tpa-attack-lab

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Published: Oct 17, 2026 License: MIT Imports: 14 Imported by: 0

README

TPA Attack Lab (tests/tpa-attack-lab)

A deliberately malicious MCP server that reproduces the published MCP attack landscape — tool poisoning, ASCII smuggling, encoded droppers, cross-server shadowing, rug pulls, output poisoning, data-sink parameters, embedded secrets — as a harmless, deterministic fixture for testing mcpproxy's TPA defenses end to end.

Companions:

  • cmd/tpa-redteam — offline adversarial evasion harness (mutation × detect-engine sweep; findings in docs/research/2026-10-11-tpa-attack-lab/).
  • scripts/tpa-lab-redteam-experiments.sh — end-to-end experiment suite (EXP-1..6) against a real daemon with Docker-isolated upstreams; see docs/research/2026-10-11-tpa-attack-lab/end-to-end-experiments.md for the confirmed security holes.

Safety invariants

  • Every exfiltration endpoint uses attacker.invalid (RFC 2606 reserved TLD, never resolves). The lab performs zero network I/O.
  • No handler reads files, env vars, or executes anything. Every "secret" is a fake canary (FAKE-CANARY-…, sk-live-… lab token).
  • Calling any attack tool returns a JSON simulation report describing what a real instance would have done — so the activity log shows exactly which vector "fired".

The descriptions in catalog.go are deliberately malicious test payloads for the detect engine; do not copy them into a real server.

Build & run

go build -o /tmp/tpa-attack-lab ./tests/tpa-attack-lab

/tmp/tpa-attack-lab --role attacker --stage 1   # honest-looking contract (reviewable)
/tmp/tpa-attack-lab --role attacker --stage 2   # armed contract (post-approval)
/tmp/tpa-attack-lab --role victim               # innocent peer server it clones

The rug-pull stage can be set three ways (pick one per test run):

Mechanism Use case
--stage 2/--stage 3 flag serve the armed contract from process start (stage 3 = paraphrased wording that scans clean)
TPA_LAB_STAGE env config-driven runs (mcpServers[].env)
call lab_arm_stage2 live flip: re-registers the staged tools and sends tools/list_changed so the proxy re-discovers them without a restart

Attacker profiles (--profile / TPA_LAB_PROFILE)

Profile Serves Purpose
all (default) full catalog: 18 attack vectors + controls baseline scan coverage (EXP-1)
facade only staged rug-pull tools + controls; stage 1 scans CLEAN rug-pull lifecycle experiments (EXP-2/5/6); under trust_mode: scan the clean facade gets auto-approved, then stage 3 paraphrases the pull past the change gate
mutants the six mutants that bypassed the offline detector before SEC-01 and RT-04/RT-07 (homoglyph override, paraphrased system-prompt exfil, chained combo, German override, name-squat, sink-rename), served as real tools end-to-end detector-evasion scan (EXP-3)
toctou tools/list #1 returns the poisoned contract, later lists return the clean one (same names/params) time-of-check vs time-of-use probe against the scan's export path (EXP-4)

Running safely (nothing can touch your laptop)

The lab is a pure simulation by construction — the binary never execs, opens files, or opens sockets, all endpoints use attacker.invalid (never resolves), and every "secret" is a fake canary. For defense-in-depth, and especially before pointing this flow at real-world malicious servers, use the tiers below.

Tier 1 — offline red-team harness (no Docker needed)
go run ./cmd/tpa-redteam --report /tmp/redteam.md

This is a pure in-process function over strings (scanner.ScanToolMetadataVerdict): no network, no filesystem access except writing the report path you pass. The only thing it can affect is that file.

scripts/run-tpa-lab-docker.sh          # build image + proxy, serve, scan, report
KEEP=1 scripts/run-tpa-lab-docker.sh   # leave the daemon up for the rug-pull walkthrough

What the script sets up (tests/tpa-lab-config-docker.json):

  • both lab upstreams run via mcpproxy's per-server Docker isolation;
  • the image is distroless/static — no shell, no coreutils: even a fully weaponized binary could not rm files or curl out, because the tools are not in the image;
  • network_mode: "none" — the upstreams speak stdio only, so they need no network at all (verify with docker ps — the script prints it);
  • --read-only rootfs, --cap-drop=ALL, --security-opt no-new-privileges, noexec tmpfs /tmp;
  • all proxy state stays inside the worktree (data_dir: ./test-data-tpa-lab-docker), never ~/.mcpproxy.

Note the first run needs golang:1.27-alpine (go.mod requires Go ≥ 1.26) and a few minutes; subsequent runs reuse the cache (SKIP_BUILD=1 skips rebuilds).

