authkit

AuthKit

Lightweight auth library for Go services.

AuthKit is based on a browser-managed bearer-token model: login/OIDC/Solana flows issue an access_token and refresh_token, frontend JavaScript stores them, protected API calls use Authorization: Bearer <access_token>, and refresh uses POST /token with the refresh token. It is not a cookie-session library: it does not currently provide opaque session_id browser cookies, HttpOnly token-cookie callbacks, or CSRF/session middleware for that model.

Note: This repo ships the HTTP transport as the top-level http package (github.com/open-rails/authkit/http). First-party router adapters live in github.com/open-rails/authkit/adapters/gin and github.com/open-rails/authkit/adapters/chi.

Scope (minimal)

• Asymmetric JWT issuing (RS256) + JWKS endpoint (no persistence yet).
• Password login and email-based password reset tokens.
• OIDC RP (OAuth2/OIDC) with PKCE (Redis/Garnet or in-memory for ephemeral state; no DB table).
• Solana wallet authentication (SIWS - Sign In With Solana).
• Storage with Postgres + Redis/Garnet for ephemeral auth state.

Packages

• jwt: minimal key management, signer, JWKS helper.
• oidc: client (RP) types; implementation to follow.
• siws: Sign In With Solana - Ed25519 signature verification for Solana wallets.
• storage: minimal interfaces for users, passwords, providers, resets, roles, revocations.
• migrations: embedded SQL defining the profiles schema and minimal tables.
• adapters/gin and adapters/chi: optional router adapters that register AuthKit's canonical route specs on host-owned route groups.

Migrations

• Postgres SQL migrations live in migrations/postgres/ and are embedded via go:embed.
• Import github.com/open-rails/authkit/migrations/postgres and register Migrations with your runner, or use FS.
• PostgreSQL-backed storage requires PostgreSQL 18 or newer. Older PostgreSQL versions are not supported. AuthKit migrations use native uuidv7() defaults for AuthKit-owned UUID identifiers; PostgreSQL 17 can store UUIDv7 values but does not provide the required uuidv7() function.

Quick Start (Gin)

package main

import (
  "github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
  authkitgin "github.com/open-rails/authkit/adapters/gin"
  core "github.com/open-rails/authkit/core"
  authhttp "github.com/open-rails/authkit/http"
)

func main() {
  // Build core.Config from your app config.
  cfg := core.Config{
    Issuer:            "https://myapp.com",
    IssuedAudiences:   []string{"myapp"},
    ExpectedAudiences: []string{"myapp"},
    BaseURL:           "https://myapp.com",
    FrontendCallbackPath: "/login/callback",
    // RegistrationVerification: core.RegistrationVerificationRequired, // none|optional|required
    // OrgMode: "single" (default) | "multi"
    // Keys: nil => auto-discovery in AuthKit (env/fs/dev fallback)
  }

  svc, _ := authhttp.NewService(cfg)
  // svc = svc.WithPostgres(pg).WithRedis(redis).WithEmailSender(email).WithSMSSender(sms)...

  router := gin.New()
  v1 := router.Group("/api/v1")

  authkitgin.RegisterJWKS(router, svc)
  authkitgin.RegisterAPI(v1, svc)
  authkitgin.RegisterOIDC(router, svc, "/oidc")

  router.Run(":8080")
}

AuthKit route specs are prefix-neutral. The host app chooses the mount point: registering RegisterAPI(router.Group("/api/v1"), svc) exposes /api/v1/token, /api/v1/user/me, and /api/v1/admin/users, while AuthKit's internal route paths remain /token, /user/me, and /admin/users.

Hosts can mount only selected route groups or wrap individual handlers:

authkitgin.RegisterAPI(v1, svc, authkitgin.WithRoutes(svc.Routes().Groups(
  authhttp.RouteCore,
  authhttp.RoutePassword,
  authhttp.RouteRegister,
  authhttp.RouteEmailVerification,
  authhttp.RouteUser,
  authhttp.RouteAccountOIDCLinking,
)))

For custom routers, iterate svc.Routes().DefaultAPI() or svc.Routes().Groups(...) and register each RouteSpec.Method, RouteSpec.Path, and RouteSpec.Handler yourself. Host apps should not keep duplicated AuthKit route allowlists.

Quick Start (net/http)

package main

import (
  "net/http"

  authhttp "github.com/open-rails/authkit/http"
  core "github.com/open-rails/authkit/core"
)

func main() {
  cfg := core.Config{
    Issuer:            "https://myapp.com",
    IssuedAudiences:   []string{"myapp"},
    ExpectedAudiences: []string{"myapp"},
    BaseURL:           "https://myapp.com",
    FrontendCallbackPath: "/login/callback",
  }

  svc, _ := authhttp.NewService(cfg)
  mux := http.NewServeMux()
  mux.Handle("/.well-known/jwks.json", svc.JWKSHandler())
  mux.Handle("/api/v1/", http.StripPrefix("/api/v1", svc.APIHandler()))
  mux.Handle("/oidc/", svc.OIDCHandler())
  http.ListenAndServe(":8080", mux)
}

