quic

zap/quic — QUIC transport for ZAP

github.com/luxfi/zap/quic is the canonical QUIC transport for the ZAP messaging substrate (KMS, MPC, IAM, arcd, every Hanzo / Lux service that embeds ZAP).

It wraps github.com/quic-go/quic-go and exposes:

• TLS 1.3 with the IANA-registered hybrid post-quantum key exchange X25519MLKEM768 (NamedGroup 0x11ec) as the default.
• Multiplexed bidirectional + unidirectional streams over one connection (one ZAP message exchange per stream).
• Connection migration on local-IP changes (Wi-Fi to LTE, NAT rebind).
• 0-RTT resumption via TLS 1.3 session tickets.
• ALPN allowlist: zap/1 only — other ALPN values are rejected at the TLS layer and again post-handshake as belt-and-suspenders.

When to pick QUIC over TCP

QUIC is the better choice when any one of these applies:

• The connection serves many concurrent independent RPCs (KMS, MPC, threshold orchestrators). QUIC eliminates head-of-line blocking between streams.
• The client moves networks (laptop, validator that re-homes between ASNs, K8s pod migrated between nodes). The QUIC connection ID survives the path change; TCP would tear down.
• The latency budget cares about 0-RTT resumption. Repeat connections to a cached peer skip a round trip.

TCP is the better choice when middleboxes / firewalls block UDP, or when the peer link is a kernel TCP pipe and the binary cannot afford the UDP per-packet syscall overhead.

NodeConfig.Transport selects between them. Default is TransportTCP for back-compat — every existing consumer keeps working untouched.

Quick start

As a standalone QUIC server / client

import (
    "context"
    "crypto/tls"

    zapquic "github.com/luxfi/zap/quic"
)

cert, _ := zapquic.GenerateSelfSignedCert("example.com")
srv, _ := zapquic.Listen(zapquic.ServerConfig{
    NodeID: "node-a",
    Addr:   ":9999",
    TLS:    &tls.Config{Certificates: []tls.Certificate{cert}},
})
defer srv.Close()

go func() {
    for {
        c, err := srv.Accept(context.Background())
        if err != nil { return }
        go handle(c)
    }
}()

cli, _ := zapquic.NewClient(zapquic.ClientConfig{
    NodeID: "node-b",
    TLS:    &tls.Config{RootCAs: trustedCAs},
})
defer cli.Close()

c, _ := cli.Dial(context.Background(), "node-a.example.com:9999")
c.Send(reqBytes)
respBytes, _ := c.Recv()

Via the ZAP Node API

import (
    "github.com/luxfi/zap"
    _ "github.com/luxfi/zap/quic" // registers the QUIC TransportFactory
)

n := zap.NewNode(zap.NodeConfig{
    NodeID:    "node-a",
    Port:      9999,
    TLS:       tlsCfg,            // must contain server Certificates
    Transport: zap.TransportQUIC, // opt-in; default stays TCP
})
n.Start()

All existing Handle / Send / Call / Broadcast / ConnectDirect calls work identically.

Production deployment notes

• UDP port reachability: most cloud / on-prem firewalls deny UDP by default. Open the ZAP port (default 9999) explicitly for UDP.
• MTU: quic-go picks a safe IPv6 baseline (1232) but will probe up to the path MTU. On overlay networks (VXLAN, IP-in-IP, WireGuard) set quic.Config.InitialPacketSize conservatively to avoid PMTUD blackholes.
• ECN: Linux kernels >= 4.18 support QUIC ECN out of the box. No application-level configuration required.
• Receive buffer: quic-go warns on small SO_RCVBUF. On Linux: sysctl -w net.core.rmem_max=7500000.
• Connection migration: works automatically across local NAT rebinds. Cross-server migration (load balancer switching the backend) requires shared connection-ID state — out of scope for this transport.
• 0-RTT replay: enabled by default. Application handlers MUST be idempotent, or set ServerConfig.RejectEarlyData = true to force a full 1-RTT handshake for every connection.

Cipher and KEM defaults

Defaults installed by applyZAPDefaults (see tls.go):

Override any field by setting it on ServerConfig.TLS / ClientConfig.TLS before calling Listen / NewClient. zap/1 is always prepended to the caller's NextProtos if missing.

Why X25519MLKEM768?

X25519MLKEM768 is the IANA-registered NamedGroup 0x11ec. It is the hybrid post-quantum KEM jointly defined by Cloudflare, Google, and the IETF TLS working group, shipped by Go 1.24+, BoringSSL, Cloudflare production, and every other modern TLS stack with a PQ story.

The KEM combines:

• X25519 (RFC 7748) — classical 128-bit ECC security
• ML-KEM-768 (NIST FIPS 203) — NIST Level 3 lattice security

The combined shared secret is HKDF-Extract(X25519_ss || MLKEM_ss), performed by Go's crypto/tls internally. This package does NOT implement its own KEM combiner; that would be a custom-crypto path and a needless attack surface.

We deliberately do not ship a hybrid that deviates from 0x11ec (no "z-wing" fork, no rolled-our-own ID). Interop with every other Hanzo / Lux service is the load-bearing property; the moment we diverge from the IANA registry we lose it.

Threat model — what is and isn't protected

Hybrid KEM defends against harvest-now / decrypt-later: a captured ciphertext stays confidential even if a quantum adversary eventually breaks X25519. The KEM half (ML-KEM-768) carries the post-quantum security; X25519 is the classical fallback.

The server certificate signature is still classical (ECDSA or RSA). Go's stdlib TLS does not yet support post-quantum signature schemes (ML-DSA, SLH-DSA). A quantum adversary who can forge today's CA signature can mount a real-time MITM, but cannot decrypt past captures. This trade-off is acceptable under the published threat model and is the same one Cloudflare ships today; for a fully post-quantum auth path see the PQ-Hybrid-KEM paper at ../papers/pq-hybrid-kem/main.pdf.

API surface

Test vectors

go test ./quic/... -v runs the X25519MLKEM768 negotiation assertion end-to-end. The TestHandshake_NegotiatesX25519MLKEM768 test fails loudly if CurveID != 0x11ec after either side completes the handshake — keep it green.

See also

• ../papers/pq-hybrid-kem/main.pdf — formal security argument for the X25519MLKEM768 hybrid in ZAP's context.
• ../LLM.md — top-level ZAP overview with the TCP transport.
• IANA TLS NamedGroup registry — 0x11ec is X25519MLKEM768.
• draft-kwiatkowski-tls-ecdhe-mlkem — the spec.