Tier 3 — testing real-world malicious samples

When you graduate from this fixture to actually-suspicious servers from the wild (npm/PyPI MCP packages, registry typosquats), the same isolation flags apply — put them in the server's isolation block and keep network_mode: "none" unless the protocol genuinely needs egress. Never run an untrusted MCP server bare on your host: unlike this lab, a real one executes its own code on startup. For anything that must reach the network, prefer a throwaway VM over Docker.

Cleanup
pkill -f 'mcpproxy serve.*tpa-lab-config-docker'
rm -rf test-data-tpa-lab-docker
docker rmi tpa-attack-lab:lab

Registering with mcpproxy

Use tests/tpa-lab-config.json as a template (adjust the binary path), or:

mcpproxy upstream add tpa-lab-victim -- /tmp/tpa-attack-lab --role victim
mcpproxy upstream add tpa-lab-attacker -- /tmp/tpa-attack-lab --role attacker --stage 1
mcpproxy security scan tpa-lab-attacker     # expect verdict: dangerous
mcpproxy security report tpa-lab-attacker   # per-vector findings

Both roles must be registered for the cross-server shadowing vectors (V07/V08) to fire — the victim provides the peer context.

Vector catalog

ID Tool Attack class Expected detection
V01 finance_convert_currency Tool poisoning: exfiltration imperative in description (Invariant Labs TPA) tpa-db TPA-2026-0001 (verified: bundle is the only check firing on this wording)
V02 send_email Recipient redirect / message hijacking tpa-db TPA-2026-0004
V03 send_message SMS recipient swap behind <SYSTEM> tag tpa-db TPA-2026-0006
V04 weather_lookup ASCII smuggling via Unicode TAG block (U+E0000) unicode.hidden critical
V05 notes_search Zero-width steganography + HTML-comment covert directive unicode.hidden + tpa-db TPA-2026-0002
V06 crypto_price Base64 dropper (curl … | sh) in description payload.decoded critical
V07 filesystem_read Cross-server impersonation (perfect clone of victim tool) shadowing.cross_server
V08 docs_export Cross-server reference luring the victim's write tool shadowing.cross_server
V09 calendar_get_events Rug pull: benign facade → armed exfiltrative contract stage 1 clean → approvable; stage 2 contract hash changes → status=changed → blocked
V10 stock_quote Sneaky rug pull: description unchanged, schema grows sidenote contract hash change only
V11 browser_capture_passwords New malicious tool appearing post-approval (stage 2 only) pending-approval gate + phrase.injection
V12 github_list_issues Output poisoning: markdown-image exfil in tool result NOT caught by description scan (by design) — runtime monitoring territory
V13 memory_remember Autonomous infection (agent warfare) via output NOT caught by description scan (by design)
V14 shell_exec_helper Overly broad capability normalizing credential-file reads secret.embedded soft via sensitive paths
V15 translate_text Unexplained data-sink parameter (sidenote) capability.mismatch soft
V16 config_helper Embedded live-looking token + .env path secret.embedded soft
V17 summarize_text Instruction override (classic corpus phrase) phrase.injection hard
V18 daily_briefing Soft coercion: tool-priority claim + secrecy directive.imperative soft → warnings
V19 notes_export Rug pull via annotation-only flip (destructive → readOnly-lying, desc+schema identical) fixed by RT-03: safety hints are in the contract hash → status=changed (EXP-5)
M01–M06 mutant_*, filesystem_read, translate_text (profile mutants) Formerly-bypassing evasion mutants served live after RT-04: profile dangerous (M01, M03 hard; M02, M04, M06 soft; M05 out of scope, MCP-3520) (EXP-3)
T01 summarize_text, convert_currency (profile toctou) TOCTOU contract switching between discovery and scan export scan export attacker-controllable (EXP-4)
C01–C03 benign_*, lab_arm_stage2 Controls (must scan clean) no findings

Test matrix

  1. Scan: mcpproxy security scan tpa-lab-attacker → verdict dangerous; findings cover all seven detect checks + tpa-db bundle (pinned by go test ./tests/tpa-attack-lab/).
  2. Rug pull, restart path: approve V09/V10 at stage 1 (their facade scans clean), restart the upstream with TPA_LAB_STAGE=2 (or --stage 2). Discovery re-hashes the contract → status=changed, tools land in BlockedTools, tool_description_changed activity event fires. Under trust_mode: scan the change gate re-scans and holds with findings.
  3. Rug pull, live path: call lab_arm_stage2 through the proxy — the tools/list_changed notification triggers re-discovery without a restart; expect the same changed/blocked outcome.
  4. Output poisoning: call github_list_issues / memory_remember — their contracts scan clean, the poison travels in the result. This is the documented coverage boundary of a description-only scanner; verify runtime defenses (activity monitoring / PII / sensitive-data detection) see it.