Optional Twilio providers

• Core is provider-agnostic and only depends on core.EmailSender / core.SMSSender.
• Optional convenience providers are available:
  • github.com/open-rails/authkit/providers/email/twilio for Twilio Email API (SendGrid endpoint).
  • github.com/open-rails/authkit/providers/sms/twilio for Twilio Messaging API.
• AuthKit never reads provider environment variables directly. Host apps load their own config, build the sender, then pass it with WithEmailSender / WithSMSSender.
• The SMS provider requires AccountSID, AuthToken, and MessagingServiceSID. It uses Twilio Messaging (Messages.json) only; there is no Verify service path and no From number fallback path.
• The email provider requires a SendGrid/Twilio Email API key and a verified from address. Hosts can provide link builders or full message builders for branded/localized copy.
• A 2xx response from AuthKit means the message was accepted by the configured sender/provider submission call. It does not prove the recipient mailbox or carrier ultimately delivered, accepted, opened, or displayed the message.

emailSender, err := emailtwilio.New(emailtwilio.Config{
    APIKey:    cfg.TwilioEmailAPIKey,
    FromEmail: cfg.TwilioEmailFromAddress,
    FromName:  cfg.TwilioEmailFromName,
    AppName:   "Example",
    VerificationLinkURL: func(token string) string {
        return cfg.SiteBaseURL + "/verify-registration?token=" + url.QueryEscape(token)
    },
    ResetLinkURL: func(token string) string {
        return cfg.SiteBaseURL + "/reset-password?token=" + url.QueryEscape(token)
    },
})
if err != nil {
    return err
}
svc = svc.WithEmailSender(emailSender)

smsSender, err := smstwilio.New(smstwilio.Config{
    AccountSID:          cfg.TwilioAccountSID,
    AuthToken:           cfg.TwilioAuthToken,
    MessagingServiceSID: cfg.TwilioMessagingServiceSID,
    AppName:             "Example",
})
if err != nil {
    return err
}
svc = svc.WithSMSSender(smsSender)

External identity providers

• Built-in providers (google, apple, discord, github) can still be enabled with core.Config.Providers by passing client IDs/secrets.
• For custom providers, prefer core.Config.ProviderDescriptors. OIDC providers are usually pure configuration because identity claims are standardized. OAuth2 providers are pure configuration when their userinfo JSON can be mapped with dot paths.
• Apple uses the same descriptor model, but its client secret is a signed JWT. Use ClientSecret.Strategy: "apple_jwt" with Apple team/key/private-key fields.

cfg.ProviderDescriptors = map[string]authprovider.Provider{
    "example-oidc": {
        Name:     "example-oidc",
        Kind:     authprovider.KindOIDC,
        Issuer:   "https://issuer.example",
        ClientID: cfg.ExampleClientID,
        ClientSecret: authprovider.ClientSecret{Env: "EXAMPLE_CLIENT_SECRET"},
        Scopes:   []string{"openid", "email", "profile"},
        PKCE:     true,
    },
    "example-oauth": {
        Name:         "example-oauth",
        Kind:         authprovider.KindOAuth2,
        Issuer:       "https://oauth.example",
        ClientID:     cfg.OAuthClientID,
        ClientSecret: authprovider.ClientSecret{Value: cfg.OAuthClientSecret},
        AuthorizeURL: "https://oauth.example/authorize",
        TokenURL:     "https://oauth.example/token",
        UserInfoURL:  "https://oauth.example/me",
        Scopes:       []string{"profile", "email"},
        PKCE:         true,
        UserMapping: authprovider.UserMapping{
            Subject:           authprovider.FieldMapping{Path: "id", Transforms: []string{"string", "trim"}},
            Email:             authprovider.FieldMapping{Path: "email", Transforms: []string{"trim"}},
            EmailVerified:     authprovider.FieldMapping{Path: "email_verified"},
            PreferredUsername: authprovider.FieldMapping{Path: "username"},
            DisplayName:       authprovider.FieldMapping{Path: "name"},
        },
    },
    "apple": {
        Name:     "apple",
        Kind:     authprovider.KindOIDC,
        Issuer:   "https://appleid.apple.com",
        ClientID: "com.example.web",
        Scopes:   []string{"openid", "email", "name"},
        ExtraAuthParams: map[string]string{"response_mode": "form_post"},
        ClientSecret: authprovider.ClientSecret{
            Strategy: "apple_jwt",
            AppleJWT: &authprovider.AppleJWTSecret{
                TeamID:        cfg.AppleTeamID,
                KeyID:         cfg.AppleKeyID,
                PrivateKeyEnv: "APPLE_PRIVATE_KEY_PEM",
            },
        },
    },
}

Entitlements Provider (Optional)

AuthKit can include entitlements (e.g., "premium", "pro") in JWT access tokens if you provide an EntitlementsProvider. This is useful for billing/subscription systems where entitlements are stored outside the profiles schema.

Interface:

type EntitlementsProvider interface {
    ListEntitlements(ctx context.Context, userID string) ([]entitlements.Entitlement, error)
}

Example implementation (querying a billing.entitlements table):

package main

import (
    "context"
    "time"

    entpg "github.com/open-rails/authkit/entitlements"
    "github.com/jackc/pgx/v5/pgxpool"
)

type BillingEntitlementsProvider struct {
    pg *pgxpool.Pool
}

func (p *BillingEntitlementsProvider) ListEntitlements(ctx context.Context, userID string) ([]entpg.Entitlement, error) {
    rows, err := p.pg.Query(ctx, `
        SELECT entitlement, start_at, end_at, revoked_at
        FROM billing.entitlements
        WHERE user_id = $1
          AND revoked_at IS NULL
          AND start_at <= $2
          AND (end_at IS NULL OR end_at > $2)
          AND deleted_at IS NULL
    `, userID, time.Now())
    if err != nil {
        return nil, err
    }
    defer rows.Close()

    var out []entpg.Entitlement
    for rows.Next() {
        var name string
        var startAt time.Time
        var endAt, revokedAt *time.Time
        if err := rows.Scan(&name, &startAt, &endAt, &revokedAt); err != nil {
            return nil, err
        }
        out = append(out, entpg.Entitlement{
            Name:      name,
            ExpiresAt: endAt,
            RevokedAt: revokedAt,
            Source:    "billing",
        })
    }
    return out, rows.Err()
}

// Wire it up:
svc, _ := authhttp.NewService(cfg)
svc = svc.
    WithPostgres(pg).
    WithEntitlements(&BillingEntitlementsProvider{pg: pg})

Entitlements are snapshotted into the JWT at token issuance time. For fresh entitlements, re-issue the token.

