Documentation
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Index ¶
Constants ¶
const ( IdempotencyKeyHeader = "Idempotency-Key" IdempotentReplayedHeader = "Idempotent-Replayed" ContentTypeHeader = "Content-Type" VersionHeader = "OpenMRP-Version" TargetAccountIDHeader = "OpenMRP-Account" ActorAccountIDHeader = "OpenMRP-Actor-Account" AuthorizationHeader = "Authorization" RequestIDHeader = "Request-ID" WwwAuthenticateHeader = "WWW-Authenticate" RetryAfterHeader = "Retry-After" RateLimitLimitHeader = "RateLimit-Limit" RateLimitRemainingHeader = "RateLimit-Remaining" RateLimitResetHeader = "RateLimit-Reset" LocationHeader = "Location" // InternalIdentityHeader carries a JSON-serialized agent identity on the internal listener. It is trusted ONLY when InternalServiceTokenHeader matches the configured secret. The edge/ingress must strip any X-OpenMRP-Internal-* headers from external traffic. InternalIdentityHeader = "X-OpenMRP-Internal-Identity" // InternalServiceTokenHeader carries the shared service token that gates the internal listener's identity trust. InternalServiceTokenHeader = "X-OpenMRP-Service-Token" // #nosec G101 -- header name, not a credential )
Variables ¶
var ( ErrHeaderPrefix = "Invalid Authorization header format." // #nosec G101 - This is an error message, not a hardcoded credential ErrAPIKeyInvalid = "Invalid API Key provided." ErrEnvMisconfigured = "You might have forgotten to setup your API key in your environment." )
Functions ¶
func GetClientIP ¶
GetClientIP returns the client IP address for the request, using the X-Forwarded-For chain only to the extent it can be trusted.
trustedProxyHops is the number of reverse-proxy hops in front of this service. Each trusted proxy is expected to APPEND the IP of the connection it received from to X-Forwarded-For (this is what AWS ALB does). The rightmost trustedProxyHops entries in the chain are therefore the ones written by trusted infrastructure, and the entry at position `len(parts) - trustedProxyHops` is the IP of the original client as observed by the outermost trusted proxy.
When trustedProxyHops is 0 (no trusted proxy in front), the X-Forwarded-For header is ignored entirely — it is fully attacker-controlled and must not be used for any security-sensitive purpose such as rate limiting. RemoteAddr is returned instead.
When fewer XFF entries are present than expected, the trusted-proxy chain was not fully traversed, and we fall back to RemoteAddr rather than risk trusting an attacker-supplied entry.
Types ¶
type AuthHeaderResult ¶
type AuthHeaderResult struct {
TokenString string
Scheme AuthScheme
}
func ValidateAndExtractAuthHeader ¶
func ValidateAndExtractAuthHeader(authHeader string) (*AuthHeaderResult, *apierror.APIError)
type AuthScheme ¶
type AuthScheme string
const ( AuthSchemeBasic AuthScheme = "basic" AuthSchemeBearer AuthScheme = "bearer" )
Source Files