictReject Verdict = "reject" // VerdictTempfail reports temporary SMTP deferral. VerdictTempfail Verdict = "tempfail" // VerdictContinue withholds a terminal DKIM2 decision. VerdictContinue Verdict = "continue" )
type VerificationReason ¶
type VerificationReason string
VerificationReason identifies the authoritative aggregate verification reason.
const ( VerificationReasonNone VerificationReason = "none" VerificationReasonLimitExceeded VerificationReason = "limit_exceeded" VerificationReasonMalformedMessage VerificationReason = "malformed_message" VerificationReasonMalformedProtocol VerificationReason = "malformed_protocol" VerificationReasonDuplicateHashAlgorithm VerificationReason = "duplicate_hash_algorithm" VerificationReasonInvalidRecipeJSON VerificationReason = "invalid_recipe_json" VerificationReasonInvalidRecipe VerificationReason = "invalid_recipe" VerificationReasonFromNotAuthentic VerificationReason = "from_not_authentic" VerificationReasonFromSubdomainForbidden VerificationReason = "from_subdomain_forbidden" VerificationReasonDomainPolicyTemporary VerificationReason = "domain_policy_temporary" VerificationReasonDomainPolicyAmbiguous VerificationReason = "domain_policy_ambiguous" VerificationReasonDomainPolicyInvalid VerificationReason = "domain_policy_invalid" VerificationReasonDuplicateSelector VerificationReason = "duplicate_selector" VerificationReasonMissingProtocol VerificationReason = "missing_protocol" VerificationReasonSequenceInvalid VerificationReason = "sequence_invalid" VerificationReasonUnsupportedAlgorithm VerificationReason = "unsupported_algorithm" VerificationReasonHashMismatch VerificationReason = "hash_mismatch" VerificationReasonSignatureMismatch VerificationReason = "signature_mismatch" VerificationReasonMissingKey VerificationReason = "missing_key" VerificationReasonInvalidKey VerificationReason = "invalid_key" VerificationReasonAmbiguousKey VerificationReason = "ambiguous_key" VerificationReasonRevokedKey VerificationReason = "revoked_key" VerificationReasonUnsupportedKeyType VerificationReason = "unsupported_key_type" VerificationReasonKeyAlgorithmMismatch VerificationReason = "key_algorithm_mismatch" VerificationReasonProviderTemporary VerificationReason = "provider_temporary" VerificationReasonProviderPermanent VerificationReason = "provider_permanent" VerificationReasonProviderContract VerificationReason = "provider_contract" VerificationReasonTimestampInvalid VerificationReason = "timestamp_invalid" VerificationReasonEnvelopeMismatch VerificationReason = "envelope_mismatch" VerificationReasonDomainAlignmentMismatch VerificationReason = "domain_alignment_mismatch" VerificationReasonNextDomainMismatch VerificationReason = "next_domain_mismatch" VerificationReasonCustodyMismatch VerificationReason = "custody_mismatch" VerificationReasonOutOfBandRequired VerificationReason = "out_of_band_required" VerificationReasonInternalContract VerificationReason = "internal_contract" )
Closed verification reason constants mirrored from service verification outcomes.
func (VerificationReason) Known ¶
func (r VerificationReason) Known() bool
Known reports whether reason belongs to the closed verification vocabulary.