Concepts (concise)

• Service (issuer + storage): used by authhttp.NewService(cfg); backs the built-in handlers (sessions, login, OIDC, etc).
• Middleware: github.com/open-rails/authkit/http provides Required/Optional (JWT verification) plus helpers like RequireAdmin(pg).
• Verify-only: use authhttp.NewVerifier() + verifier.AddIssuer(...) to accept tokens from other issuers without issuing tokens yourself.

Configuration ownership

AuthKit library behavior is host-owned: the embedding app should pass runtime behavior via core.Config, not rely on library env/file reads.

Notes

• No extra app code needed for OIDC state or user linking — handled internally with Redis (if provided) or a built-in in-memory cache, plus the default resolver.
• Apple: prefer a provider descriptor with ClientSecret.Strategy: "apple_jwt" for config-first setup. oidckit.AppleWithKey(...) remains available for code-owned wiring.

Token/session model

• AuthKit assumes a browser-managed bearer-token model, not cookie sessions.
• Login, OIDC, Solana, registration confirmation, and refresh flows issue an access_token plus a refresh_token.
• Browser JavaScript stores those tokens and sends protected API requests with Authorization: Bearer <access_token>.
• Refresh is also JavaScript-managed: the browser calls POST /token with the refresh token and stores the returned token pair.
• Full-page OIDC callbacks redirect to {BaseURL}{FrontendCallbackPath} with tokens in the URL fragment (#access_token=...&refresh_token=...) so the host backend serves the frontend route but does not receive the tokens. The default frontend callback path is /login/callback; configured paths must be app-relative, may include a query string, and must not include a fragment.
• AuthKit stores refresh-session records server-side for refresh-token lifecycle and revocation, but it does not provide an opaque session_id browser-cookie mode or HttpOnly cookie token mode.
• Apps that want cookie/session authentication need a separate integration mode: cookie parsing in middleware, CSRF protection, cookie-setting callback behavior, and different frontend refresh/logout assumptions.

Admin Gate (DB-backed)

• Use authhttp.RequireAdmin(pg) to strictly enforce admin access using the database.
• Example:

ver := authhttp.NewVerifier()
ver.AddIssuer("https://my-issuer.com", []string{"my-app"}, authhttp.IssuerOptions{
  JWKSURL: "https://my-issuer.com/.well-known/jwks.json",
})
ver.WithService(coreSvc)

adminHandler := authhttp.Required(ver)(
  authhttp.RequireAdmin(pg)(
    http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
      w.WriteHeader(200)
    }),
  ),
)

Roles (global storage)

• AuthKit stores roles in Postgres profiles.roles and memberships in profiles.user_roles.
• AuthKit does not define app role taxonomy (what roles exist). The embedding application/platform should seed its role catalog.
• Role IDs are deterministic UUIDv5 derived from slug (uuidv5(namespace, "role:"+slug)), so role rows are stable across environments.

Organizations (org_mode)

• AuthKit supports orgs + org-scoped RBAC when OrgMode: "multi":
  • Shared owner namespace: user slugs and org slugs should be treated as one namespace (no collisions).
  • Every user has a personal org (non-transferable ownership) keyed by owner_user_id.
  • Users can belong to 0, 1, or many orgs simultaneously.
  • Org slug renames create aliases; handlers accept either current slug or alias on :org.
  • Username renames preserve old owner paths via user slug aliases; personal org slug aliases are also retained.
  • Default access tokens do not embed org membership or org roles; apps check membership/roles server-side.
  • GET /user/me returns orgs (membership list) plus org-scoped roles for the user.
  • GET /user/bootstrap returns canonical personal org + org memberships in one call.
  • Org-scoped access tokens include org + roles (single org only), and are rejected when the user is not a member.
    • Mint explicitly: POST /token/org
    • Or mint at login/refresh by providing org in the request body.
  • Invitation workflow:
    • Org owners create/list/revoke invites with /orgs/:org/invites.
    • Users list their invites via GET /me/invites (cross-org).
    • Users accept/decline via /me/invites/:invite_id/accept|decline.
  • Org management is permission-based RBAC (a role = a set of permissions). authkit is the generic engine: it ships base permissions in the reserved org: namespace (org:roles:manage, org:members:manage, org:tokens:manage, org:read) that gate all org-management endpoints, stores per-org role→permission assignments, computes EffectivePermissions, and enforces no-escalation + catalog validation. The embedding app declares its own permission catalog (Config.PermissionCatalog) + optional default roles (Config.DefaultRoles, e.g. an admin = * minus {org:roles:manage, org:members:manage}); effective catalog = base ∪ app. The owner role is hardcoded and seeded with * (all), protected, and cannot be removed as the last owner. Permissions are opaque to authkit — the app owns their meaning and enforces them at its own endpoints via core.EffectivePermissions. Introspection endpoints complement the management API: GET /orgs/:org/me (self-read of {roles, permissions}, membership only — no org:read) and POST /orgs/:org/permissions/check (a testIamPermissions-style "does this principal hold X?" → {granted[]}). Roles are RESTful resources: GET /orgs/:org/roles/:role (detail), PUT /orgs/:org/roles/:role (idempotent create-or-replace, body {permissions[]}), DELETE /orgs/:org/roles/:role; members likewise (DELETE /orgs/:org/members/:user_id). Invitee self-routes live at top-level /me/invites (cross-org — the invitee isn't a member yet).
• In OrgMode: "single" (default), AuthKit behaves like a single-tenant app:
  • Access tokens include roles (string[]) and there are no org-related claims/fields.

