Documentation
¶
Overview ¶
Package config loads the identity service configuration from environment variables with the GATEWAY_ prefix.
This is the Go port of backend/api_gateway/config.py. It uses os.Getenv with typed defaults — no external config library needed. Sensitive values (secrets, encryption keys, client secrets) are never logged.
Index ¶
- Constants
- type Config
- func (c *Config) EmailServiceAddress() string
- func (c *Config) IsMultiMode() bool
- func (c *Config) JWTExpiry() time.Duration
- func (c *Config) PasswordResetExpiry() time.Duration
- func (c *Config) RefreshExpiry() time.Duration
- func (c *Config) SessionCacheTTL() time.Duration
- func (c *Config) Validate() error
- type RevocationMode
Constants ¶
const ( IdentityModeSingle = "single" IdentityModeMulti = "multi" )
Identity-mode constants for GATEWAY_IDENTITY_MODE. See docs/IDENTITY.md decision log §1 — the mode is per-deployment and fixed at boot.
Variables ¶
This section is empty.
Functions ¶
This section is empty.
Types ¶
type Config ¶
type Config struct {
// Server
GRPCPort int
ConnectPort int
MetricsPort int
// Persistence driver. Selects which Repository / DB
// implementation the binary wires up — "entdb" (default), "memory"
// for an in-process store useful for local dev, or "postgres"
// once the Postgres driver lands. Driven by GATEWAY_REPO_DRIVER.
RepoDriver string
// EntDB
EntDBAddress string
// Tenant
DefaultTenantID string
// IdentityMode selects the per-deployment tenancy shape — "single"
// (one tenant for the whole deployment, B2C) or "multi" (one tenant
// per customer organisation, B2B). Driven by GATEWAY_IDENTITY_MODE.
// See docs/IDENTITY.md decision log §1: the mode is per-deployment,
// not per-request. In "multi" the OrganizationSignup RPC is wired
// up; in "single" it returns Unimplemented (decision log §3).
IdentityMode string
// Email service (internal gRPC)
EmailServiceHost string
EmailServicePort int
// JWT (RS256). Two backends ship in-tree:
//
// file (default) reads the keys file at GATEWAY_JWT_KEYS_FILE,
// reloads on SIGHUP. The default for any non-KMS
// deployment; works without external dependencies. If
// JWTKeysFile is empty, the binary auto-generates a
// throwaway dev key in a temp file at startup (suitable
// for local dev / CI only — emits a warning log).
// kms_aws delegates Sign to AWS KMS. JWTKMSKeys is a CSV of
// "kid=keyARN" entries.
//
// Adding a new backend (GCP KMS, HashiCorp Vault, hardware HSM, …)
// is a matter of implementing pkg/jwt.Signer in a sibling package.
JWTSigner string
JWTKeysFile string
JWTKMSKeys string
JWTKMSAWSRegion string
JWTExpirySeconds int
// JWT audience. When non-empty, minted access tokens carry this as
// the "aud" claim and the verifier enforces a match. When
// JWTRequireAudience is true, tokens with no "aud" claim are also
// rejected; the false default exists so a deploy can roll out the
// mint-side change first, wait for in-flight tokens to expire, then
// flip to required.
JWTAudience string
JWTRequireAudience bool
// Refresh tokens
RefreshExpirySeconds int
// Revocation mode. Selects how the service propagates a
// DeleteRefreshTokensForUser to in-flight access tokens.
//
// "ttl" (default) — refresh tokens are deleted; already-minted
// access tokens stay valid until natural JWT expiry. Zero
// hot-path cost. Hard startup assertion:
// `JWTExpirySeconds <= 900` so a deployer cannot raise the
// access-token lifetime without explicitly switching modes.
// "session" — opt-in. Access tokens carry an `sid` claim referencing
// a Session row; the verification middleware reads that
// row (via an in-process cache, configurable below) and
// rejects the request when `revoked_at_ms != 0`.
// DeleteRefreshTokensForUser additionally triggers
// RevokeSessionsForUser so the existing replay-detection
// code path also kills the access tokens.
//
// See docs/IDENTITY.md decision log §6 for the two-mode contract.
RevocationMode RevocationMode
// SessionCacheTTLSeconds bounds how long a session-state read from the
// in-process cache may serve "active" before being re-read from the
// repository. 0 = strict mode: every authenticated request reads the
// row. Effective only when RevocationMode == RevocationModeSession.
SessionCacheTTLSeconds int
// OAuth providers. Identity does the code exchange for these
// providers itself — see pkg/oauth. A provider is enabled only
// when BOTH the ID and secret are non-empty.
GoogleClientID string
GoogleClientSecret string
MicrosoftClientID string
MicrosoftClientSecret string
MicrosoftTenantID string
GitHubClientID string
GitHubClientSecret string
// Identity Verification (document + selfie). The provider name
// selects the implementation in pkg/idv. Empty disables IDV; the
// RPCs return CodeUnimplemented to clients in that case.
