identity

type Act struct {
	Subject string `json:"sub"`               // "agent:<name>"
	Harness string `json:"harness,omitempty"` // where it runs, e.g. claude-code
	Session string `json:"session,omitempty"` // the harness session id
	Act     *Act   `json:"act,omitempty"`
}

type DelegatedClaims struct {
	Issuer   string   `json:"iss"`
	Subject  string   `json:"sub"`
	Audience string   `json:"aud"`
	Groups   []string `json:"groups,omitempty"`
	Kind     string   `json:"kind"`
	RootKind string   `json:"root_kind,omitempty"`
	Act      *Act     `json:"act"`
	// Models narrows the aliases the credential may call; absent = not
	// narrowed by the credential (policy still applies). halo-server never
	// mints an empty scope: an empty intersection is refused, not widened.
	Models []string `json:"models,omitempty"`
	// AuthTime is when the root authenticated (OIDC auth_time): a session
	// revoked after it kills the credential at its next exchange.
	AuthTime int64  `json:"auth_time,omitempty"`
	Parent   string `json:"parent_jti,omitempty"` // jti of the credential it was exchanged from
	// Ancestors are the jtis of the credentials before the parent (its
	// parent first), so revoking any ancestor's jti (ADR-0026) also kills
	// this credential. Absent when the parent was minted from a session or
	// from nothing with a jti.
	Ancestors []string `json:"anc_jti,omitempty"`
	IssuedAt  int64    `json:"iat"`
	NotBefore int64    `json:"nbf"`
	Expiry    int64    `json:"exp"`
	ID        string   `json:"jti"`
}

type MCPClaims struct {
	Issuer   string   `json:"iss"`
	Subject  string   `json:"sub"`
	Audience string   `json:"aud"` // canonical server URL (policy.CanonicalResource)
	Groups   []string `json:"groups,omitempty"`
	// Kind is the subject's kind ("" human, workload); Actors the delegation
	// chain when an agent asked, root-side first. Attribution for the server.
	Kind   string   `json:"kind,omitempty"`
	Actors []string `json:"actors,omitempty"`
	// Server is the registry id the token was minted for.
	Server    string `json:"mcp_server"`
	IssuedAt  int64  `json:"iat"`
	NotBefore int64  `json:"nbf"`
	Expiry    int64  `json:"exp"`
	ID        string `json:"jti"`
}

type OIDCJWT struct {
	Issuer, Audience       string
	UserClaim, GroupsClaim string
	// TrustUnverifiedEmail accepts an "email" user claim without
	// email_verified=true. Off by default: see SubjectFromClaims.
	TrustUnverifiedEmail bool
	// contains filtered or unexported fields
}

type Options struct {
	Mode                   string
	Issuer, Audience       string
	UserClaim, GroupsClaim string
	IdentityHeader         string
	GroupsHeader           string
	TrustedProxyCIDRs      []string
	// TrustUnverifiedEmail: accept userClaim "email" without email_verified=true.
	// Default false; only for IdPs that never issue unverified emails.
	TrustUnverifiedEmail bool
	// WorkloadKeys is PEM (one or more ed25519 PUBLIC KEY blocks) of
	// halo-server's workload signing key(s). When set, workload credentials
	// (ADR-0023) are accepted besides the mode's own callers. Ignored in mode none.
	WorkloadKeys string
}

type Resolver struct {
	// contains filtered or unexported fields
}

type TrustedHeader struct {
	IdentityHeader string
	GroupsHeader   string
	// contains filtered or unexported fields
}

type Verifier interface {
	Verify(r *http.Request) (policy.Subject, error)
}

type WorkloadClaims struct {
	Issuer    string   `json:"iss"`
	Subject   string   `json:"sub"`
	Audience  string   `json:"aud"`
	Groups    []string `json:"groups,omitempty"`
	Kind      string   `json:"kind"`
	Rule      string   `json:"rule"` // workloads.rules name that matched
	IssuedAt  int64    `json:"iat"`
	NotBefore int64    `json:"nbf"`
	Expiry    int64    `json:"exp"`
	ID        string   `json:"jti"`
}

type WorkloadJWT struct {
	Keys []ed25519.PublicKey
	Next Verifier
	Now  func() time.Time // nil = time.Now
}