Organization Access Tokens (OATs)

• Long-lived, revocable bearer credentials owned by an org (not a person), for machine/automation callers (CI, operator CLIs, service-to-service). The standard machine-auth primitive (cf. Docker Hub OATs, Stripe sk_ keys) — robots should not replay the human password-login path.
• An OAT acts as the org: middleware sets Claims.Org + Claims.Permissions (the token's app-defined permission strings) and a service marker (Claims.IsService()), leaving UserID empty — so the live-user ban/enrichment gate is skipped. Permissions are opaque to authkit; the embedding app owns the vocabulary and enforces meaning. (Users carry OrgRoles; the resource server expands role→permission at request time.)
• Presented as Authorization: Bearer <app>oat_<key_id>_<secret>, where <app> is the host-configured Config.TokenPrefix brand (e.g. cozy → cozy_oat_…; empty → bare oat_). key_id is a non-secret public id for O(1) indexed lookup; only sha256(secret) is stored; the full token is shown once.
• Resolved in the Required/Optional middleware before JWT verification (constant-time secret compare; revoked/expired/org-deleted rejected; non-OAT tokens fall through to JWT). The OAT path is separate from the password-login handler, so OATs bypass the interactive password-login rate limiter by design.
• Mint authorization is native + permission-based: minting requires org:tokens:manage, and authkit validates the requested permissions against the org's effective catalog — each must be a defined permission the caller holds (no escalation; 403 permission_grant_denied/400 unknown_permission), with the reserved write/mint perms (org:roles:manage, org:members:manage, org:tokens:manage) and wildcards barred from OATs (read-only org:read is OAT-grantable). Permissions are frozen at mint time. An OAT can never mint/list/revoke OATs (no user). See "Org RBAC" below for the catalog + role→permission model.
• Manage via POST/GET/DELETE /orgs/:org/access-tokens[/:token_id]. Optional expires_at (null = non-expiring), capped by Config.OrgAccessTokenMaxTTL when set. Stored in profiles.org_access_tokens.
• Leak response: revoke the token (DELETE …/access-tokens/:id) — the <app>oat_ prefix is registrable with secret-scanning/push-protection partners so leaked tokens can be auto-detected.

Reserved slug policy

• Owner namespaces use explicit states:
  • restricted_name: slug is blocked in profiles.owner_reserved_names and not publicly registrable.
  • parked_org: org exists and is platform-held (metadata.namespace_state=parked_org, metadata.reserved=true).
  • registered_org: normal org lifecycle (metadata.namespace_state=registered_org).
• Public lookup endpoint: GET /owners/{slug} returns canonical public metadata for the slug:
  • requested_slug: normalized slug from the request.
  • slug / canonical_slug: current canonical slug when the request resolves to a live or held owner; otherwise the requested slug.
  • status / state: registered_user, registered_org, parked_user, parked_org, restricted_name, renamed_user, renamed_org, held_by_deleted_user, held_by_deleted_org, held_by_recent_user_rename, held_by_recent_org_rename, or unregistered.
  • claimable: whether the slug can currently be claimed by a new user/org.
  • renamed: whether this lookup resolved through rename history.
  • hold_until: present for active rename reuse holds.
  • entity_kind: none, org, user, or org_and_user
  • optional org and/or user payloads when records exist.
• The PostgreSQL baseline schema creates profiles.owner_reserved_names and seeds canonical restricted names (admin, superuser, root, sudo) directly.
• Public register/create/rename/org-create/org-rename paths do not use a hardcoded denylist; conflicts are enforced through owner-namespace uniqueness plus reserved-name table checks.
• Reserved users are non-loginable (reserved placeholder credentials/providers are cleared by migration and reserve flows).

Verification delivery and expiry

• Manual entry codes are fixed-length numeric strings (6 digits) generated by core and expire in 15 minutes.
• Verification links use high-entropy link tokens generated by core and expire in 1 hour.
• Password reset link tokens expire in 1 hour.
• Sender integrations receive core.VerificationMessage{Code, LinkToken} and must send only provided fields; at least one must be present.
• Code-based and link-based flows are both supported:
  • Email verify code: POST /email/verify/confirm with {"code":"123456"}
  • Email verify link token: POST /email/verify/confirm-link with {"token":"..."}
  • Phone verify code: POST /phone/verify/confirm with {"phone_number":"+1...","code":"123456"}
  • Phone verify link token: POST /phone/verify/confirm-link with {"token":"..."}
  • Email password reset link handoff: POST /email/password/reset/confirm-link with {"token":"..."} returns {"ok":true,"reset_session":"..."}
  • Email password reset confirm: POST /email/password/reset/confirm with {"reset_session":"...","new_password":"..."}
• AuthKit API routes are prefix-neutral. Your API can live under a prefix (recommended: /api/v1); do not add an extra /auth segment when embedding AuthKit.

