authkit

AuthKit

Lightweight auth library for Go services.

AuthKit is based on a browser-managed bearer-token model: login/OIDC/Solana flows issue an access_token and refresh_token, frontend JavaScript stores them, protected API calls use Authorization: Bearer <access_token>, and refresh uses POST /token with the refresh token. It is not a cookie-session library: it does not currently provide opaque session_id browser cookies, HttpOnly token-cookie callbacks, or CSRF/session middleware for that model.

Note: This repo ships the HTTP transport as the top-level http package (github.com/open-rails/authkit/http). First-party router adapters live in github.com/open-rails/authkit/adapters/gin and github.com/open-rails/authkit/adapters/chi.

Scope (minimal)

• Asymmetric JWT issuing (RS256) + JWKS endpoint (no persistence yet).
• Password login and email-based password reset tokens.
• OIDC RP (OAuth2/OIDC) with PKCE (Redis/Garnet or in-memory for ephemeral state; no DB table).
• Solana wallet authentication (SIWS - Sign In With Solana).
• Storage with Postgres + Redis/Garnet for ephemeral auth state.

Packages

• jwt: minimal key management, signer, JWKS helper.
• oidc: client (RP) types; implementation to follow.
• siws: Sign In With Solana - Ed25519 signature verification for Solana wallets.
• storage: minimal interfaces for users, passwords, providers, resets, roles, revocations.
• migrations: embedded SQL defining the profiles schema and minimal tables.
• adapters/gin and adapters/chi: optional router adapters that register AuthKit's canonical route specs on host-owned route groups.

Migrations

• Postgres SQL migrations live in migrations/postgres/ and are embedded via go:embed.

• Run them with migratekit, name-tracked per app in public.migrations so a recorded migration is never re-applied:

  ms, _ := migratekit.LoadFromFS(pgmigrations.FS)
  m := migratekit.NewPostgres(sqlDB, "authkit")
  _ = m.ApplyMigrations(ctx, ms)
  

  The bundled devserver uses this exact path. FS remains available for custom runners.

• PostgreSQL-backed storage requires PostgreSQL 18 or newer. Older PostgreSQL versions are not supported. AuthKit migrations use native uuidv7() defaults for AuthKit-owned UUID identifiers; PostgreSQL 17 can store UUIDv7 values but does not provide the required uuidv7() function.

Configurable schema (issue 69)

• AuthKit's tables live in the Postgres schema named by core.Config.Schema (default profiles, the historical name — leaving it unset is fully backward-compatible). Set it when multiple apps embed AuthKit against the same database and must not share auth tables (e.g. one app keeps profiles, another uses openrails_auth). Names must match ^[a-z_][a-z0-9_]*$ (max 63 bytes).

• AuthKit never touches search_path on the host's shared pool; queries stay schema-qualified and the qualifier is rewritten to the configured schema at execution time (see internal/db/schema.go).

• Hosts with a non-default schema must run the migrations rendered for it:

  fsys, _ := pgmigrations.FSForSchema("openrails_auth") // fs.FS; "profiles"/"" returns the embedded FS unchanged
  ms, _ := migratekit.LoadFromFS(fsys)
  

• Pool-parameter helpers default to profiles; schema-aware variants take svc.Schema(): authhttp.RequireAdminInSchema, authhttp.IsAdminInSchema, authhttp.HasRoleDBCheckInSchema, identity.NewStoreInSchema.

Database queries (sqlc)

• All static Postgres queries are written as raw SQL in internal/db/queries/*.sql (one file per domain) and compiled to type-safe Go by sqlc into the internal/db package (committed, never hand-edited).
• To add or change a query: edit the .sql file, run make sqlc (runs sqlc generate + sqlc vet as a pair; vet's db-prepare rule PREPAREs every query against a real Postgres — start one with docker compose -f docker-compose.devserver.yaml up -d postgres and apply migrations/postgres/*.up.sql), then use the generated method on db.Queries.
• The schema source of truth for sqlc is migrations/postgres/ — generated code is always type-checked against the real migrations. CI fails if internal/db drifts from the query files (make sqlc-check).
• Escape hatch: queries whose SQL is assembled at runtime stay on raw pgx with a comment explaining why (currently core.AdminListUsers and the advisory-lock path in core.ReconcileTenantManifest). ClickHouse queries are out of sqlc's scope.

---

Quick Start (Gin)

package main

import (
  "github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
  authkitgin "github.com/open-rails/authkit/adapters/gin"
  core "github.com/open-rails/authkit/core"
  authhttp "github.com/open-rails/authkit/http"
)

func main() {
  // Build core.Config from your app config.
  cfg := core.Config{
    Issuer:            "https://myapp.com",
    IssuedAudiences:   []string{"myapp"},
    ExpectedAudiences: []string{"myapp"},
    BaseURL:           "https://myapp.com",
    FrontendCallbackPath: "/login/callback",
    // RegistrationVerification: core.RegistrationVerificationRequired, // none|optional|required
    // NativeUserRegistrationMode / TenantRegistrationMode: open|invite_only|admin_only|admin_bootstrap_only|... (host policy)
    // AutoCreatePersonalTenants: true  // opt in to a personal tenant per native user
    // Keys: nil => auto-discovery in AuthKit (env/fs/dev fallback)
  }

  svc, _ := authhttp.NewService(cfg)
  // svc = svc.WithPostgres(pg).WithRedis(redis).WithEmailSender(email).WithSMSSender(sms)...

  router := gin.New()
  v1 := router.Group("/api/v1")

  authkitgin.RegisterJWKS(router, svc)
  authkitgin.RegisterAPI(v1, svc)
  authkitgin.RegisterOIDC(router, svc, "/oidc")

  router.Run(":8080")
}

AuthKit route specs are prefix-neutral. The host app chooses the mount point: registering RegisterAPI(router.Group("/api/v1"), svc) exposes /api/v1/token, /api/v1/user/me, and /api/v1/admin/users, while AuthKit's internal route paths remain /token, /user/me, and /admin/users.

Hosts can mount only selected route groups or wrap individual handlers:

authkitgin.RegisterAPI(v1, svc, authkitgin.WithRoutes(svc.Routes().Groups(
  authhttp.RouteCore,
  authhttp.RoutePassword,
  authhttp.RouteRegister,
  authhttp.RouteEmailVerification,
  authhttp.RouteUser,
  authhttp.RouteAccountOIDCLinking,
)))

For custom routers, iterate svc.Routes().DefaultAPI() or svc.Routes().Groups(...) and register each RouteSpec.Method, RouteSpec.Path, and RouteSpec.Handler yourself. Host apps should not keep duplicated AuthKit route allowlists.

Registration modes and route selection

Route-group selection is the primary host control: a locked-down host should mount only the svc.Routes().Groups(...) subset it intentionally exposes instead of DefaultAPI(). As a defense-in-depth backstop, AuthKit also exposes separate registration modes on core.Config:

• NativeUserRegistrationMode: open, invite_only, admin_only, admin_bootstrap_only, or closed.
• TenantRegistrationMode: open, invite_only, admin_only, admin_bootstrap_only, manifest_only, or closed.

Both default to open. Any non-open native-user mode turns off public user self-registration and auto-registration paths: POST /register, /register/availability, /register/resend-email, /register/resend-phone, OIDC/social/Solana auto-create, and pending-registration confirmation all return a stable registration_disabled error (/register/availability reports every field as unavailable, never usable). Existing-user authentication is unaffected: login, refresh, logout, password reset/recovery, token verification, and sessions all keep working. Embedded bootstrap/admin creation through exported core APIs (CreateUser, ImportUser) still works.

Any non-open tenant registration mode denies the public tenant-facing mutation routes (tenant creation/rename, invites, member changes, role changes, service token management routes) with a stable tenant_management_disabled error. Read-only tenant routes and the tenant-scoped token exchange (POST /token/tenant) stay available for existing members. Embedded core/bootstrap code can still ensure initial tenants, roles, admins, trusted issuers, and generated opaque service tokens through the privileged provisioning API (ProvisionTenant) or the tenant manifest reconciler. Public tenant creation uses CreateTenantForUser; lower level CreateTenant is for bootstrap/admin callers that intentionally create an ownerless tenant.