IDVProvider string // "azure", "stub", or "" (disabled)
IDVAzureEndpoint string // e.g. https://my-face.cognitiveservices.azure.com
IDVAzureKey string // Cognitive Services key
IDVAzureSessionTTLSec int // session token lifetime; default 600
// When true, PasswordLogin / OAuthLogin reject users without an
// approved identity verification. The default is false (verification
// is offered but not required) to match the existing email-verified
// pattern. Tenants that need stricter onboarding flip this on.
IDVRequired bool
// Password
PasswordSignupEnabled bool
PasswordResetEnabled bool
PasswordResetExpirySeconds int
// TOTP (2FA)
// 32-byte key, base64-encoded. Required in prod; dev falls back to
// a deterministic throwaway key.
TOTPEncryptionKey string
TOTPIssuer string
// Pepper used as the HMAC-SHA-256 key for recovery-code hashing.
// Base64-encoded; must decode to >= 32 bytes. Required whenever
// TOTPEncryptionKey is set (i.e. any non-dev deployment). The
// pepper turns a stolen DB into a brute-force-resistant artifact:
// without it, an attacker cannot precompute or enumerate hashes.
TOTPRecoveryPepper string
// Login challenge (how long after password success user has to complete 2FA)
LoginChallengeExpirySeconds int
// WebAuthn / Passkeys
PasskeyRPID string
PasskeyRPName string
PasskeyOrigin string
PasskeyChallengeExpirySeconds int
// QR Login (cross-device authorization)
QRLoginBaseURL string
QRLoginExpirySeconds int
// Login security (failed-login lockout)
LoginMaxFailedAttempts int
LoginLockoutSeconds int
// Default email domain
DefaultEmailDomain string
// CORS
AllowedOrigins string
// Cookie settings
CookieDomain string
CookieSecure bool
CookieSameSite string
// Dev-only
AuthAllowLocal bool
// SMTP single-provider config (simple form). If SMTPProviders is set,
// that takes precedence.
SMTPHost string // GATEWAY_SMTP_HOST
SMTPPort int // GATEWAY_SMTP_PORT (default 587)
SMTPUser string // GATEWAY_SMTP_USER
SMTPPass string // GATEWAY_SMTP_PASS
SMTPFrom string // GATEWAY_SMTP_FROM
SMTPTLS bool // GATEWAY_SMTP_TLS (default true)
// SMTP multi-provider JSON. If set, parsed as []email.SMTPConfig and
// used as a chain in order. Overrides the single-provider env vars.
SMTPProviders string // GATEWAY_SMTP_PROVIDERS
// Public app URLs used in email links.
AppBaseURL string // GATEWAY_APP_BASE_URL — e.g. "https://app.example.com"
// How long an email-verification or password-reset token is valid for.
EmailTokenExpirySeconds int // GATEWAY_EMAIL_TOKEN_EXPIRY_SECONDS (default 86400)
// Per-recipient cooldown between transactional email sends. Defeats
// inbox-bombing via repeated unauthenticated RequestPasswordReset /
// SendEmailVerification calls. In-memory per replica.
EmailSendCooldownSeconds int // GATEWAY_EMAIL_SEND_COOLDOWN_SECONDS (default 60)
// Per-email cooldown on PasswordSignup. Throttled signups return
// the same anti-enumeration decoy as a duplicate-email signup so the
// endpoint cannot be used to probe for which addresses are
// rate-limited (which would itself reveal recent attempts).
// Complements the per-IP rate limit at the middleware layer.
SignupEmailCooldownSeconds int // GATEWAY_SIGNUP_EMAIL_COOLDOWN_SECONDS (default 60)
// Audit log queue depth for the async flusher. Drops happen if the
// auth hot path produces events faster than EntDB can absorb them.
// Surface via audit.Logger.DroppedCount() on a metric.
AuditQueueSize int // GATEWAY_AUDIT_QUEUE_SIZE (default 4096)
// Maximum HTTP request body size in bytes, enforced via
// http.MaxBytesHandler so a slow-POST / oversize-payload attacker
// can't exhaust memory. Default 1 MiB — auth RPC bodies are tiny.
HTTPMaxBodyBytes int64 // GATEWAY_HTTP_MAX_BODY_BYTES (default 1048576)
// Trusted proxies: comma-separated list of CIDRs whose
// X-Forwarded-For headers the service will honour. Anything outside
// these ranges is treated as an untrusted client and its forwarded
// headers are ignored — TCP peer IP is used instead.
TrustedProxies string // GATEWAY_TRUSTED_PROXIES (default "10.0.0.0/8,172.16.0.0/12,192.168.0.0/16,127.0.0.1/32,::1/128")
// Rate-limit configuration. The in-memory token bucket is keyed by
// client IP. quotas are requests-per-window per IP. Set to 0 to
// disable the per-endpoint limiter.
RateLimitWindowSeconds int // GATEWAY_RATE_LIMIT_WINDOW_SECONDS (default 60)
RateLimitSignupPerIP int // GATEWAY_RATE_LIMIT_SIGNUP_PER_IP (default 10/min)
RateLimitLoginPerIP int // GATEWAY_RATE_LIMIT_LOGIN_PER_IP (default 30/min)
RateLimitResetPerIP int // GATEWAY_RATE_LIMIT_RESET_PER_IP (default 5/min)
RateLimitVerifyPerIP int // GATEWAY_RATE_LIMIT_VERIFY_PER_IP (default 20/min)
// Postgres (alternate persistence driver). When PostgresDSN is set
// the application bootstrapper may prefer the Postgres-backed
// repository over EntDB; the actual driver selection lives in the
// internal/repo package.