Identity validation policy

• AuthKit owns identity validation policy. Host applications should not duplicate or override username, password, email, or phone validation rules.
• Username rules are fixed: trim whitespace, 4-30 characters, start with an ASCII letter, allow only ASCII letters/digits/underscore, no @, and no leading +. AuthKit normalizes the owner slug by lowercasing and converting underscore/dash runs to single dashes.
• Username namespace checks reject collisions with users/orgs, renamed or recently held slugs, soft-deleted owners, parked namespaces, and restricted names. Parked/restricted names return username_not_allowed; held/taken names return owner_slug_taken.
• User rename cooldown is fixed at 72 hours. PATCH /user/username returns rename_rate_limited with the shared action-availability fields when blocked (action, allowed, reason, retry_after_seconds, next_allowed_at, cooldown_seconds). time_until_rename_available is still included as a compatibility alias.
• Password policy is fixed in AuthKit and currently requires at least 8 characters; weak passwords return password_too_short.
• Email and phone validation/normalization are fixed in AuthKit. Email is trimmed/lowercased and must be address-like. Phone numbers must be E.164-like (+ followed by country code and digits).
• Shared helpers are exported from core: ValidateUsername, OwnerSlugFromUsername, ValidatePassword, NormalizeEmail, ValidateEmail, NormalizePhone, ValidatePhone, and ValidationErrorCode.

Two-Factor Authentication (2FA):

• Optional security feature for admin accounts to prevent account takeover if password is leaked.
• Users can enable 2FA via email or SMS methods.
• When enabled, login requires both password AND a 6-digit code sent via email/SMS.
• Each user gets 10 backup codes (8-character alphanumeric) for account recovery in case they lose access to their 2FA method.
• Login flow with 2FA:
  1. POST /password/login with email/password
  2. If 2FA enabled: response has {"requires_2fa": true, "user_id": "...", "method": "email|sms", "verification_id": "..."}
  3. User receives 6-digit code via email or SMS
  4. POST /2fa/verify with {"user_id": "...", "code": "123456"} (or {"user_id": "...", "code": "ABC123XY", "backup_code": true} for backup codes)
  5. Response contains access_token and refresh_token as usual
• Setup flow:
  1. GET /user/2fa to check current status
  2. POST /user/2fa/enable with {"method": "email"} or {"method": "sms", "phone_number": "+1..."}
  3. Response includes backup_codes array - show these to user ONCE and tell them to save them
  4. User can regenerate codes with POST /user/2fa/regenerate-codes (invalidates old codes)
  5. User can disable with POST /user/2fa/disable
• Backup codes are single-use and removed after verification.
• 2FA codes expire in 15 minutes.

Operation:

• Key rotation is outside the scope of this library and should be handled by your infrastructure (e.g., External Secrets Operator updating mounted secrets, then restarting pods).
• To rotate keys manually: add the new public key to the map under a new kid, switch the active signer, leave the old pub in the map until tokens expire, then remove it.
• For local development, AuthKit auto-generates keys in .runtime/authkit/ (disabled in production).

Integration requirements (API server)

• Ephemeral auth state (verification codes, resets, SIWS challenges) uses Redis/Garnet when provided; in dev it falls back to memory.
• In production, a Redis-compatible store is required.
• Rate limiting:
  • Enabled by default (in-memory limiter) with per-bucket defaults from authhttp.DefaultRateLimits().
  • Keys: auth:<bucket>:ip:<client-ip>; errors fail-open (request allowed).
  • Default client IP strategy uses the immediate RemoteAddr peer, including private Docker bridge, loopback, and reverse-proxy peers. This keeps anonymous sensitive endpoints protected in local Compose and embedded deployments instead of silently failing open.
  • Request-code and resend buckets default to a 60-second per-client cooldown and 6 requests per hour for registration, registration resend, email/phone verification, password-reset request, and user email/phone change request/resend.
  • 429 responses include one shared action-availability shape for frontend timers: {"error":"rate_limited","action":"request_email_verification","allowed":false,"reason":"cooldown","retry_after_seconds":N,"next_allowed_at":"...","limit":6,"remaining":5,"window_seconds":3600,"cooldown_seconds":60}.
  • 429 responses also include Retry-After: N plus RateLimit-Limit, RateLimit-Remaining, and RateLimit-Reset when the limiter can compute them.
  • Behind reverse proxies, you must explicitly configure trusted proxies to safely use X-Forwarded-For / CF-Connecting-IP. AuthKit will not trust forwarded headers by default (clients can spoof them).
  • For multi-instance production, prefer a Redis/Garnet-backed limiter and a trusted-proxy client IP function, e.g.:
    • svc.WithRateLimiter(redislimiter.New(redis, authhttp.ToRedisLimits(authhttp.DefaultRateLimits())))
    • svc.WithClientIPFunc(authhttp.ClientIPFromForwardedHeaders(trustedProxyCIDRs)) where trustedProxyCIDRs are the CIDRs of your ingress/proxy layer (nginx, cloudflared, etc.).
  • Hosts that intentionally want the older public-remote-only fail-open behavior can opt in with svc.WithClientIPFunc(authhttp.PublicRemoteAddrClientIP()).
  • To explicitly opt out: svc.DisableRateLimiter().
• Storage: run the SQL migrations in authkit/migrations/postgres (includes profiles.refresh_sessions).
• Keys/JWKS: host /.well-known/jwks.json using svc.JWKSHandler() and rotate keys as needed.

