Documentation
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Index ¶
- Constants
- Variables
- func AssertMinDelayWithinCap(newMinDelaySeconds uint64) error
- func ExtractTransactionCall(output interface{}, operationID string) (sui_ops.TransactionCall, error)
- func FindCurserCapInFastRegistry(ctx context.Context, suiClient client.SuiPTBClient, ...) (string, error)
- func FindCurserCapObjectIDFromTx(ctx context.Context, suiClient client.SuiPTBClient, txDigest string) (string, error)
- func GenerateProposal(ctx context.Context, input GenerateProposalInput) (*mcms.TimelockProposal, error)
- func ResolveCurserCapObjectID(ctx context.Context, suiClient client.SuiPTBClient, txDigest string, ...) (string, error)
- func TransactionCallToMCMSTransaction(call sui_ops.TransactionCall) (types.Transaction, error)
- func TransactionLatestPackageID(tx types.Transaction) (string, error)
- type GenerateProposalInput
- type TimelockConfig
Constants ¶
const MaxTimelockScheduleDelay = 30 * 24 * time.Hour
MaxTimelockScheduleDelay caps every timelock delay value produced by tooling in this package. It applies in two places:
- The per-op scheduling delay carried in a Schedule proposal (TimelockConfig.MinDelay), enforced by TimelockConfig.Validate.
- The new_min_delay payload of any mcms::mcms_timelock_update_min_delay batch entry, enforced by assertUpdateMinDelayWithinCap in op_proposal_generate.
The Move source has no upper bound on either value. This cap is the deploy-side belt against the compound F8 finding: values large enough to trip the u64 overflow in `get_timestamp_seconds(clock) + delay` (in timelock_schedule), or to make min_delay > any u64 the schedule cap would allow, permanently brick the timelock.
Variables ¶
var DefaultTimelockExpirationInHours = 72
Functions ¶
func AssertMinDelayWithinCap ¶
AssertMinDelayWithinCap rejects any candidate on-chain min_delay value above MaxTimelockScheduleDelay. It is the single source of truth for the numeric bound so both the preventative payload check (in op_proposal_generate.assertUpdateMinDelayWithinCap) and the defensive state-read check (in op_set_config, Interpretation B) share the same definition of "too large". See finding F8 in findings-deduped.md.
func ExtractTransactionCall ¶
func ExtractTransactionCall(output interface{}, operationID string) (sui_ops.TransactionCall, error)
func FindCurserCapInFastRegistry ¶
func FindCurserCapInFastRegistry( ctx context.Context, suiClient client.SuiPTBClient, fastRegistryObjectID string, ccipPackageID string, ) (string, error)
FindCurserCapInFastRegistry reads the CurserCap object ID from the fast MCMS Registry bag.
func FindCurserCapObjectIDFromTx ¶
func FindCurserCapObjectIDFromTx(ctx context.Context, suiClient client.SuiPTBClient, txDigest string) (string, error)
FindCurserCapObjectIDFromTx extracts the minted CurserCap object ID from transaction effects.
func GenerateProposal ¶
func GenerateProposal(ctx context.Context, input GenerateProposalInput) (*mcms.TimelockProposal, error)
func ResolveCurserCapObjectID ¶
func ResolveCurserCapObjectID( ctx context.Context, suiClient client.SuiPTBClient, txDigest string, fastRegistryObjectID string, ccipPackageID string, ) (string, error)
ResolveCurserCapObjectID returns the CurserCap registered in the fast MCMS Registry. mint_and_register_curser_cap stores the cap in the registry bag, so it may not appear as a top-level created object in transaction effects.
func TransactionCallToMCMSTransaction ¶
func TransactionCallToMCMSTransaction(call sui_ops.TransactionCall) (types.Transaction, error)
TransactionCallToMCMSTransaction converts an encoded Sui op call into an MCMS transaction. When call.LatestPackageID is set, it is propagated for upgraded-package PTB routing.
func TransactionLatestPackageID ¶
func TransactionLatestPackageID(tx types.Transaction) (string, error)
TransactionLatestPackageID returns the optional upgraded package ID stored on an MCMS transaction.
Types ¶
type GenerateProposalInput ¶
type GenerateProposalInput struct {
ChainSelector uint64
Client cslclient.BindingsClient
MCMSPackageID string
MCMSStateObjID string
AccountObjID string
RegistryObjID string
TimelockObjID string
DeployerStateObjID string
Description string
BatchOp types.BatchOperation
TimelockConfig TimelockConfig
}
type TimelockConfig ¶
type TimelockConfig struct {
MCMSAction types.TimelockAction `json:"mcmsAction"`
MinDelay time.Duration `json:"minDelay"` // delay for timelock worker to execute the transfers.
OverrideRoot bool `json:"overrideRoot"` // if true, override the previous root with the new one.
}
TimelockConfig is based on chainlink/deployment proposal utils
func (TimelockConfig) Validate ¶
func (c TimelockConfig) Validate() error
Validate rejects configurations that would produce a proposal the Sui MCMS timelock cannot safely execute. Currently enforces the F8 scheduling-delay ceiling; a negative delay is also rejected since time.Duration is signed and would silently underflow when converted to u64 seconds on chain.
Source Files