Locked-down (e.g. self-hosted OpenRails) pattern: mount only the chosen route groups, set both modes to admin_bootstrap_only or manifest_only, and bootstrap through embedded core APIs or a deployment-owned tenant manifest. Bootstrap authority is an operator/deploy action, not a fake AuthKit tenant.

cfg := core.Config{
  // ...issuer/audiences/keys...
  NativeUserRegistrationMode: core.RegistrationModeAdminBootstrapOnly,
  TenantRegistrationMode:     core.RegistrationModeManifestOnly,
}
svc, _ := authhttp.NewService(cfg)

// Mount only the route groups this deployment intentionally exposes:
authkitgin.RegisterAPI(v1, svc, authkitgin.WithRoutes(svc.Routes().Groups(
  authhttp.RouteCore,     // /token, /sessions/current, /logout
  authhttp.RoutePassword, // login + password reset for existing users
  authhttp.RouteUser,     // self-service for existing accounts
)))

// Bootstrap declared tenants, roles, admins, and service tokens internally via
// AuthKit core APIs (unaffected by the public registration modes):
core := svc.Core()
admin, _ := core.CreateUser(ctx, "ops@example.com", "operator")
bootstrap, _ := core.ProvisionTenant(ctx, core.TenantProvisionRequest{
  Slug: "operator",
  Memberships: []core.TenantProvisionMembership{{UserID: admin.ID, Role: "owner"}},
  ServiceTokens: []core.TenantProvisionServiceToken{{
    Name: "ci",
    Permissions: []string{"tenant:read"},
  }},
}, nil)
_ = bootstrap.MintedTokens[0].Plaintext // write once to a secret store

For a closed-registration deployment, the manifest reconciler is the standard machine/bootstrap path. It declares tenants, trusted delegated-token issuers, roles, optional memberships, trusted issuers, and optional generated opaque service tokens, then applies them idempotently under a Postgres advisory lock:

tenants:
  - slug: cozy-art
    issuers:
      - issuer: https://cozy.example
        jwks_uri: https://cozy.example/.well-known/jwks.json
        audiences: ["openrails"]
        enabled: true
    roles:
      - name: operator
        permissions: ["tenant:read", "openrails:billing:read"]
    memberships:
      - user_id: 018f0000-0000-7000-8000-000000000001
        role: operator
    service_tokens:
      - name: openrails-runtime
        permissions: ["openrails:entitlements:read"]
        resources:
          - kind: openrails.tenant
            id: cozy-art
        output:
          file: /run/secrets/openrails-runtime-token

The standalone AuthKit devserver exposes this as both an opt-in startup hook and a one-shot deploy-job command:

DEVSERVER_ISSUER=https://auth.example \
DB_URL=postgres://... \
DEVSERVER_PERMISSION_CATALOG=openrails:billing:read,openrails:entitlements:read \
DEVSERVER_TOKEN_PREFIX=cozy \
DEVSERVER_TENANT_MANIFEST_PATH=/manifests/tenants.yaml \
/authkit-devserver tenant-manifest apply

Use DEVSERVER_RECONCILE_TENANT_MANIFEST_ON_START=true only for local/dev or simple self-hosted deployments. Production systems should usually run the one-shot command as a release job, or call core.ReconcileTenantManifest from their own job with a Vault/Kubernetes-backed TenantManifestTokenStore, so API pods do not need long-lived secret-write credentials.

Hosted SaaS deployments can later set both registration modes to open and mount the RouteRegister / RouteTenants groups to enable public signup and tenant onboarding without code changes.

OpenRails' bootstrap flow should call these AuthKit primitives for AuthKit-owned objects: user-owned tenant registration for public SaaS signup, and ProvisionTenant/ReconcileTenantManifest for closed-registration or embedded bootstrap. OpenRails still owns OpenRails-specific catalog, prices, entitlements, grants, billing, and provider state.

Quick Start (net/http)

package main

import (
  "net/http"

  authhttp "github.com/open-rails/authkit/http"
  core "github.com/open-rails/authkit/core"
)

func main() {
  cfg := core.Config{
    Issuer:            "https://myapp.com",
    IssuedAudiences:   []string{"myapp"},
    ExpectedAudiences: []string{"myapp"},
    BaseURL:           "https://myapp.com",
    FrontendCallbackPath: "/login/callback",
  }

  svc, _ := authhttp.NewService(cfg)
  mux := http.NewServeMux()
  mux.Handle("/.well-known/jwks.json", svc.JWKSHandler())
  mux.Handle("/api/v1/", http.StripPrefix("/api/v1", svc.APIHandler()))
  mux.Handle("/oidc/", svc.OIDCHandler())
  http.ListenAndServe(":8080", mux)
}

Optional Twilio providers

• Core is provider-agnostic and only depends on core.EmailSender / core.SMSSender.
• Optional convenience providers are available:
  • github.com/open-rails/authkit/providers/email/twilio for Twilio Email API (SendGrid endpoint).
  • github.com/open-rails/authkit/providers/sms/twilio for Twilio Messaging API.
• AuthKit never reads provider environment variables directly. Host apps load their own config, build the sender, then pass it with WithEmailSender / WithSMSSender.
• The SMS provider requires AccountSID, AuthToken, and MessagingServiceSID. It uses Twilio Messaging (Messages.json) only; there is no Verify service path and no From number fallback path.
• The email provider requires a SendGrid/Twilio Email API key and a verified from address. Hosts can provide link builders or full message builders for branded/localized copy.
• A 2xx response from AuthKit means the message was accepted by the configured sender/provider submission call. It does not prove the recipient mailbox or carrier ultimately delivered, accepted, opened, or displayed the message.

Preferred locale

• AuthKit stores an optional preferred_locale on the user profile. Registration seeds it from the request language, so a user signing up from /es or ?lang=es starts with Spanish as their communication/default locale.
• Host apps should pass the current site language through AuthKit's language middleware during registration, and should use PATCH /user/preferred-locale when the user explicitly changes their account preference.
• Ordinary login, token refresh, and browsing a different route language must not rewrite preferred_locale.
• AuthKit uses the stored locale for account, security, verification, password reset, login-code, and welcome messages. Built-in Twilio email/SMS defaults fall back to English when a locale is unsupported; host-provided builders can read lang.LanguageFromContext(ctx) for custom localized copy.
• Site/content language remains host-app owned. preferred_locale is the communication language and a default only when the host has no stronger route/session/browser choice.

emailSender, err := emailtwilio.New(emailtwilio.Config{
    APIKey:    cfg.TwilioEmailAPIKey,
    FromEmail: cfg.TwilioEmailFromAddress,
    FromName:  cfg.TwilioEmailFromName,
    AppName:   "Example",
    VerificationLinkURL: func(token string) string {
        return cfg.SiteBaseURL + "/verify-registration?token=" + url.QueryEscape(token)
    },
    ResetLinkURL: func(token string) string {
        return cfg.SiteBaseURL + "/reset-password?token=" + url.QueryEscape(token)
    },
})
if err != nil {
    return err
}
svc = svc.WithEmailSender(emailSender)

smsSender, err := smstwilio.New(smstwilio.Config{
    AccountSID:          cfg.TwilioAccountSID,
    AuthToken:           cfg.TwilioAuthToken,
    MessagingServiceSID: cfg.TwilioMessagingServiceSID,
    AppName:             "Example",
})
if err != nil {
    return err
}
svc = svc.WithSMSSender(smsSender)

External identity providers

• Built-in providers (google, apple, discord, github) can still be enabled with core.Config.Providers by passing client IDs/secrets.
• For custom providers, prefer core.Config.ProviderDescriptors. OIDC providers are usually pure configuration because identity claims are standardized. OAuth2 providers are pure configuration when their userinfo JSON can be mapped with dot paths.
• Apple uses the same descriptor model, but its client secret is a signed JWT. Use ClientSecret.Strategy: "apple_jwt" with Apple team/key/private-key fields.