AuthKit API route specs, and the APIHandler() net/http compatibility handler built from those same specs, are shown relative to the host-selected API mount prefix. With the recommended /api/v1 mount, GET /user/me is served at GET /api/v1/user/me. Browser OIDC routes are served separately and are usually mounted outside API versioning at /oidc/*.

• GET /.well-known/jwks.json
• OIDC:
  • GET /oidc/:provider/login
  • GET /oidc/:provider/callback
  • POST /oidc/:provider/link/start (RouteAccountOIDCLinking API group, requires auth) -> {auth_url}
• Password:
  • POST /password/login (accepts email, phone, or username in identifier field)
  • POST /email/password/reset/request
  • POST /email/password/reset/confirm-link ({token} -> {reset_session})
  • POST /email/password/reset/confirm ({reset_session, new_password})
• Registration (unified - accepts email or phone in identifier field):
  • POST /register (server auto-detects email vs phone based on format)
    • Success response includes {ok, username, email, phone_number, discord_username, next_action}
    • next_action is one of none, verify_email, or verify_phone
    • When next_action is none, the response also includes {access_token, refresh_token, token_type, expires_in}
  • Set RegistrationVerification: none|optional|required in core.Config
  • POST /register/resend-email
  • POST /register/resend-phone
  • Registration resend requests now return invalid_email / invalid_phone_number for malformed input and pending_registration_not_found when no matching pending registration exists.
  • Message delivery failures from the configured sender are surfaced as stable email_delivery_failed / sms_delivery_failed errors after AuthKit attempts provider submission.
• Email verification:
  • POST /email/verify/request
  • POST /email/verify/confirm
  • POST /email/verify/confirm-link
  • Verification request endpoints return explicit target-state errors: user_not_found, email_already_verified, or phone_already_verified.
• Phone verification and password reset:
  • POST /phone/verify/request
  • POST /phone/verify/confirm
  • POST /phone/verify/confirm-link
  • POST /phone/password/reset/request
  • POST /phone/password/reset/confirm ({reset_session, new_password})
• Sessions:
  • POST /token { grant_type: "refresh_token", refresh_token }
  • POST /sessions/current { refresh_token } → { session_id }
  • GET /user/sessions (requires auth)
  • DELETE /user/sessions/:id (requires auth)
  • DELETE /user/sessions (requires auth)
  • DELETE /logout (requires auth; revokes the current session via sid claim)
• User profile:
  • GET /user/me (requires auth)
  • PATCH /user/username (requires auth)
  • POST /user/email/change/request (requires auth)
  • POST /user/email/change/confirm (requires auth)
  • POST /user/email/change/resend (requires auth)
  • PATCH /user/biography (requires auth)
  • POST /user/password (requires auth)
  • DELETE /user (requires auth)
  • DELETE /user/providers/:provider (requires auth)
• Two-Factor Authentication (2FA):
  • GET /user/2fa (requires auth) → {enabled, method, phone_number}
  • POST /user/2fa/start-phone (requires auth) → starts phone 2FA setup, sends code to phone
  • POST /user/2fa/enable (requires auth) → → {enabled, method, backup_codes}
  • POST /user/2fa/disable (requires auth)
  • POST /user/2fa/regenerate-codes (requires auth) → {backup_codes}
  • POST /2fa/verify (during login) → {access_token, refresh_token}
• Admin roles (admin only):
  • POST /admin/roles/grant
  • POST /admin/roles/revoke
• Admin users (admin only):
  • GET /admin/users
  • GET /admin/users/:user_id
  • POST /admin/users/ban
  • POST /admin/users/unban
  • POST /admin/users/set-email
  • POST /admin/users/set-username
  • POST /admin/users/set-password
  • DELETE /admin/users/:user_id
  • POST /admin/users/:user_id/restore
  • GET /admin/users/deleted
  • GET /admin/users/:user_id/signins
  • POST /admin/users/:user_id/sessions/revoke
• Admin owner-namespace lifecycle (admin only):
  • POST /admin/accounts/restrict (batch add slugs to restricted-name list)
  • POST /admin/accounts/unrestrict (batch remove slugs from restricted-name list)
  • POST /admin/account/park ({kind:"org"|"user",slug})
  • POST /admin/account/claim ({kind:"org"|"user",slug,...}; for kind:"org", owner_user_id is required)
• Public owner-namespace lookup:
  • GET /owners/:slug → canonical owner metadata + status/claimable
• Solana wallet authentication (SIWS):
  • POST /solana/challenge → {domain, address, nonce, issuedAt, expirationTime, ...}
  • POST /solana/login → {access_token, refresh_token, user}
  • POST /solana/link (requires auth) → {success, solana_address}

Expired Token/Code Cleanup

AuthKit deletes verification codes when they're consumed. Expired codes are not auto‑purged. Operators should periodically delete expired rows. Example SQL:

-- Remove expired email verification codes
DELETE FROM profiles.email_verifications WHERE expires_at <= now();

-- Remove expired password reset codes
DELETE FROM profiles.password_resets WHERE expires_at <= now();

-- Remove expired phone verification codes (registration + password reset)
DELETE FROM profiles.phone_verifications WHERE expires_at <= now();

-- Remove expired pending registrations
-- Pending registrations now live in Redis/Garnet; no SQL cleanup needed.
DELETE FROM profiles.pending_phone_registrations WHERE expires_at <= now();

-- Remove expired 2FA verification codes
DELETE FROM profiles.two_factor_verifications WHERE expires_at <= now();

Run these from your scheduler (cron, pg_cron, or your job system).