//
// GATEWAY_POSTGRES_DSN e.g. "postgres://user:pass@host:5432/identity?sslmode=disable"
// GATEWAY_POSTGRES_MAX_CONNS pool size, default 25
// GATEWAY_POSTGRES_AUTO_MIGRATE run pending migrations on connect, default false
// (production: run migrations out-of-band as a
// separate Job; setting this true on a rolling
// deploy can race multiple replicas).
PostgresDSN string
PostgresMaxConns int
PostgresAutoMigrate bool
// OTel exports OpenTelemetry traces to a deployer-supplied OTLP
// collector. Default off so a deployer who has no collector pays
// zero cost — when disabled the no-op tracer is installed and the
// otelconnect interceptor is omitted from the handler chain.
//
// GATEWAY_OTEL_ENABLED true|false (default false)
// GATEWAY_OTEL_EXPORTER_ENDPOINT host:port — required when enabled
// GATEWAY_OTEL_EXPORTER_PROTOCOL grpc|http (default grpc)
// GATEWAY_OTEL_SAMPLE_RATIO 0.0–1.0 (default 0.1)
// GATEWAY_OTEL_DEPLOYMENT_ENV deployment.environment.name (default "")
// GATEWAY_OTEL_SERVICE_VERSION overrides build version baked into the binary
OTelEnabled bool
OTelExporterEndpoint string
OTelExporterProtocol string
OTelSampleRatio float64
OTelDeploymentEnv string
OTelServiceVersion string
// Sweeper (#94). A background goroutine periodically deletes
// expired-but-uncollected rows from five ephemeral tables
// (WebAuthn challenges, email-verification / password-reset /
// email-change tokens, login challenges). Without GC these
// tables grow unboundedly with the abandoned-flow rate.
//
// GATEWAY_SWEEPER_INTERVAL_SECONDS tick interval; 0 disables sweeping
// entirely (useful for tests and for
// deployers who run their own GC).
// GATEWAY_SWEEPER_BATCH_SIZE per-table per-tick deletion cap.
// GATEWAY_SWEEPER_GRACE_SECONDS additional grace past expires_at
// before a row is eligible to delete;
// covers in-flight flows that just
// consumed the token.
SweeperIntervalSeconds int
SweeperBatchSize int
SweeperGraceSeconds int
}
Config holds all identity service configuration.
func Load ¶
func Load() *Config
Load reads configuration from environment variables with GATEWAY_ prefix, falling back to sensible defaults for local development.
func (*Config) EmailServiceAddress ¶
EmailServiceAddress returns the host:port for the email service.
func (*Config) IsMultiMode ¶ added in v0.8.0
IsMultiMode reports whether the deployment is configured for `mode=multi` (B2B multi-tenant). False indicates `mode=single` or any unrecognised value (which the binary should already have rejected at startup).
func (*Config) PasswordResetExpiry ¶
PasswordResetExpiry returns the password reset expiry as a time.Duration.
func (*Config) RefreshExpiry ¶
RefreshExpiry returns the refresh token expiry as a time.Duration.
func (*Config) SessionCacheTTL ¶ added in v0.8.0
SessionCacheTTL returns the configured cache TTL as a time.Duration. 0 means strict mode (read on every request).
func (*Config) Validate ¶ added in v0.8.0
Validate enforces invariants that are too complex to express as per-field defaults: most importantly the `mode=ttl` access-token TTL ceiling. The binary calls this at startup; tests pin their configs through the same path so misuse surfaces immediately rather than as a silent revocation-window gap.
Why a method rather than running inside Load(): tests build *Config values directly (without going through Load) and a silent failure mode there would re-introduce the bug this function prevents. Callers that synthesise a Config must invoke Validate before handing it to app.New.
type RevocationMode ¶ added in v0.8.0
type RevocationMode string
RevocationMode names the two refresh-token revocation models the service supports. See the Config.RevocationMode comment for the semantics; the two-mode contract is in docs/IDENTITY.md decision log §6.
const ( // RevocationModeTTL keeps the existing zero-cost hot path. // DeleteRefreshTokensForUser deletes refresh tokens; in-flight // access tokens stay valid until natural JWT expiry. The default. RevocationModeTTL RevocationMode = "ttl" // RevocationModeSession mints access tokens with an `sid` claim // referencing a Session row. The verification middleware reads // that row (via an in-process cache) and rejects the request when // the session is revoked. RevocationModeSession RevocationMode = "session" // RevocationModeTTLAccessTokenCap is the maximum access-token TTL // (seconds) compatible with the `ttl` revocation model. A deployer // who needs a longer-lived access token must switch to // `RevocationModeSession`, where cache TTL bounds the revocation // latency. RevocationModeTTLAccessTokenCap = 900 )