cfg.ProviderDescriptors = map[string]authprovider.Provider{
    "example-oidc": {
        Name:     "example-oidc",
        Kind:     authprovider.KindOIDC,
        Issuer:   "https://issuer.example",
        ClientID: cfg.ExampleClientID,
        ClientSecret: authprovider.ClientSecret{Env: "EXAMPLE_CLIENT_SECRET"},
        Scopes:   []string{"openid", "email", "profile"},
        PKCE:     true,
    },
    "example-oauth": {
        Name:         "example-oauth",
        Kind:         authprovider.KindOAuth2,
        Issuer:       "https://oauth.example",
        ClientID:     cfg.OAuthClientID,
        ClientSecret: authprovider.ClientSecret{Value: cfg.OAuthClientSecret},
        AuthorizeURL: "https://oauth.example/authorize",
        TokenURL:     "https://oauth.example/token",
        UserInfoURL:  "https://oauth.example/me",
        Scopes:       []string{"profile", "email"},
        PKCE:         true,
        UserMapping: authprovider.UserMapping{
            Subject:           authprovider.FieldMapping{Path: "id", Transforms: []string{"string", "trim"}},
            Email:             authprovider.FieldMapping{Path: "email", Transforms: []string{"trim"}},
            EmailVerified:     authprovider.FieldMapping{Path: "email_verified"},
            PreferredUsername: authprovider.FieldMapping{Path: "username"},
            DisplayName:       authprovider.FieldMapping{Path: "name"},
        },
    },
    "apple": {
        Name:     "apple",
        Kind:     authprovider.KindOIDC,
        Issuer:   "https://appleid.apple.com",
        ClientID: "com.example.web",
        Scopes:   []string{"openid", "email", "name"},
        ExtraAuthParams: map[string]string{"response_mode": "form_post"},
        ClientSecret: authprovider.ClientSecret{
            Strategy: "apple_jwt",
            AppleJWT: &authprovider.AppleJWTSecret{
                TeamID:        cfg.AppleTeamID,
                KeyID:         cfg.AppleKeyID,
                PrivateKeyEnv: "APPLE_PRIVATE_KEY_PEM",
            },
        },
    },
}

---

Entitlements Provider (Optional)

AuthKit can include entitlements (e.g., "premium", "pro") in JWT service tokens if you provide an EntitlementsProvider. This is useful for billing/subscription systems where entitlements are stored outside the profiles schema.

Interface:

type EntitlementsProvider interface {
    ListEntitlements(ctx context.Context, userID string) ([]string, error)
}

Providers return active entitlement names only — AuthKit bakes them verbatim into the JWT entitlements claim and admin user views. Filtering expired/revoked grants is the provider's responsibility.

Optionally implement BatchEntitlementsProvider (ListEntitlementsBatch) so AdminListUsers can fetch entitlements in one round trip instead of per row.

Example implementation (querying a billing.entitlements table):

package main

import (
    "context"
    "time"

    "github.com/jackc/pgx/v5/pgxpool"
)

type BillingEntitlementsProvider struct {
    pg *pgxpool.Pool
}

func (p *BillingEntitlementsProvider) ListEntitlements(ctx context.Context, userID string) ([]string, error) {
    rows, err := p.pg.Query(ctx, `
        SELECT entitlement
        FROM billing.entitlements
        WHERE user_id = $1
          AND revoked_at IS NULL
          AND start_at <= $2
          AND (end_at IS NULL OR end_at > $2)
          AND deleted_at IS NULL
    `, userID, time.Now())
    if err != nil {
        return nil, err
    }
    defer rows.Close()

    var out []string
    for rows.Next() {
        var name string
        if err := rows.Scan(&name); err != nil {
            return nil, err
        }
        out = append(out, name)
    }
    return out, rows.Err()
}

// Wire it up:
svc, _ := authhttp.NewService(cfg)
svc = svc.
    WithPostgres(pg).
    WithEntitlements(&BillingEntitlementsProvider{pg: pg})

Provider failures. A billing outage must not block login: if the provider errors during token issuance, AuthKit still mints the token but omits entitlement claims and logs loudly (token issued WITHOUT entitlement claims). Admin views degrade to no entitlements rather than failing the request.

Gating requests. Use Claims.HasEntitlement(name) for ad-hoc checks, or the RequireEntitlement("premium") / RequireAnyEntitlement("pro", "premium") middleware (mount after Required) to gate routes; both deny service-principal (OAT) and delegated tokens, which carry no entitlements.

Snapshot semantics & revocation lag. Entitlements are snapshotted into the JWT at issuance time. Unlike account bans (re-checked live on every request), entitlements are NOT re-validated per request, so a revocation only takes effect once the access token expires or is re-issued. Size your access-token TTL (AccessTokenDuration) to your acceptable entitlement-revocation lag, or re-issue the token when a grant changes.

---

Concepts (concise)

• Service (issuer + storage): used by authhttp.NewService(cfg); backs the built-in handlers (sessions, login, OIDC, etc).
• Middleware: github.com/open-rails/authkit/http provides Required/Optional (JWT verification) plus helpers like RequireAdmin(pg).
• Verify-only: use authhttp.NewVerifier() + verifier.AddIssuer(...) to accept tokens from other issuers without issuing tokens yourself.

---

Configuration ownership

AuthKit library behavior is host-owned: the embedding app should pass runtime behavior via core.Config, not rely on library env/file reads.

Area	Ownership	Notes
Issuer, IssuedAudiences, ExpectedAudiences	Host config	Required token contract inputs.
RequireVerifiedRegistrations, Environment, SolanaNetwork, AutoCreatePersonalTenants, NativeUserRegistrationMode, TenantRegistrationMode, BaseURL	Host config	Runtime behavior should be deterministic from config.
Keys provided (cfg.Keys != nil)	Host config	Fully disables library key env/filesystem discovery.
Keys omitted (cfg.Keys == nil)	Library exception	Only allowed env/filesystem auto-discovery path (ACTIVE_KEY_ID, ACTIVE_PRIVATE_KEY_PEM, PUBLIC_KEYS, <KeysPath>/keys.json (default /vault/auth), .runtime/authkit/*).
KeysPath / AUTHKIT_KEYS_PATH	Host config	Overrides the filesystem directory the local resolver scans for keys.json. Default /vault/auth (unchanged). See "Signing & key resolution for embedders".

---

Signing & key resolution for embedders

One key per app. Each embedding app owns exactly one JWT signing keypair — its issuer identity, the only thing on its JWKS (plus retiring keys during rotation). That single key signs all of the app's JWTs: user access/refresh tokens, first-party service JWTs, and delegated access JWTs. They differ only in claims (aud, sub/delegated_sub, token_use), never in key. No app should manage a second JWT key.

Sign through AuthKit — the host never holds the private key. The host delegates the signing operation to AuthKit and passes claims/params only. AuthKit exposes the host exactly two things: (1) mint/sign operations (params in → signed token out) and (2) public verification material (JWKS). There is no API that returns a private key, a PEM, or a raw crypto.Signer over the private key — so the host literally cannot read, copy, or persist it. Mint through the *core.Service methods:

svc, _ := core.NewFromConfig(core.Config{
    Issuer:            "https://cozy-art.example",
    IssuedAudiences:   []string{"cozy-art"},
    ExpectedAudiences: []string{"cozy-art"},
    // Keys: nil  => local resolver; point it wherever the host renders keys.json:
    KeysPath:          "/vault/auth", // or set AUTHKIT_KEYS_PATH; default is /vault/auth
})

// Delegated access JWT (cross-service federation) — params only, no key:
tok, _ := svc.MintDelegatedAccessToken(ctx, core.DelegatedAccessParams{
    Audiences:        []string{"tensorhub"},
    DelegatedSubject: userID,
    Permissions:      []string{"repo:create"},
}) // iss defaults to the Service's Issuer

// First-party service JWT (machine-to-machine, e.g. cozy-art -> tensorhub):
sjwt, _, _ := svc.MintServiceJWT(ctx, core.ServiceJWTMintOptions{
    Subject:   "service:cozy-art",
    Audiences: []string{"tensorhub"},
})

// Arbitrary first-party claims (escape hatch — host owns the claim semantics):
cjwt, _ := svc.MintCustomJWT(ctx, core.CustomJWTMintOptions{
    Type:      "worker-capability+jwt",
    TTL:       10 * time.Minute,
    Subject:   "service:tensorhub",
    Audiences: []string{"cozy.scheduler"},
    Claims: map[string]any{
        "cap_kind":   "worker",
        "grants":     []string{"job:run"},
        "release_id": releaseID,
    },
}) // iss/iat/exp + kid header owned by AuthKit; the host owns everything else

Three mint entry points — pick the most constrained one that fits. All three sign through the one internal key (same JWKS, same kid/alg header); they differ only in how much of the claim shape AuthKit owns:

Method	Use when	Claim shape
MintServiceJWT	First-party machine-to-machine call (service:<app> → another app).	Opinionated. Forces token_use=service, typ=service+jwt; you supply sub/aud/permissions/resources only.
MintDelegatedAccessToken	Cross-service federation — one issuer signs for a delegated actor a receiver accepts after issuer/JWKS/aud checks.	Opinionated. Forces typ=delegated-access+jwt, writes delegated_sub, NEVER sets sub.
MintCustomJWT	Escape hatch — token shapes the two above can't express (e.g. tensorhub capability/worker tokens with cap_kind/grants/release_id, or a worker variant with aud:["cozy.scheduler"]).	Host-owned. You pass an arbitrary Claims map (+ optional Type/Subject/Audiences/Issuer). AuthKit owns ONLY iss/iat/exp and the kid/alg header.