Frontend (React) quick guide

• Paths below are relative to the AuthKit API mount. In doujins/hentai0-style hosts mounted at /api/v1, call /api/v1/token, /api/v1/user/me, /api/v1/admin/users, etc.
• Tokens
  • Store access_token in memory and refresh_token in IndexedDB/secure storage.
  • Add Authorization: Bearer <access_token> to protected API calls. On 401, call POST /token with refresh_token, then retry.
• Registration (unified)
  • POST /register with {identifier, username, password} where identifier is email or phone
  • On success, branch on next_action: none, verify_email, or verify_phone
  • If next_action is none, store the returned access/refresh tokens immediately; do not replay the password
  • Email registration: check email for 6-char code → POST /email/verify/confirm with {code}
  • Phone registration: check SMS for 6-char code → POST /phone/verify/confirm with {phone_number, code}
  • Successful email/phone code or link confirmation returns access/refresh tokens
  • Resend codes: POST /register/resend-email or POST /register/resend-phone
• Password Login
  • POST /password/login with {login, password} where login can be email/phone/username → {id_token, refresh_token}
• Password Reset
  • POST /email/password/reset/request with {email} → check email for reset instructions
  • POST /email/password/reset/confirm-link with {token} → {reset_session}
  • POST /email/password/reset/confirm with {reset_session, new_password} → {ok: true}
  • POST /phone/password/reset/request with {phone_number} → check SMS for reset instructions
  • POST /phone/password/reset/confirm with {reset_session, new_password} → {ok: true}
• OIDC
  • Start: window.location = /oidc/${provider}/login.
  • Link: POST /api/v1/oidc/:provider/link/start (with Authorization) → {auth_url}; then window.location = auth_url.
• Unlink
  • DELETE /user/providers/:provider (Authorization). Guard prevents unlinking the last login method.
• Sessions
  • DELETE /logout (current), DELETE /user/sessions (all), DELETE /user/sessions/:id (single), GET /user/sessions (list).
  • POST /sessions/current with {refresh_token} → {session_id}.
• Current user
  • GET /user/me → {id, email, pending_email?, phone_number?, username, discord_username?, email_verified, phone_verified, has_password, roles, entitlements, biography}.
  • Email change
    • POST /user/email/change/request with {email} (Authorization) → sends verification code
    • POST /user/email/change/confirm with {code} (Authorization) → confirms email change
    • POST /user/email/change/resend (Authorization) → resends verification code
  • Phone number change
    • POST /user/phone/change/request with {phone_number} (Authorization) → sends verification code
    • POST /user/phone/change/confirm with {code} (Authorization) → confirms phone number change
    • POST /user/phone/change/resend (Authorization) → resends verification code
• User profile updates
  • PATCH /user/username with {username} (Authorization)
  • PATCH /user/biography with {biography} (Authorization)
  • POST /user/password with {old_password, new_password} (Authorization)
  • DELETE /user (Authorization) → deletes account
• Solana Wallet (SIWS)
  • Login/Register: POST /solana/challenge → wallet.signIn(input) → POST /solana/login
  • Link wallet: POST /solana/challenge → wallet.signIn(input) → POST /solana/link (with Authorization)

Solana Wallet Authentication (SIWS)

Sign In With Solana allows users to authenticate using their Solana wallet (Phantom, Solflare, Backpack, etc.). Users can create accounts with just a wallet (no email/password required) or link a wallet to an existing account.

Frontend Integration (React/TypeScript):

import { useWallet } from '@solana/wallet-adapter-react';

// 1. Request challenge from backend
const requestChallenge = async (address: string, username?: string) => {
  const response = await fetch('/api/v1/solana/challenge', {
    method: 'POST',
    headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
    body: JSON.stringify({ address, username }), // username optional for new accounts
  });
  return response.json(); // Returns SignInInput
};

// 2. Sign with wallet
const signIn = async () => {
  const { publicKey, signIn } = useWallet();
  if (!publicKey || !signIn) return;

  // Get challenge from backend
  const input = await requestChallenge(publicKey.toBase58(), 'desired_username');

  // Wallet prompts user to sign
  const output = await signIn(input);

  // 3. Verify signature and get tokens
  const response = await fetch('/api/v1/solana/login', {
    method: 'POST',
    headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
    body: JSON.stringify({
      output: {
        account: { address: output.account.address },
        signature: btoa(String.fromCharCode(...output.signature)),
        signedMessage: btoa(String.fromCharCode(...output.signedMessage)),
      },
    }),
  });

  const { access_token, refresh_token, user } = await response.json();
  // Store tokens as usual
};

Link wallet to existing account:

const linkWallet = async (accessToken: string) => {
  const { publicKey, signIn } = useWallet();
  if (!publicKey || !signIn) return;

  // Get challenge
  const input = await requestChallenge(publicKey.toBase58());

  // Sign
  const output = await signIn(input);

  // Link (requires auth)
  const response = await fetch('/api/v1/solana/link', {
    method: 'POST',
    headers: {
      'Content-Type': 'application/json',
      'Authorization': `Bearer ${accessToken}`,
    },
    body: JSON.stringify({
      output: {
        account: { address: output.account.address },
        signature: btoa(String.fromCharCode(...output.signature)),
        signedMessage: btoa(String.fromCharCode(...output.signedMessage)),
      },
    }),
  });

  return response.json(); // { success: true, solana_address: "..." }
};

Notes:

• Challenges expire in 15 minutes
• Username is optional - if not provided, a username is derived from the wallet address (e.g., u_7xKX)
• Users can change their username later via PATCH /user/username
• Wallet address is stored as a provider link (like Google/Discord) in profiles.user_providers
• One wallet per user, one user per wallet

Verifier (JWKS, verify‑only)

Use the verifier when a service needs to accept access tokens issued by one or more AuthKit‑powered APIs (e.g., spacex), without mounting any auth routes.