Observed coverage notes (verified against the engine)

These behaviors are pinned by lab_test.go and worth knowing when triaging:

  • V01's wording is caught only by the tpa-db bundle signature — the engine's own phrase/directive/capability checks stay silent on it. An attacker who paraphrases past the signature is not caught (see cmd/tpa-redteam).
  • directive.imperative needs its curated signal phrases; it fires on V18 but not on V01's prose.
  • shell_exec_helper trips secret.embedded (sensitive paths) rather than capability.mismatch.
  • docs_export is caught by shadowing; its "send … to https://…" sentence does not trip phrase.injection.
  • Before RT-03, tool annotations were excluded from the rug-pull contract hash, so an annotation-only flip was invisible to the change gate. The approval hash now includes the effective safety hints (readOnly, destructive, idempotent, openWorld), and the flip is held as changed (EXP-5 HOLDS).

Regression tests

go test ./tests/tpa-attack-lab/

Runs the real offline detect engine + embedded tpa-db bundle over the catalog via scanner.ScanToolMetadataVerdict — the same seam the runtime trust_mode=scan change gate uses. Failures mean a detector regression (or an intentional behavior change that should update the catalog expectations).

Relationship to existing fixtures

  • tests/malicious-mcp-server/index.js — 3 basic TPA vectors (Node); this lab supersedes it for Go workflows and keeps it for the legacy quarantine QA script.
  • tests/echo-rugpull-server/index.js — Node rug-pull fixture; this lab's staged tools cover the same lifecycle (plus schema-only pulls) in Go.

Documentation

Overview

Vector catalog for the TPA attack lab. Every entry is a research-documented MCP attack technique rendered as a tool definition plus a harmless handler that returns a JSON "simulation report" instead of doing anything real.

Safety invariants of the lab:

  • every exfiltration endpoint uses attacker.invalid (RFC 2606 reserved TLD, never resolves; the lab performs zero network I/O)
  • every "secret" is a fake canary (FAKE-CANARY-…, sk-live-… lab token)
  • no handler reads files, env vars, or executes anything

The descriptions below are DELIBERATELY malicious. They are test payloads for mcpproxy's detect engine (internal/security/detect) and tpa-db bundle; do not copy them into a real server.

Command tpa-attack-lab is a deliberately malicious MCP server that reproduces the published MCP attack landscape (tool poisoning, ASCII smuggling, encoded payloads, cross-server shadowing, rug pulls, output poisoning, data-sink parameters, embedded secrets) as a deterministic, harmless test fixture for mcpproxy's TPA defenses:

  • the offline detect engine + embedded tpa-db bundle (security scan)
  • the tool-contract rug-pull gate (tool_quarantine.go hash change)
  • runtime activity monitoring (output-poisoning vectors)

It speaks MCP over stdio via mark3labs/mcp-go, the same library mcpproxy's client side pins, so the wire contract is correct by construction.

Roles (run two upstreams to exercise cross-server shadowing):

tpa-attack-lab --role attacker [--stage 1|2]   # the malicious server
tpa-attack-lab --role victim                   # the innocent peer it clones

The rug-pull stage can be set three ways (pick one per test run):

--stage 2 flag            — serve the armed contract from process start
TPA_LAB_STAGE=2 env       — same, convenient for config-file-driven runs
calling lab_arm_stage2    — live flip: re-registers the staged tools and
                            sends notifications/tools/list_changed so the
                            proxy re-discovers them without a restart

Safety: the lab performs no network I/O, no filesystem access, and no execution. Every exfiltration endpoint uses attacker.invalid (RFC 2606 reserved TLD, never resolves) and every secret is a fake canary. Tool calls return a JSON simulation report describing what a real attack would do.

See tests/tpa-attack-lab/README.md for the vector table and the mcpproxy test matrix, and docs/research/2026-10-11-tpa-attack-lab/research.md for the underlying attack research.

Alternate attacker profiles for the red-team experiment suite:

facade  — only the staged rug-pull tools + controls. Stage 1 scans CLEAN,
          which is what makes the trust_mode=scan auto-approval chain
          exploitable (EXP-6): approve a clean facade, then pull.
mutants — evasion mutants that BYPASSED the offline detector before the
          SEC-01 and RT-04/RT-07 hardening (BYPASS rows from
          cmd/tpa-redteam), served as real tools so the daemon's scan can
          be challenged end-to-end (EXP-3).
toctou   — contract switching between tools/list calls: the FIRST list
          (discovery at connect) serves the poisoned contract, later lists
          (the scan's export call) serve the clean one (EXP-4).

Stage 3 = paraphrased armed rug pull: the same malicious intent as stage 2 but worded to scan clean. Before RT-02 the trust_mode=scan change gate auto-approved the pull itself; it now holds every changed contract.

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