MintCustomJWT is the blessed alternative to reaching for the low-level jwtkit.Signer.Sign — the host stops hand-assembling kid/iss/exp and never risks holding a signer it shouldn't. You own the claim semantics; the verifier side must understand them. Precedence is enforced: the host Claims map may NOT set iss/iat/exp (returns ErrCustomClaimsReserved) — iss is overridable only via the explicit Issuer option (defaults to the Service issuer); the explicit Subject/Audiences options win over any sub/aud in the map. TTL is required and capped at MaxCustomJWTLifetime (1h); empty and oversized claim sets are rejected.

Local-backend key resolution precedence (used when cfg.Keys == nil), identical for the convenience auto-resolver and the explicit constructors:

1. Env — ACTIVE_KEY_ID + ACTIVE_PRIVATE_KEY_PEM (+ optional PUBLIC_KEYS).
2. File — <dir>/keys.json where dir = cfg.KeysPath → AUTHKIT_KEYS_PATH → /vault/auth (default, unchanged). The file uses the {active_key_id, active_private_key_pem, public_keys} envelope.
3. Dev-gen — auto-generates and persists a keypair under .runtime/authkit/. Non-prod only: when ENV/APP_ENV/ENVIRONMENT is production/prod and neither env nor file yields a key, resolution hard-fails — no throwaway key in production.

Compose it yourself with the exported jwtkit constructors instead of the convenience resolver:

• jwtkit.EnvKeySource() — env loader (returns nil when unset).
• jwtkit.FileKeySource(dir) — <dir>/keys.json loader (returns nil when absent; empty dir defaults to /vault/auth).
• jwtkit.NewGeneratedKeySourceInDir(dir) — dev-gen under a chosen dir (defaults to .runtime/authkit).
• jwtkit.NewAutoKeySource() / jwtkit.NewAutoKeySourceWithPath(dir) — the composed env → file → dev-gen ladder above.

Pluggable backend (future remote signer). Because jwt.Signer is an interface, the local backend (RSA key in memory, from a KeySource) and a future remote Vault-Transit backend (where the private key never enters the app's memory/disk/container) are interchangeable. AuthKit selects the backend at init; call sites (svc.MintDelegatedAccessToken(...) etc.) are unchanged and never see key material. The remote VaultTransitSigner is tracked as a forward-looking follow-up — authkit future #72 — and drops in behind this same Signer seam with zero host changes.

---

Notes

• No extra app code needed for OIDC state or user linking — handled internally with Redis (if provided) or a built-in in-memory cache, plus the default resolver.
• Apple: prefer a provider descriptor with ClientSecret.Strategy: "apple_jwt" for config-first setup. oidckit.AppleWithKey(...) remains available for code-owned wiring.

Token/session model

• AuthKit assumes a browser-managed bearer-token model, not cookie sessions.
• Login, OIDC, Solana, registration confirmation, and refresh flows issue an access_token plus a refresh_token.
• Browser JavaScript stores those tokens and sends protected API requests with Authorization: Bearer <access_token>.
• Refresh is also JavaScript-managed: the browser calls POST /token with the refresh token and stores the returned token pair.
• Full-page OIDC callbacks redirect to {BaseURL}{FrontendCallbackPath} with tokens in the URL fragment (#access_token=...&refresh_token=...) so the host backend serves the frontend route but does not receive the tokens. The default frontend callback path is /login/callback; configured paths must be app-relative, may include a query string, and must not include a fragment.
• AuthKit stores refresh-session records server-side for refresh-token lifecycle and revocation, but it does not provide an opaque session_id browser-cookie mode or HttpOnly cookie token mode.
• Apps that want cookie/session authentication need a separate integration mode: cookie parsing in middleware, CSRF protection, cookie-setting callback behavior, and different frontend refresh/logout assumptions.

Admin Gate (DB-backed)

• Use authhttp.RequireAdmin(pg) to strictly enforce admin access using the database.
• Example:

ver := authhttp.NewVerifier()
ver.AddIssuer("https://my-issuer.com", []string{"my-app"}, authhttp.IssuerOptions{
  JWKSURI: "https://my-issuer.com/.well-known/jwks.json",
})
ver.WithService(coreSvc)

adminHandler := authhttp.Required(ver)(
  authhttp.RequireAdmin(pg)(
    http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
      w.WriteHeader(200)
    }),
  ),
)

Roles (global storage)

• AuthKit stores roles in Postgres profiles.roles and memberships in profiles.user_roles.
• AuthKit does not define app role taxonomy (what roles exist). The embedding application/platform should seed its role catalog.
• Role IDs are deterministic UUIDv5 derived from slug (uuidv5(namespace, "role:"+slug)), so role rows are stable across environments.

Tenants

• AuthKit always supports tenants + tenant-scoped RBAC — there is no global TenantMode switch (issue #60). Tenants are a first-class primitive at the core layer; what a host exposes is decided by which route groups it mounts and by the two registration modes (NativeUserRegistrationMode, TenantRegistrationMode), not by a mode flag. Native users may exist with zero tenants; tenants may exist (via manifest/admin/bootstrap) with zero native users.
  • Shared owner namespace: user slugs and tenant slugs should be treated as one namespace (no collisions).
  • Native users do not create tenant rows by default. Hosts that want personal workspaces must opt in with AutoCreatePersonalTenants: true; those personal tenants are non-transferable and keyed by owner_user_id.
  • Users can belong to 0, 1, or many tenants simultaneously.
  • Tenant slug renames create aliases; handlers accept either current slug or alias on :tenant.
  • Username renames preserve old owner paths via user slug aliases; personal tenant slug aliases are also retained.
  • Default service tokens do not embed tenant membership or tenant roles; apps check membership/roles server-side.
  • GET /user/me returns tenants (membership list) plus tenant-scoped roles for the user.
  • GET /user/bootstrap returns canonical personal tenant + tenant memberships in one call.
  • Tenant-scoped service tokens include tenant + roles (single tenant only), minted whenever the user is a member (rejected otherwise) — no mode gate.
    • Mint explicitly: POST /token/tenant
    • Or mint at login/refresh by providing tenant in the request body (accepted on every deployment; the legacy tenant_not_supported rejection is gone).
  • Invitation workflow:
    • Tenant owners create/list/revoke invites with /tenants/:tenant/invites.
    • Users list their invites via GET /me/invites (cross-tenant).
    • Users accept/decline via /me/invites/:invite_id/accept|decline.
  • Tenant management is permission-based RBAC (a role = a set of permissions). authkit is the generic engine: it ships base permissions in the reserved tenant: namespace (tenant:roles:manage, tenant:members:manage, tenant:service_tokens:manage, tenant:read) that gate all tenant-management endpoints, stores per-tenant role→permission assignments, computes EffectivePermissions, and enforces no-escalation + catalog validation. The embedding app declares its own permission catalog (Config.PermissionCatalog) + optional default roles (Config.DefaultRoles, e.g. an admin = * minus {tenant:roles:manage, tenant:members:manage}); effective catalog = base ∪ app. The owner role is hardcoded and seeded with * (all), protected, and cannot be removed as the last owner. Permissions are opaque to authkit — the app owns their meaning and enforces them at its own endpoints via core.EffectivePermissions. Introspection endpoints complement the management API: GET /tenants/:tenant/me (self-read of {roles, permissions}, membership only — no tenant:read) and POST /tenants/:tenant/permissions/check (a testIamPermissions-style "does this principal hold X?" → {granted[]}). Roles are RESTful resources: GET /tenants/:tenant/roles/:role (detail), PUT /tenants/:tenant/roles/:role (idempotent create-or-replace, body {permissions[]}), DELETE /tenants/:tenant/roles/:role; members likewise (DELETE /tenants/:tenant/members/:user_id). Invitee self-routes live at top-level /me/invites (cross-tenant — the invitee isn't a member yet).
• Token claim shape (uniform; no mode):
  • A user access token always includes global_roles (platform-wide) and a legacy roles claim that mirrors global_roles (fixed token-shape compatibility). Tenant-scoped tokens additionally carry tenant + tenant roles/tenant_roles.
  • An app with no tenants simply never mints tenant-scoped tokens — its tokens carry roles/global_roles only.

