protocol

type BadRequest = ProblemDetails

type Conflict = ProblemDetails

type DPoPProof = string

type Forbidden = ProblemDetails

type InternalServerError = ProblemDetails

type JWK struct {
	Alg                  *string                `json:"alg,omitempty"`
	Crv                  *string                `json:"crv,omitempty"`
	E                    *string                `json:"e,omitempty"`
	Kid                  *string                `json:"kid,omitempty"`
	Kty                  string                 `json:"kty"`
	N                    *string                `json:"n,omitempty"`
	Use                  *string                `json:"use,omitempty"`
	X                    *string                `json:"x,omitempty"`
	Y                    *string                `json:"y,omitempty"`
	AdditionalProperties map[string]interface{} `json:"-"`
}

type MailboxCaptchaRequestPayloadV1 struct {
	// Action Relying-party action label.
	Action string `json:"action"`

	// ChallengeId Captcha challenge id.
	ChallengeId string `json:"challenge_id"`

	// ExpiresAt Captcha request expiry as a Unix timestamp in seconds.
	ExpiresAt int64 `json:"expires_at"`

	// Origin Canonical relying-party origin. The captcha request producer MUST canonicalize this value before sending; approval bindings copy this exact string without further normalization.
	Origin string `json:"origin"`
}

type MailboxCaptchaResponsePayloadV1 struct {
	// ApprovalBinding RFC 4648 standard base64 with `=` padding for the deterministic CBOR `NaughtBotApprovalBindingV1` bytes whose SHA-256 is signed as the approval hash. This is not the HPKE transport's base64url encoding.
	ApprovalBinding []byte `json:"approval_binding"`

	// Proof RFC 4648 standard base64 with `=` padding for the attested-key-zk approval proof bytes. This is not the HPKE transport's base64url encoding.
	Proof []byte `json:"proof"`

	// ProofType Attested-key-zk approval proof type.
	ProofType MailboxCaptchaResponsePayloadV1ProofType `json:"proof_type"`

	// RequestEnvelopeId Source captcha request `MailboxEnvelopeV1.id`.
	RequestEnvelopeId openapi_types.UUID `json:"request_envelope_id"`
}

type MailboxCaptchaResponsePayloadV1ProofType string

type MailboxEnvelopeV1 struct {
	// Id Canonical lower-case RFC 4122 UUID string for idempotency / dedup on receiver.
	Id openapi_types.UUID `json:"id"`

	// IssuedAt RFC 3339 UTC timestamp with the canonical `Z` suffix. Senders SHOULD emit fractional seconds (`2026-05-03T05:00:00.123Z`); receivers MUST also accept the plain second-precision form (`2026-05-03T05:00:00Z`). Times outside UTC and timestamps lacking the `T` delimiter are rejected. See `memories/mailbox-envelope.md` § "Timestamp format" for the full rule.
	IssuedAt time.Time `json:"issued_at"`

	// Payload Type-specific payload, MUST be a JSON object (`{...}`); scalar / array / string roots are not valid envelopes. Internal schema is validated by the per-`type` handler, not by the envelope codec.
	Payload map[string]interface{} `json:"payload"`

	// Type Registered type discriminator. Receivers may decode the envelope successfully but log+drop on unknown values. Registered v1 values: `link_request`, `link_approval`, `link_rejection`, `captcha_request`, and `captcha_response`.
	Type string `json:"type"`

	// V Envelope version. Receivers reject unknown versions.
	V MailboxEnvelopeV1V `json:"v"`
}

type MailboxEnvelopeV1V int

type NaughtBotApprovalBindingV1 struct {
	// EnvelopeId Source `MailboxEnvelopeV1.id` as a canonical lower-case RFC 4122 UUID string.
	EnvelopeId openapi_types.UUID `json:"envelope_id"`

	// EnvelopeType Source `MailboxEnvelopeV1.type`; only captcha requests are signed.
	EnvelopeType NaughtBotApprovalBindingV1EnvelopeType `json:"envelope_type"`

	// EnvelopeV Source `MailboxEnvelopeV1.v`.
	EnvelopeV NaughtBotApprovalBindingV1EnvelopeV `json:"envelope_v"`

	// IssuedAt Source `MailboxEnvelopeV1.issued_at`, preserved as a string.
	IssuedAt string `json:"issued_at"`
	Payload  struct {
		// Action Relying-party action label from the captcha request payload.
		Action string `json:"action"`

		// ChallengeId Captcha challenge id from the captcha request payload.
		ChallengeId string `json:"challenge_id"`

		// ExpiresAt Captcha request expiry as a Unix timestamp in seconds.
		ExpiresAt int64 `json:"expires_at"`

		// Origin Already-canonical relying-party origin from the captcha request payload, copied byte-for-byte with no approval-binding normalization.
		Origin string `json:"origin"`
	} `json:"payload"`
}

type NaughtBotApprovalBindingV1EnvelopeType string

type NaughtBotApprovalBindingV1EnvelopeV int

type NotFound = ProblemDetails

type NotImplemented = ProblemDetails

type Pagination struct {
	// NextCursor Opaque cursor for the next page; null when no more pages.
	NextCursor *string `json:"next_cursor,omitempty"`
	PageSize   *int    `json:"page_size,omitempty"`
}

type PayloadTooLarge = ProblemDetails

type ProblemDetails struct {
	// Detail Human-readable explanation specific to this occurrence.
	Detail *string `json:"detail,omitempty"`

	// Instance URI reference identifying the specific occurrence.
	Instance *string `json:"instance,omitempty"`

	// Status HTTP status code generated by the origin server.
	Status *int `json:"status,omitempty"`

	// Title Short, human-readable summary of the problem type.
	Title *string `json:"title,omitempty"`

	// Type A URI reference identifying the problem type.
	Type                 *string                `json:"type,omitempty"`
	AdditionalProperties map[string]interface{} `json:"-"`
}

type TooManyRequests = ProblemDetails

type Unauthorized = ProblemDetails

type UnprocessableEntity = ProblemDetails

type XRequestID = string