• Create with authhttp.NewVerifier(opts...) — options: WithSkew, WithAlgorithms, WithHTTPClient, WithOrgMode.
• Add issuers via verifier.AddIssuer(issuerID, audiences, opts) — each may specify a JWKS URL (defaults to /.well-known/jwks.json), pre-provided PEM keys, or raw *rsa.PublicKey maps.
• Default skew: 60s. Default algorithms: RS256.
• DB enrichment (recommended):
  • Call verifier.WithService(coreSvc) to enable best-effort DB enrichment hooks (roles + canonical email + provider usernames) when the token lacks those claims.

Accepting Tokens From Multiple Issuers

SpaceX accepts access tokens from multiple issuers; both tesla.com and x.com.

  import (
    "encoding/json"
    "net/http"
    authhttp "github.com/open-rails/authkit/http"
    "time"
  )

  func main() {
    ver := authhttp.NewVerifier(authhttp.WithSkew(60 * time.Second))
    ver.AddIssuer("https://tesla.com", []string{"spacex-app"}, authhttp.IssuerOptions{})
    ver.AddIssuer("https://x.com", []string{"spacex-app"}, authhttp.IssuerOptions{})

    mux := http.NewServeMux()

    // (1) Claims-only: just check JWT (no DB). 401 if missing/invalid.
    mux.Handle("/claims-only", authhttp.Required(ver)(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
      cl, ok := authhttp.ClaimsFromContext(r.Context())
      if !ok {
        w.WriteHeader(401)
        return
      }
      _ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(map[string]any{"user_id": cl.UserID})
    })))

    // (4) Admin-only: require login, then check admin role directly via DB.
    mux.Handle("/admin/report", authhttp.Required(ver)(authhttp.RequireAdmin(pg)(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
      w.WriteHeader(200)
    }))))

    http.ListenAndServe(":8080", mux)
  }

Federated Orgs & Platform Delegation

AuthKit owns the full platform-delegation lifecycle so an org can bring in federated users — users who live in the org's own system and authenticate via the org's issuer rather than local passwords. Two AuthKit-embedding services register with and trust each other:

• the platform / IdP side (e.g. cozy-art) mints delegated tokens and sends its registration;
• the resource-server side (e.g. tensorhub) accepts registrations and validates the delegated tokens.

There are three roles, all owned by AuthKit:

The delegated-token contract

A delegated platform token is signed by the org's platform issuer key and carries:

• delegated_sub — the federated user id. A delegated token never sets sub. The invariant is: a token carries EITHER sub (native user) XOR delegated_sub (federated user), never both. AuthKit refuses to mint both, and Verify() rejects any token presenting both (conflicting_subject).
• org / tenant — the federated org slug. Claims.Tenant reads tenant, falling back to org.
• user_tier — the platform's tier for this user (Claims.UserTier).
• roles — platform-scoped roles for the federated user.
• aud — the resource servers this token targets.
• exp — expiry (defaults to 15m).

Because a delegated token has no sub, the resource server's middleware skips the local-user gate (no user_disabled lookup) — authorization is by issuer/tenant trust, not local-user existence. Validated delegated tokens are read via:

cl, _ := verifier.Verify(token)
if dp, ok := cl.Delegated(); ok {
    // dp.Tenant, dp.DelegatedSubject, dp.UserTier, dp.Roles, dp.Issuer
}

Registration handshake (both sides)

Outbound (platform side, e.g. cozy-art) — publish this org's issuer + JWKS URL to a resource server's accept endpoint:

fc := authhttp.NewFederationClient(
    authhttp.WithFederationAuthToken(ownerAccessToken), // org owner/admin token
)
err := fc.RegisterIssuer(ctx, "https://tensorhub.example/api/v1/federated-issuers",
    authhttp.FederationRegistration{
        Org:      "cozy-art",
        IssuerID: "https://cozy.art",
        JWKSURL:  "https://cozy.art/.well-known/jwks.json",
    })

Inbound (resource-server side, e.g. tensorhub) — mount the RouteFederation group. POST /federated-issuers accepts + stores a registration, authorized by the org owner/admin of the registering org (global admins may register for any org); DELETE /federated-issuers removes one; GET /federated-issuers (global-admin) lists them. This is the AuthKit-owned home for what services used to expose as a bespoke /api/v1/platform/issuers endpoint.

In-house JWKS — no external push/sync

The resource server loads registered federated issuers from AuthKit's own store (the profiles.federated_org_issuers table) and registers each with the Verifier, whose existing in-house JWKS fetch/refresh then handles the keys. There is no external key push or sync — the resource server pulls JWKS from each issuer's URL on demand and refreshes per CacheTTL.

// At startup (and re-run on a ticker / after a registration) to pick up store changes:
err := verifier.LoadFederatedIssuers(ctx, coreSvc /* or any FederatedIssuerSource */, []string{"tensorhub"})

LoadFederatedIssuers registers only active issuers. A newly-accepted registration is also added to the Verifier immediately by the inbound handler, so it is usable without waiting for the next store load.