Service Tokens (opaque machine credentials)

• Long-lived, revocable bearer credentials owned by a tenant (not a person), for machine/automation callers (CI, operator CLIs, service-to-service). The standard machine-auth primitive (cf. Docker Hub service tokens, Stripe sk_ keys) — robots should not replay the human password-login path.
• A service token acts as the tenant: middleware sets Claims.Tenant + Claims.Permissions (the token's app-defined permission strings) and a service marker (Claims.IsService()), leaving UserID empty — so the live-user ban/enrichment gate is skipped. Permissions are opaque to authkit; the embedding app owns the vocabulary and enforces meaning. (Users carry TenantRoles; the resource server expands role→permission at request time.)
• Presented as Authorization: Bearer <app>st_<key_id>_<secret>, where <app> is the host-configured Config.ServiceTokenPrefix brand (e.g. cozy → cozy_st_…; empty → bare st_). key_id is a non-secret public id for O(1) indexed lookup; only sha256(secret) is stored; the full token is shown once.
• Resolved in the Required/Optional middleware before JWT verification (constant-time secret compare; revoked/expired/tenant-deleted rejected; non-service-token credentials fall through to JWT). The service token path is separate from the password-login handler, so service tokens bypass the interactive password-login rate limiter by design.
• Mint authorization is native + permission-based: minting requires tenant:service_tokens:manage, and authkit validates the requested permissions against the tenant's effective catalog — each must be a defined permission the caller holds (no escalation; 403 permission_grant_denied/400 unknown_permission), with the reserved write/mint perms (tenant:roles:manage, tenant:members:manage, tenant:service_tokens:manage) and wildcards barred from service tokens (read-only tenant:read is service token-grantable). Permissions are frozen at mint time. A service token can never mint/list/revoke service tokens (no user). See "Tenant RBAC" below for the catalog + role→permission model.
• Resource scopes: service tokens may carry opaque host-defined resource rows, resources: [{kind,id}], in addition to permissions. AuthKit validates shape/length and duplicate pairs, stores them in profiles.service_token_resources, and returns them from list/resolve/middleware claims. AuthKit does not interpret resource kinds or wildcard-looking IDs; the embedding host owns semantics. Hosts that need resource no-escalation can set Config.ResourceScopeAuthorizer. Rule: permissions say what; resources say where.
• Manage via POST/GET/DELETE /tenants/:tenant/service-tokens[/:token_id]. POST accepts {name, permissions[], resources?:[{kind,id}], expires_at?}. Optional expires_at (null = non-expiring), capped by Config.ServiceTokenMaxTTL when set. Stored in profiles.service_tokens.
• Leak response: revoke the token (DELETE …/service-tokens/:id) — the <app>st_ prefix is registrable with secret-scanning/push-protection partners so leaked tokens can be auto-detected.

Service JWTs (OIDC/JWKS machine credentials)

• First-party services with their own AuthKit issuer/JWKS should prefer short-lived service JWTs over generated opaque service tokens. The caller mints a 15-minute JWT with iss, sub, aud, iat, nbf, exp, jti, token_use=service, and permissions: [], caches it in memory until near expiry, and sends it as Authorization: Bearer <jwt>.
• AuthKit provides core.MintServiceJWT / (*core.Service).MintServiceJWT and authhttp.Verifier.VerifyServiceJWT plus RequiredServiceJWT. Verification uses the same issuer/JWKS registry as delegated access tokens, including tenant issuer lazy-load and disabled-issuer fail-closed behavior.
• permissions: [] is the canonical requested-capability claim. OAuth scope is accepted only as an explicit compatibility bridge. AuthKit parses requested permissions/resources but does not grant them; resource servers such as OpenRails must intersect them with server-side grants for the issuer/subject.
• Use service JWTs for callers that can publish an issuer/JWKS, such as Doujins/Hentai0 -> OpenRails. Use opaque service tokens for generated API-key-like credentials, non-OIDC clients, bootstrap scripts, and manual integrations.

Reserved slug policy

• Owner namespaces use explicit states:
  • restricted_name: slug is blocked in profiles.owner_reserved_names and not publicly registrable.
  • parked_tenant: tenant exists and is platform-held (metadata.namespace_state=parked_tenant, metadata.reserved=true).
  • registered_tenant: normal tenant lifecycle (metadata.namespace_state=registered_tenant).
• Public lookup endpoint: GET /owners/{slug} returns canonical public metadata for the slug:
  • requested_slug: normalized slug from the request.
  • slug / canonical_slug: current canonical slug when the request resolves to a live or held owner; otherwise the requested slug.
  • enabled / state: registered_user, registered_tenant, parked_user, parked_tenant, restricted_name, renamed_user, renamed_tenant, held_by_deleted_user, held_by_deleted_tenant, held_by_recent_user_rename, held_by_recent_tenant_rename, or unregistered.
  • claimable: whether the slug can currently be claimed by a new user/tenant.
  • renamed: whether this lookup resolved through rename history.
  • hold_until: present for enabled rename reuse holds.
  • entity_kind: none, tenant, user, or tenant_and_user
  • optional tenant and/or user payloads when records exist.
• The PostgreSQL baseline schema creates profiles.owner_reserved_names and seeds canonical restricted names (admin, superuser, root, sudo) directly.
• Public register/create/rename/tenant-create/tenant-rename paths do not use a hardcoded denylist; conflicts are enforced through owner-namespace uniqueness plus reserved-name table checks.
• Reserved users are non-loginable (reserved placeholder credentials/providers are cleared by migration and reserve flows).

Verification delivery and expiry

• Email verification codes and links expire in 60 minutes.
• Phone/SMS verification codes and links expire in 15 minutes.
• Password reset link tokens expire in 1 hour.
• Sender integrations receive core.VerificationMessage{Code, LinkToken} and must send only provided fields; at least one must be present.
• Code-based and link-based flows are both supported:
  • Email verify code: POST /email/verify/confirm with {"code":"123456"}
  • Email verify link token: POST /email/verify/confirm-link with {"token":"..."}
  • Phone verify code: POST /phone/verify/confirm with {"phone_number":"+1...","code":"123456"}
  • Phone verify link token: POST /phone/verify/confirm-link with {"token":"..."}
  • Email password reset link handoff: POST /email/password/reset/confirm-link with {"token":"..."} returns {"ok":true,"reset_session":"..."}
  • Email password reset confirm: POST /email/password/reset/confirm with {"reset_session":"...","new_password":"..."}
• AuthKit API routes are prefix-neutral. Your API can live under a prefix (recommended: /api/v1); do not add an extra /auth segment when embedding AuthKit.

Identity validation policy

• AuthKit owns identity validation policy. Host applications should not duplicate or override username, password, email, or phone validation rules.
• Username rules are fixed: trim whitespace, 4-30 characters, start with an ASCII letter, allow only ASCII letters/digits/underscore, no @, and no leading +. AuthKit normalizes the owner slug by lowercasing and converting underscore/dash runs to single dashes.
• Username namespace checks reject collisions with users/tenants, renamed or recently held slugs, soft-deleted owners, parked namespaces, and restricted names. Parked/restricted names return username_not_allowed; held/taken names return owner_slug_taken.
• User rename cooldown is fixed at 72 hours. PATCH /user/username returns rename_rate_limited with the shared action-availability fields when blocked (action, allowed, reason, retry_after_seconds, next_allowed_at, cooldown_seconds). time_until_rename_available is still included as a compatibility alias.
• Password policy is fixed in AuthKit and currently requires at least 8 characters; weak passwords return password_too_short.

Password hash policy (verification whitelist):

• AuthKit verifies exactly two hash formats: argon2id (native) and bcrypt (legacy-but-sound; verified, then lazily re-hashed to argon2id on the first successful login). This is the designed migration path for hosts importing password hashes: import bcrypt via UpsertPasswordHash, and accounts upgrade themselves transparently.
• Anything else is deliberately NOT verified, even when an implementation would be easy. Rationale, learned from the doujins legacy migration (1,255 unimportable hashes): DES crypt() truncates passwords to 8 significant characters with a 12-bit salt — accepting a DES match as proof of identity keeps a trivially crackable credential live in the auth path; md5-crypt is fast and memory-unhardened; and corrupted/mangled stored hashes (22% of that cohort) can never verify under any algorithm, so a refuse-and-reset mechanism is needed regardless. A short whitelist is itself the invariant: every additional accepted format lowers the floor of what counts as authentication.
• For unverifiable imports, hosts store the row with hash_algo = "legacy-reset-required" (core.HashAlgoLegacyResetRequired), preserving the raw legacy hash for forensics only. Every password-verify path (login, reauth, change-password) then returns core.ErrPasswordResetRequired, surfaced over HTTP as a 401 with the stable body code password_reset_required, so clients can tell the user to reset instead of showing generic invalid-credentials.
• Recovery root of trust: these accounts fall back to email (or phone) mailbox control as the sole proof of ownership — the same trust model as any forgot-password flow (reset links expire in 1 hour, and the flow does not require the address to be pre-verified: receiving the link is the proof). Completing the reset writes an argon2id hash, which clears the flag permanently. Accounts with no reachable email/phone are support cases by design.
• Email and phone validation/normalization are fixed in AuthKit. Email is trimmed/lowercased and must be address-like. Phone numbers must be E.164-like (+ followed by country code and digits).
• Shared helpers are exported from core: ValidateUsername, OwnerSlugFromUsername, ValidatePassword, NormalizeEmail, ValidateEmail, NormalizePhone, ValidatePhone, and ValidationErrorCode.

Two-Factor Authentication (2FA):

• Optional security feature for admin accounts to prevent account takeover if password is leaked.
• Users can enable 2FA via email or SMS methods.
• When enabled, login requires both password AND a 6-digit code sent via email/SMS.
• Each user gets 10 backup codes (8-character alphanumeric) for account recovery in case they lose access to their 2FA method.
• Login flow with 2FA:
  1. POST /password/login with email/password
  2. If 2FA enabled: response has {"requires_2fa": true, "user_id": "...", "method": "email|sms", "verification_id": "..."}
  3. User receives 6-digit code via email or SMS
  4. POST /2fa/verify with {"user_id": "...", "code": "123456"} (or {"user_id": "...", "code": "ABC123XY", "backup_code": true} for backup codes)
  5. Response contains access_token and refresh_token as usual
• Setup flow:
  1. GET /user/2fa to check current enabled
  2. POST /user/2fa/enable with {"method": "email"} or {"method": "sms", "phone_number": "+1..."}
  3. Response includes backup_codes array - show these to user ONCE and tell them to save them
  4. User can regenerate codes with POST /user/2fa/regenerate-codes (invalidates old codes)
  5. User can disable with POST /user/2fa/disable
• Backup codes are single-use and removed after verification.
• 2FA codes expire in 15 minutes.

Operation:

• Key rotation is outside the scope of this library and should be handled by your infrastructure (e.g., External Secrets Operator updating mounted secrets, then restarting pods).
• To rotate keys manually: add the new public key to the map under a new kid, switch the enabled signer, leave the old pub in the map until tokens expire, then remove it.
• For local development, AuthKit auto-generates keys in .runtime/authkit/ (disabled in production).

Integration requirements (API server)

• Ephemeral auth state (verification codes, resets, SIWS challenges) uses Redis/Garnet when provided; in dev it falls back to memory.
• In production, a Redis-compatible store is required.
• Rate limiting:
  • Enabled by default (in-memory limiter) with per-bucket defaults from authhttp.DefaultRateLimits().
  • Keys: auth:<bucket>:ip:<client-ip>; errors fail-open (request allowed).
  • Default client IP strategy uses the immediate RemoteAddr peer, including private Docker bridge, loopback, and reverse-proxy peers. This keeps anonymous sensitive endpoints protected in local Compose and embedded deployments instead of silently failing open.
  • Request-code and resend buckets default to a 60-second per-client cooldown and 6 requests per hour for registration, registration resend, email/phone verification, password-reset request, and user email/phone change request/resend.
  • 429 responses include one shared action-availability shape for frontend timers: {"error":"rate_limited","action":"request_email_verification","allowed":false,"reason":"cooldown","retry_after_seconds":N,"next_allowed_at":"...","limit":6,"remaining":5,"window_seconds":3600,"cooldown_seconds":60}.
  • 429 responses also include Retry-After: N plus RateLimit-Limit, RateLimit-Remaining, and RateLimit-Reset when the limiter can compute them.
  • Behind reverse proxies, you must explicitly configure trusted proxies to safely use X-Forwarded-For / CF-Connecting-IP. AuthKit will not trust forwarded headers by default (clients can spoof them).
  • For multi-instance production, prefer a Redis/Garnet-backed limiter and a trusted-proxy client IP function, e.g.:
    • svc.WithRateLimiter(redislimiter.New(redis, authhttp.ToRedisLimits(authhttp.DefaultRateLimits())))
    • svc.WithClientIPFunc(authhttp.ClientIPFromForwardedHeaders(trustedProxyCIDRs)) where trustedProxyCIDRs are the CIDRs of your ingress/proxy layer (nginx, cloudflared, etc.).
  • Hosts that intentionally want the older public-remote-only fail-open behavior can opt in with svc.WithClientIPFunc(authhttp.PublicRemoteAddrClientIP()).
  • To explicitly opt out: svc.DisableRateLimiter().
• Storage: run the SQL migrations in authkit/migrations/postgres (includes profiles.refresh_sessions).
• Keys/JWKS: host /.well-known/jwks.json using svc.JWKSHandler() and rotate keys as needed.

---

AuthKit API route specs, and the APIHandler() net/http compatibility handler built from those same specs, are shown relative to the host-selected API mount prefix. With the recommended /api/v1 mount, GET /user/me is served at GET /api/v1/user/me. Browser OIDC routes are served separately and are usually mounted outside API versioning at /oidc/*.

• GET /.well-known/jwks.json
• OIDC:
  • GET /oidc/:provider/login
  • GET /oidc/:provider/callback
  • POST /oidc/:provider/link/start (RouteAccountOIDCLinking API group, requires auth) -> {auth_url}
• Password:
  • POST /password/login (accepts email, phone, or username in identifier field)
  • POST /email/password/reset/request
  • POST /email/password/reset/confirm-link ({token} -> {reset_session})
  • POST /email/password/reset/confirm ({reset_session, new_password})
• Registration (unified - accepts email or phone in identifier field):
  • POST /register (server auto-detects email vs phone based on format)
    • Success response includes {ok, username, email, phone_number, discord_username, next_action}
    • next_action is one of none, verify_email, or verify_phone
    • When next_action is none, the response also includes {access_token, refresh_token, token_type, expires_in}
  • Set RegistrationVerification: none|optional|required in core.Config
  • POST /register/resend-email
  • POST /register/resend-phone
  • Registration resend requests now return invalid_email / invalid_phone_number for malformed input and pending_registration_not_found when no matching pending registration exists.
  • Message delivery failures from the configured sender are surfaced as stable email_delivery_failed / sms_delivery_failed errors after AuthKit attempts provider submission.
• Email verification:
  • POST /email/verify/request
  • POST /email/verify/confirm
  • POST /email/verify/confirm-link
  • Verification request endpoints return explicit target-state errors: user_not_found, email_already_verified, or phone_already_verified.
• Phone verification and password reset:
  • POST /phone/verify/request
  • POST /phone/verify/confirm
  • POST /phone/verify/confirm-link
  • POST /phone/password/reset/request
  • POST /phone/password/reset/confirm ({reset_session, new_password})
• Sessions:
  • POST /token { grant_type: "refresh_token", refresh_token }
  • POST /sessions/current { refresh_token } → { session_id }
  • GET /user/sessions (requires auth)
  • DELETE /user/sessions/:id (requires auth)
  • DELETE /user/sessions (requires auth)
  • DELETE /logout (requires auth; revokes the current session via sid claim)
• User profile:
  • GET /user/me (requires auth)
  • PATCH /user/username (requires auth)
  • POST /user/email/change/request (requires auth)
  • POST /user/email/change/confirm (requires auth)
  • POST /user/email/change/resend (requires auth)
  • PATCH /user/biography (requires auth)
  • POST /user/password (requires auth)
  • DELETE /user (requires auth)
  • DELETE /user/providers/:provider (requires auth)
• Two-Factor Authentication (2FA):
  • GET /user/2fa (requires auth) → {enabled, method, phone_number}
  • POST /user/2fa/start-phone (requires auth) → starts phone 2FA setup, sends code to phone
  • POST /user/2fa/enable (requires auth) → → {enabled, method, backup_codes}
  • POST /user/2fa/disable (requires auth)
  • POST /user/2fa/regenerate-codes (requires auth) → {backup_codes}
  • POST /2fa/verify (during login) → {access_token, refresh_token}
• Admin roles (admin only):
  • POST /admin/roles/grant
  • POST /admin/roles/revoke
• Admin users (admin only):
  • GET /admin/users
  • GET /admin/users/:user_id
  • POST /admin/users/ban
  • POST /admin/users/unban
  • POST /admin/users/set-email
  • POST /admin/users/set-username
  • POST /admin/users/set-password
  • DELETE /admin/users/:user_id
  • POST /admin/users/:user_id/restore
  • GET /admin/users/deleted
  • GET /admin/users/:user_id/signins
  • POST /admin/users/:user_id/sessions/revoke
• Admin owner-namespace lifecycle (admin only):
  • POST /admin/accounts/restrict (batch add slugs to restricted-name list)
  • POST /admin/accounts/unrestrict (batch remove slugs from restricted-name list)
  • POST /admin/account/park ({kind:"tenant"|"user",slug})
  • POST /admin/account/claim ({kind:"tenant"|"user",slug,...}; for kind:"tenant", owner_user_id is required)
• Public owner-namespace lookup:
  • GET /owners/:slug → canonical owner metadata + enabled/claimable
• Solana wallet authentication (SIWS):
  • POST /solana/challenge → {domain, address, nonce, issuedAt, expirationTime, ...}
  • POST /solana/login → {access_token, refresh_token, user}
  • POST /solana/link (requires auth) → {success, solana_address}

---

Expired Token/Code Cleanup

AuthKit deletes verification codes when they're consumed. Expired codes are not auto‑purged. Operators should periodically delete expired rows. Example SQL:

-- Remove expired email verification codes
DELETE FROM profiles.email_verifications WHERE expires_at <= now();

-- Remove expired password reset codes
DELETE FROM profiles.password_resets WHERE expires_at <= now();

-- Remove expired phone verification codes (registration + password reset)
DELETE FROM profiles.phone_verifications WHERE expires_at <= now();

-- Remove expired pending registrations
-- Pending registrations now live in Redis/Garnet; no SQL cleanup needed.
DELETE FROM profiles.pending_phone_registrations WHERE expires_at <= now();

-- Remove expired 2FA verification codes
DELETE FROM profiles.two_factor_verifications WHERE expires_at <= now();

Run these from your scheduler (cron, pg_cron, or your job system).

---

Frontend (React) quick guide

• Paths below are relative to the AuthKit API mount. In doujins/hentai0-style hosts mounted at /api/v1, call /api/v1/token, /api/v1/user/me, /api/v1/admin/users, etc.
• Tokens
  • Store access_token in memory and refresh_token in IndexedDB/secure storage.
  • Add Authorization: Bearer <access_token> to protected API calls. On 401, call POST /token with refresh_token, then retry.
• Registration (unified)
  • POST /register with {identifier, username, password} where identifier is email or phone
  • On success, branch on next_action: none, verify_email, or verify_phone
  • If next_action is none, store the returned access/refresh tokens immediately; do not replay the password
  • Email registration: check email for 6-char code → POST /email/verify/confirm with {code}
  • Phone registration: check SMS for 6-char code → POST /phone/verify/confirm with {phone_number, code}
  • Successful email/phone code or link confirmation returns access/refresh tokens
  • Resend codes: POST /register/resend-email or POST /register/resend-phone
• Password Login
  • POST /password/login with {login, password} where login can be email/phone/username → {id_token, refresh_token}
• Password Reset
  • POST /email/password/reset/request with {email} → check email for reset instructions
  • POST /email/password/reset/confirm-link with {token} → {reset_session}
  • POST /email/password/reset/confirm with {reset_session, new_password} → {ok: true}
  • POST /phone/password/reset/request with {phone_number} → check SMS for reset instructions
  • POST /phone/password/reset/confirm with {reset_session, new_password} → {ok: true}
• OIDC
  • Start: window.location = /oidc/${provider}/login.
  • Link: POST /api/v1/oidc/:provider/link/start (with Authorization) → {auth_url}; then window.location = auth_url.
• Unlink
  • DELETE /user/providers/:provider (Authorization). Guard prevents unlinking the last login method.
• Sessions
  • DELETE /logout (current), DELETE /user/sessions (all), DELETE /user/sessions/:id (single), GET /user/sessions (list).
  • POST /sessions/current with {refresh_token} → {session_id}.
• Current user
  • GET /user/me → {id, email, pending_email?, phone_number?, username, discord_username?, email_verified, phone_verified, has_password, roles, entitlements, biography}.
  • Email change
    • POST /user/email/change/request with {email} (Authorization) → sends verification code
    • POST /user/email/change/confirm with {code} (Authorization) → confirms email change
    • POST /user/email/change/resend (Authorization) → resends verification code
  • Phone number change
    • POST /user/phone/change/request with {phone_number} (Authorization) → sends verification code
    • POST /user/phone/change/confirm with {code} (Authorization) → confirms phone number change
    • POST /user/phone/change/resend (Authorization) → resends verification code
• User profile updates
  • PATCH /user/username with {username} (Authorization)
  • PATCH /user/biography with {biography} (Authorization)
  • POST /user/password with {old_password, new_password} (Authorization)
  • DELETE /user (Authorization) → deletes account
• Solana Wallet (SIWS)
  • Login/Register: POST /solana/challenge → wallet.signIn(input) → POST /solana/login
  • Link wallet: POST /solana/challenge → wallet.signIn(input) → POST /solana/link (with Authorization)

---

Solana Wallet Authentication (SIWS)

Sign In With Solana allows users to authenticate using their Solana wallet (Phantom, Solflare, Backpack, etc.). Users can create accounts with just a wallet (no email/password required) or link a wallet to an existing account.

Frontend Integration (React/TypeScript):

import { useWallet } from '@solana/wallet-adapter-react';

// 1. Request challenge from backend
const requestChallenge = async (address: string, username?: string) => {
  const response = await fetch('/api/v1/solana/challenge', {
    method: 'POST',
    headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
    body: JSON.stringify({ address, username }), // username optional for new accounts
  });
  return response.json(); // Returns SignInInput
};

// 2. Sign with wallet
const signIn = async () => {
  const { publicKey, signIn } = useWallet();
  if (!publicKey || !signIn) return;

  // Get challenge from backend
  const input = await requestChallenge(publicKey.toBase58(), 'desired_username');

  // Wallet prompts user to sign
  const output = await signIn(input);

  // 3. Verify signature and get tokens
  const response = await fetch('/api/v1/solana/login', {
    method: 'POST',
    headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
    body: JSON.stringify({
      output: {
        account: { address: output.account.address },
        signature: btoa(String.fromCharCode(...output.signature)),
        signedMessage: btoa(String.fromCharCode(...output.signedMessage)),
      },
    }),
  });

  const { access_token, refresh_token, user } = await response.json();
  // Store tokens as usual
};

Link wallet to existing account:

const linkWallet = async (accessToken: string) => {
  const { publicKey, signIn } = useWallet();
  if (!publicKey || !signIn) return;

  // Get challenge
  const input = await requestChallenge(publicKey.toBase58());

  // Sign
  const output = await signIn(input);

  // Link (requires auth)
  const response = await fetch('/api/v1/solana/link', {
    method: 'POST',
    headers: {
      'Content-Type': 'application/json',
      'Authorization': `Bearer ${accessToken}`,
    },
    body: JSON.stringify({
      output: {
        account: { address: output.account.address },
        signature: btoa(String.fromCharCode(...output.signature)),
        signedMessage: btoa(String.fromCharCode(...output.signedMessage)),
      },
    }),
  });

  return response.json(); // { success: true, solana_address: "..." }
};

Notes:

• Challenges expire in 15 minutes
• Username is optional - if not provided, a username is derived from the wallet address (e.g., u_7xKX)
• Users can change their username later via PATCH /user/username
• Wallet address is stored as a provider link (like Google/Discord) in profiles.user_providers
• One wallet per user, one user per wallet

---

Verifier (JWKS, verify‑only)

Use the verifier when a service needs to accept JWTs issued by one or more AuthKit-powered APIs (e.g., spacex), without mounting any auth routes.

• Create with authhttp.NewVerifier(opts...) — options: WithSkew, WithAlgorithms, WithHTTPClient. (WithTenantMode is a deprecated no-op shim kept for back-compat; tenant claims are parsed whenever present.)
• Add issuers via verifier.AddIssuer(issuerID, audiences, opts) — each may specify a JWKS URL (defaults to /.well-known/jwks.json), pre-provided PEM keys, or raw *rsa.PublicKey maps.
• For service JWTs, call verifier.VerifyServiceJWT(ctx, token) or mount authhttp.RequiredServiceJWT(verifier). This returns a machine principal with issuer, subject, tenant/resource account, permissions, resources, and JTI; the host still owns final authorization.
• Keep route classes explicit: ordinary user/delegated routes use authhttp.Required, delegated-only resource routes use verifier.VerifyDelegatedAccess, and first-party machine routes use authhttp.RequiredServiceJWT. Service JWTs are intentionally rejected by the ordinary/delegated entry points, and user/delegated JWTs are intentionally rejected by RequiredServiceJWT.
• Default skew: 60s. Default algorithms: RS256.
• DB enrichment (recommended):
  • Call verifier.WithService(coreSvc) to enable best-effort DB enrichment hooks (roles + canonical email + provider usernames) when the token lacks those claims.

---

Accepting Tokens From Multiple Issuers

SpaceX accepts service tokens from multiple issuers; both tesla.com and x.com.

  import (
    "encoding/json"
    "net/http"
    authhttp "github.com/open-rails/authkit/http"
    "time"
  )

  func main() {
    ver := authhttp.NewVerifier(authhttp.WithSkew(60 * time.Second))
    ver.AddIssuer("https://tesla.com", []string{"spacex-app"}, authhttp.IssuerOptions{})
    ver.AddIssuer("https://x.com", []string{"spacex-app"}, authhttp.IssuerOptions{})

    mux := http.NewServeMux()

    // (1) Claims-only: just check JWT (no DB). 401 if missing/invalid.
    mux.Handle("/claims-only", authhttp.Required(ver)(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
      cl, ok := authhttp.ClaimsFromContext(r.Context())
      if !ok {
        w.WriteHeader(401)
        return
      }
      _ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(map[string]any{"user_id": cl.UserID})
    })))

    // (4) Admin-only: require login, then check admin role directly via DB.
    mux.Handle("/admin/report", authhttp.Required(ver)(authhttp.RequireAdmin(pg)(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
      w.WriteHeader(200)
    }))))

    http.ListenAndServe(":8080", mux)
  }

---

Tenant Issuers & Delegated Access JWTs

AuthKit owns the shared identity primitives for federation: a resource service registers tenant issuers, verifies their OIDC/JWKS metadata, and records minimal delegated users as (tenant_id, issuer, subject) — where the tenant uuid is resolved server-side from the issuer registration (tokens carry only delegated_sub; the validated issuer IS the tenant identity). Product-specific approval, quota, billing, and resource policy still belong to the receiving product.

This lets a tenant bring external principals that live in the tenant's own system. Those principals authenticate via the tenant's issuer rather than local passwords. Two AuthKit-embedding services register with and trust each other:

• the platform / IdP side (e.g. cozy-art) mints delegated tokens and sends its registration;
• the resource-server side (e.g. tensorhub) accepts registrations and validates the delegated tokens.

There are three roles, all owned by AuthKit:

Role	Side	API
register	both	TenantIssuersClient.RegisterIssuer (outbound) → POST /tenant-issuers (inbound)
mint	platform	MintDelegatedAccessToken(ctx, signer, DelegatedAccessParams)
validate	resource server	Verifier.LoadTenantIssuers + Verifier.VerifyDelegatedAccess → Claims.DelegatedAccess()

Delegated access JWTs

A delegated access JWT is AuthKit's standard primitive for user or tenant-admin federation: one AuthKit issuer signs a short-lived JWT for an external delegated actor, and a resource service (OpenRails, Tensorhub, Gen-Orchestrator, ...) accepts it after issuer/JWKS/audience/resource-account validation. Mint it with MintDelegatedAccessToken / DelegatedAccessParams.

Canonical claim contract:

Claim	Meaning	Typed accessor
header typ=delegated-access+jwt	identifies a delegated access JWT (DelegatedAccessTokenType)	Claims.TokenTyp / IsDelegatedAccessToken()
iss	AuthKit issuer that signed the token	Claims.Issuer
aud	target resource API (openrails, tensorhub, gen-orchestrator)	(matched at verify)
tenant	target resource-service account slug, e.g. doujins in OpenRails	Claims.Tenant
delegated_sub	issuer-side actor id, e.g. Paul's Doujins-side subject id; no local account is implied	Claims.DelegatedSubject
permissions []string	resource-defined permission strings (NOT OAuth space-delimited scope) — the authority source	Claims.Permissions / HasPermission()
attributes {}	issuer policy metadata, e.g. {"tier":"cozy_free"} (arbitrary JSON)	Claims.Attributes / Attribute(key)
iat/exp/nbf/jti	standard timing + token id	Claims.JTI

Hard invariants (enforced + tested):

• Ordinary AuthKit access JWTs use header typ=access+jwt; delegated access tokens use header typ=delegated-access+jwt. Verify() rejects missing, unknown, or cross-profile typ values.
• A delegated access JWT MUST NOT carry a normal sub. Verify() rejects a typ=delegated-access+jwt token that carries sub (access_token_has_sub).
• A token carrying both sub and delegated_sub is rejected (conflicting_subject).
• roles are not part of delegated access JWTs. MintDelegatedAccessToken does not mint them, and Verify() rejects delegated access JWTs carrying a roles claim (delegated_access_has_roles). Receiving services authorize on permissions + explicit attributes policy.
• The tenant JWT claim is required and means the target resource-service account. Delegated access JWTs MUST NOT carry the legacy AuthKit org claim; Verify() rejects it (delegated_access_has_org).
• Tier/plan metadata belongs under attributes.tier. Delegated access JWTs MUST NOT carry a top-level user_tier claim (delegated_access_has_user_tier).
• Tenant issuers loaded from AuthKit's tenant_issuers store are also bound to the registered resource account (tenant_slug in the storage row): delegated access JWTs from that issuer must claim the same resource account, or verification rejects them with resource_account_issuer_mismatch. This prevents one trusted issuer from minting a delegated token for another resource account.

Receiving services can install validation hooks:

v := authhttp.NewVerifier(
    authhttp.WithPermissionCatalog(func(perms []string) error { /* check catalog */ }),
    authhttp.WithAttributesPolicy(func(a map[string]json.RawMessage) error { /* check schema */ }),
)
cl, dp, err := v.VerifyDelegatedAccess(token) // requires typ=delegated-access+jwt + runs hooks
// dp.Tenant, dp.DelegatedSubject, dp.Permissions, dp.Attributes, dp.JTI, dp.Issuer

Because a delegated access JWT has no sub, the resource server's middleware skips the local-user gate (no user_disabled lookup) — authorization is by issuer/resource-account trust + permissions, not local-user existence.

Recommended OpenRails permission naming uses a service prefix even though aud=openrails is present, because a host AuthKit permission catalog may carry permissions for several resource services: self-scoped openrails:self:billing:read, openrails:self:checkout:create, openrails:self:subscriptions:cancel; tenant/admin openrails:tenant:catalog:write, openrails:tenant:payments:refund, openrails:tenant:admin. Routes must still check scope semantics, not just string presence.

For browser-direct self-service billing, the host app still has one authenticated AuthKit touchpoint: a current-user token endpoint owned by the host app. That endpoint authenticates the normal app session, decides which self-scoped OpenRails permissions the current user may receive, then calls MintDelegatedAccessToken with aud=openrails, tenant, delegated_sub set to the current user id, short TTL, and permissions such as openrails:self:billing:read or openrails:self:checkout:create. The browser then calls OpenRails directly with that delegated access JWT; the host does not proxy billing reads or checkout/subscription actions.

Registration handshake (both sides)

Outbound (platform side, e.g. cozy-art) — publish this tenant's issuer + JWKS URL to a resource server's accept endpoint:

fc := authhttp.NewTenantIssuersClient(
    authhttp.WithTenantIssuersAuthToken(ownerAccessToken), // tenant owner/admin token
)
err := fc.RegisterIssuer(ctx, "https://tensorhub.example/api/v1/tenant-issuers",
    authhttp.TenantIssuersRegistration{
        Tenant:      "cozy-art",
        Issuer: "https://cozy.art",
        JWKSURI:  "https://cozy.art/.well-known/jwks.json",
    })

Inbound (resource-server side, e.g. tensorhub) — mount the RouteTenantIssuers group. POST /tenant-issuers accepts + stores a registration, authorized by the tenant owner/admin of the registering tenant (global admins may register for any tenant); DELETE /tenant-issuers removes one; GET /tenant-issuers (global-admin) lists them. This is the AuthKit-owned home for what services used to expose as a bespoke /api/v1/platform/issuers endpoint.

In-house JWKS — no external push/sync

The resource server loads registered tenant issuers from AuthKit's own store (the profiles.tenant_issuers table) and registers each with the Verifier, whose existing in-house JWKS fetch/refresh then handles the keys. There is no external key push or sync — the resource server pulls JWKS from each issuer's URL on demand and refreshes per CacheTTL.

// At startup (and re-run on a ticker / after a registration) to pick up store changes:
err := verifier.LoadTenantIssuers(ctx, coreSvc /* or any TenantIssuerSource */, []string{"tensorhub"})

LoadTenantIssuers registers only enabled issuers. A newly-accepted registration is also added to the Verifier immediately by the inbound handler, so it is usable without waiting for the next store load.